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Cyberwarfare, military activities in cyberspace conducted by a state against
another state and intended to disrupt or destroy computing or communica­
tion systems or data, is a recent addition to the warfaring arsenal. The in­
ternational laws of armed conflict set out an obligation for states at war to
protect civilians from the effects of the conflict. As societies continue to ex­
pand their activities in the cyber realm, the risk of cyberwarfare negatively
affecting the civilian population increases. The international community,
recognizing this risk, is engaged in a political dance trying to identify the
constraints that international law already places on cyberwarfare while stak­
ing out ground to preserve its effectiveness as a means of influencing other
states’ policies. This dissertation project addresses some of the problems
posed by the use of computing and network technology as weapons and tar­
gets in the context of international armed conflict. It brings together mate­
rial drawn from computing technology, military handbooks, policy research,
international standards for records preservation, non­government organiza­
tions, international humanitarian law, international human rights law, the
international laws of armed conflict, and real­world examples to reveal the
complexity and nuances of using operations in cyberspace to produce ef­
fects in meatspace, the physical world of humans, buildings, equipment, and
artefacts.
First, I argue that since there is no significant difference between using
cyber means of war and conventional means of war, it is appropriate to
treat developments in cyberwarfare under the existing international laws of
armed conflict. Then I introduce the Tallinn Manual, a handbook on the in­
ternational law applicable to cyber operations, and the events that led to
its development. I examine how well the Tallinn Manual documents the pro­
tections, prohibitions, and permissions extended under the laws of armed
conflict, concluding that it is a faithful interpretation of international law.
The application of international law to warfare is always messy and im­
precise. Its application to cyberwarfare is no different. This does not mean
that the constraints of international law are without value or purpose. On
the assumption that no state wants to start an international armed conflict,
but is prepared to respond to uses of force, I apply some of the principles
expressed in the Tallinn Manual to establish qualitative assessments of the
severity of initial aggressive cyberoperations against a state, classifying them
v
as moderate or flagrant attacks depending on the harm they produced. This
helps the target state determine whether there is just cause for a use of force,
either cyber or conventional, in response, and the constraints that apply to
any response that may be permissible under international law.
International law also affords protections for human rights, both in peace­
time and during times of conflict. I argue that cyberwarfare exposes more
civilian objects, including objects of cultural significance and records needed
to safeguard human rights, to harm through both conventional and cyber at­
tacks. If human rights are to be protected, the records (digital or otherwise)
that serve as evidence in support of rights claims must be protected as well.
I conclude that international law already sets out the obligation for these
protections, but the interpretation of international law must make explicit
the expectation that all parties in an armed conflict will make efforts to iden­
tify and preserve these objects for the well­being of persons in a post­conflict
society.
Finally, I demonstrate the breadth and applicability of further work in
this area. I point out some other problems that branch off from this partic­
ular project: the separation of information content from its representation
in different media, human rights in the cyber domain, the use of comput­
ing and communication technology to produce social or economic disrup­
tion, the status of privately­owned satellites under the multiple international
treaties and conventions during times of armed conflict, and the assignment
of peacetime responsibility for safeguarding data essential for the protection
and provision of human rights.
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1.1 Motivation for the project
In 2016 voter registration databases and email servers in the United States
of America had their sensitive data stolen by Russian actors hoping to sow
doubt about the integrity of that year’s elections.1 In 2015 two vehicle secu­
rity researchers took control of a reporter’s JeepCherokee, using amobile In­
ternet connection to disable the accelerator and brakes while the vehicle was
on the road.2 Utility companies have faced Internet­based attacks against
their control systems, at least one of which caused a far­reaching electrical
power outage.3 While networked, computer­enabled technology provides
many benefits for industry, business, society, and individuals, and even re­
duces some kinds of risks, these three examples show that the benefits come
with a different set of risks. Some of those risks can result in trivial incon­
veniences, but the range of potential harm extends as far as the widespread
loss of human life. This potential for wide­ranging harm makes these kinds
of network­connected control systems and data servers attractive targets for
1Monique Garcia and Patrick M. O’Connell, “Illinois Elections Board ‘Very Likely’
Named in Mueller Indictment of Russian Hackers, Officials Say,” Chicago Tribune, July 13,
2018, accessed February 25, 2019, https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politi
cs/ct-met-illinois-elections-board-russia-indictment-20180713-story.html.
2Andy Greenberg, “Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—with Me in It,”
Wired, July 21, 2015, accessed January 11, 2018, https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-
remotely-kill-jeep-highway/.
3Ellen Nakashima and Steven Mufson, “Hackers Have Attacked Foreign Utilities, CIA
Analyst Says,” Washington Post, January 19, 2008, A4.
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interfering with the well­being of large numbers of people, particularly in
the context of international tensions, conflicts, and wars.
It is no surprise that computing and network technology have become
part of the military toolkit. The methods of waging war are continually
evolving with the development of new technologies. Aircraft provided new
abilities for reconnaissance and attacks, andmade the skies a newbattlespace.
Nuclear weapons brought the possibility of bringing a nation to its knees—
or obliterating its population entirely—with a small number of bombs. Com­
puting and data systems are still newer warfaring technologies. These sys­
tems and their associated networks not only provide support for conven­
tional military operations, but they can be legitimate military targets in their
own right, and their vulnerability to data­ and network­based attacks makes
them particularly attractive. The effects of a well­targeted network attack
can be extensive without incurring the material and human cost of a more
conventional attack.4 Systems and data or code that target other computing
systems have become weapons in the new context of what has been called
cyberspace, and war waged by or against such systems has been dubbed cyber­
warfare.
But the practices of war are not unrestrained. Even though war inten­
tionally breaches “the rules of law and morality applicable in peace­time—
applicable to ordinary life,” and that most of these breaches are broadly tol­
erated during (and only during) times of war, there is still some expectation
that the extent of these breaches would be limited by some humane stan­
dard.5 International humanitarian law, and in particular the international
laws of armed conflict, are intended to serve this purpose.6 As Henry Shue
4Committee on Offensive Information Warfare, Computer Science and Telecommuni­
cations Board, and National Research Council [USA], Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Re­
garding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities, ed. William A. Owens, Kenneth W.
Dam, and Herbert S. Lin (Washington, DC:The National Academies Press, 2009), 27, http:
//www.nap.edu/catalog/12651/technology-policy-law-and-ethics-regarding-us-
acquisition-and-use-of-cyberattack-capabilities (hereafter cited as Owens report).
5Henry Shue, “Laws ofWar,” chap. 25 inThePhilosophy of International Law, ed. Samantha
Besson and John Tasioulas (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010), 515.
6The terms international humanitarian law and international laws of armed conflict are often
used interchangeably. However, international humanitarian law is intended to apply to
all conflicts, while the international laws of armed conflict only apply to conflicts between
states. Manfred Nowak, “Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment,” chap. 16 inTheOxfordHandbook of International Law in Armed Conflict, ed. Andrew
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puts it,
[t]he goal is to make war a rule­governed practice, with rules
that limit its violations and its evils. It is not the purpose of
these rules to end the practice [of war], or to maintain it. The
practice is simply presupposed . . .
. . .The purpose of the laws of war is to constrain the “shit” when
the “shit” happens: when armies are assaulting and attacking,
the laws of war specify firm limits.7
The international laws of armed conflict constrain how states can wage
war against each other and impose imprecise limits on the harm that can
lawfully be done to civilian persons, infrastructure, and objects in the con­
text of an international armed conflict. These laws are expressed in various
treaties, conventions, and protocols, and these instruments have been ex­
tended, amended, or created as means and methods of war develop. For
example, the Geneva Conventions of 19068 and 19299 were superseded by
the Geneva Conventions of 1949,10 which were themselves extended by ad­
Clapham et al. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014), 407.
7Shue, “Laws of War,” 515–6.
8International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, Geneva, July 6, 1906,
https://ihl- databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/
OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/C64C3E521F5CC28FC12563CD002D6737/FULLTEXT/
IHL-GC-1906-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as Geneva Convention (1906)).
9International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, Geneva, July 27, 1929,
accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl- databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/
xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/09DFB7A98E19533AC125
63CD002D6997/FULLTEXT/IHL-GC-1929-1-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as Geneva Convention
(Wounded and Sick, 1929)); International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, July 27, 1929, accessed January 3,
2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/
OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/0BDEDDD046FDEBA9C12563CD002D69B1/FULLTEXT/
IHL-GC-1929-2-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as Geneva Convention (Prisoners of War, 1929)).
10International Committee of the RedCross ﹙ICRC﹚, GenevaConventions I–IV, August 12,
1949 (hereafter cited as GC I–IV (1949)).
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ditional protocols in 197711 and 2005.12 Thefirst of these additional protocols
incorporated specific protections for medical aircraft and stranded or inca­
pacitated air crew who are no longer able to fight, and prohibited the inten­
tional targeting of civilians in aerial attacks.13 The second sets out the protec­
tions civilians and certain cultural objects have in cases of non­international
conflict between organized armed groups within the territory of a state party
to the protocol.14 Further, AP I explicitly requires states party to the proto­
col to assess the permissibility, according to applicable international law, of
using new means of warfare as they are developed.15 This declaration means
that it is both important and relevant to examine how international law con­
trols (in ways analogous to older mans of war) the use of these new devel­
opments in computing, networking, and software technology. Implicit in
that, but perhaps more readily overlooked, is the importance of exploring
how the interpretation of international law may need further development
or explication to address the kinds of harm those new weapons can produce.
This dissertation project does both with respect to cyberwarfare.
11International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, accessed January 3, 2021,
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/Open
Attachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/D9E6B6264D7723C3C12563CD002D6CE4/FULLTEXT/AP-I-
EN.pdf (hereafter cited as AP I); International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non­International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Geneva, June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS
609, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/
xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/AA0C5BCBAB5C4A85C1256
3CD002D6D09/FULLTEXT/AP-II-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as AP II).
12International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive
Emblem (Protocol III), Geneva, December 8, 2005, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/8BC1504B556D2F80C125710F002F4B28/FULLTEXT/AP-III-EN.pdf
(hereafter cited as AP III).
13AP I, Art. 8, 24–31, 49, 57.
14AP II, Art. 1.
15AP I, Art. 36.
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1.2 Goals and structure of the project
International laws of armed conflict apply to cyberwarfare
The first goal of the project is to argue, largely by analogy and equivalence,
that there is not enough of a difference between cyberwarfare and conven­
tional warfare to exempt cyberwarfare from the international laws of armed
conflict. I develop this claim in Chapter 2 by responding to conjectures
and problems presented by Randall Dipert in 2010.16 Having established
that these laws govern cyberwarfare, the rest of the project—examining how
these laws can be applied to cyberwarfare—is justified. Along the way, I of­
fer a description of what is meant by cyberwarfare and other related terms in
the context of international humanitarian law and the international laws of
armed conflict.
The Tallinn Manual represents international law fairly
In 2013 the first edition of the Tallinn Manual17 was released. It has its ori­
gins in the aftermath of a crippling cyberattack made by Russian supporters
against Estonia in 2007.18 Its primary goal is to “bring[] some degree of clar­
ity to the complex legal issues surrounding cyberoperations, with particular
attention paid to those involving the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello,”19 the
two distinct legal contexts of the international laws of armed conflict. A re­
vised edition followed in 2017 to “expand the Manual’s scope to include the
public international law governing cyber operations during peacetime.”20
16Randall R. Dipert, “The Ethics of Cyberwarfare,” Journal of Military Ethics 9, no. 4 (De­
cember 16, 2010): 384–410, https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2010.536404.
17Michael N. Schmitt, ed., Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber War­
fare: Prepared by the International Group of Experts at the Invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber
Defence Centre of Excellence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), accessed
September 18, 2015, http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/356296245.pdf
(hereafter cited as Tallinn 1.0).
18Joshua Davis, “Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe,” Wired, Au­
gust 21, 2007, accessed January 14, 2021, https://www.wired.com/2007/08/ff-estonia.
19Tallinn 1.0, 3–4.
20Michael N. Schmitt and Liis Vihul, eds., TallinnManual 2.0 on the International Law Appli­
cable to Cyber Operations: Prepared by the International Group of Experts at the Invitation of the NATO
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2017), 1 (hereafter cited as Tallinn 2.0).
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This revision includes expanded rules on state sovereignty, jurisdiction, con­
trol, and responsibility over cyberspace and provides updated commentary
on some of the other rules set out in the earlier edition. Chapter 3 sets out
the context andmotivation for the development of the TallinnManual, which
follows the model of earlier manuals concerning land, sea, and air warfare.
As a guide to understanding how both jus ad bellum and jus in bello apply
to cyberwarfare, the TallinnManual invites comparison against the principles
of just­war theory (from which the two phrases come) as well as the interna­
tional laws of armed conflict. The international laws of armed conflict set
out fewer jus ad bellum principles than just­war theory does for plausible rea­
sons concerning the discernibility of intention and the equal sovereignty of
states regardless of any imbalance in warfaring ability, andmakes no specific
reference to jus post bellum. Since the TallinnManual is meant to present inter­
national law and not the whole of just­war theory, it sets out rules that corre­
spond only to the just­war principles upheld by international law. Chapter 4
applies the Tallinn Manual’s rules and commentary to different real and hy­
pothetical examples, making reference to important sources of international
law. I conclude that the TallinnManual, while incomplete with respect to just­
war theory as a whole, is as faithful in its interpretation of jus in bello as manu­
als for other domains of warfare are, and breaks new ground in its extended
discussion of just­cause criteria as part of jus ad bellum. It is, therefore, a
useful and reliable distillation and exposition for both decision­makers and
researchers21 concerned with cyber operations in the international context.
The Tallinn Manual reveals the difficulty of assessing just cause
The Tallinn Manual presumes that no state actor desires to begin an interna­
tional armed conflict. It is concerned with what happens after the first hos­
tile action has been made against a state, either as a response to that action
(jus ad bellum) or in the continuation of such a conflict (jus in bello). A primary
concern with respect to jus ad bellum is to determine when the harm caused by
an aggressive cyberoperation may provide just cause for (but not necessarily
require) responding with a forceful act made in self­defence against another
state; that is, when it reaches the level of an actionable “use of force”22 under
21Tallinn 2.0, 2.
22United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, October 24, 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, Art. 2(4),
accessed October 6, 2015, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html (hereafter
6
the terms of the United Nations Charter.
The Tallinn Manual sets out eight criteria to consider,23 not as a checklist,
but as considerations that, when they give rise to conflicting guidance, must
all be addressedwhen determiningwhether just cause for a forceful response
exists. I look closely at four of these in Chapter 5: first, the measurability of
effects and the severity of harm produced by an initial aggressive cyberop­
eration, and then the temporal immediacy and causal directness of those ef­
fects. I show that causal directness and temporal immediacy are necessarily
separate considerations that, taken individually, can provide differing guid­
ance with respect to having just cause for responding to a cyberattack with a
use of force. I also show that aggressive cyberoperations can result in some
harms that are not readily comparable to those produced by conventional
attacks, but go beyond the level of an inconvenience. The guidance given
in the Tallinn Manual is of limited value in those intermediate cases. To ad­
dress these problems I present, then expand, a conceptual temporal schema
first set out byWilliamOwens and others24 for analyzing the emergence and
severity of any harm produced by an aggressive cyberoperation, and intro­
duce means of classifying cyberattacks and responses in terms of their actual
or intended effects, demonstrating the value of those frameworks through
examples.
International law mandates greater protections for data objects
The most significant goal of this project is to argue that states already have
obligations to protect data relevant to the safeguarding of human rights. The
international laws of armed conflict, international humanitarian law, and
international human rights law all set out obligations for parties involved
in armed conflict. Human rights law is the one that applies in all contexts.
International humanitarian law applies to all armed conflict (and so to non­
state actors), while the international laws of armed conflict apply only to
conflicts between states.25 Some of those obligations require positive actions
cited as UN Charter).
23Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 9.
24Owens report, 89–91.
25Nowak, “Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punish­
ment,” 407.
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to safeguard human rights, and in particular, the rights to an identity and
to not be arbitrarily deprived of life, liberty, or security of the person.26
One positive step toward safeguarding these rights is to honour the obli­
gation to record every child’s birth.27 Preserving rights requires preserving
the record of the person’s existence, which suggests that certain civil records
must be protected from harm during armed conflict, whether internal or in­
ternational. This has always been a problem, since the storage of multiple
copies of paper records is inefficient, but paper documents are also read­
ily destroyed. Storing these records in digital form requiring network ac­
cess to data servers makes data redundancy less expensive, but also leaves
the records susceptible to a cyberattack, not just a physical attack. Chap­
ter 6 argues that the emergence of cyberwarfare draws attention to both the
vulnerability and importance of that information, and gives support to the
opinion of some experts in international law that digital representations of
civil records and cultural objects enjoy such protection.
This gap in protection comes into focus through studying the human
rights violations that took place in the Kosovo conflict of 1998–99. These vi­
olations came through the destruction of civil records, including identity
documents and property records. Other examples demonstrate how the
loss of these kinds of records affect not only the lives of persons but also
the cultural heritage of humanity. I conclude that the Tallinn Manual un­
derstates the strength of the argument that these obligations already exist
and are not new impositions on states party to the relevant human rights
treaties. While international law already mandates this kind of protected
data­keeping, more work must go into actually doing it.
26United Nations General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Decem­
ber 10, 1948, A/RES/217﹙III﹚, Art. 3, accessed January 5, 2021, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/
UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf (hereafter cited as Universal Declaration);
United Nations General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
December 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171, Art. 6, 9, accessed February 12, 2019, https://treaties.
un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume- 999- i- 14668- english.pdf
(hereafter cited as ICCPR).
27United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Novem­
ber 20, 1989, 1577 UNTS 3, Art. 7, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.
org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.
nsf/B92BDC3CAE1B142DC12563CD002D6E8C/FULLTEXT/IHL-86-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as
Rights of the Child).
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Important work in this area remains
The final chapter demonstrates the relevance of this work in larger contexts
opened up by the development of computing and communications technol­
ogy. Specific topics for further study include the need to maintain a concep­
tual separation of the information content of data from the transportation,
storage, and processing systems of cyberspace; providing different levels
of protection to data based on the purpose the data serves; the exercise of
human rights in cyberspace; how state sovereignty can be violated by even
moderate cyberattacks; the responsibility of states for non­state actors; and
cyberspace in outer space. All of these are connected to cyberoperations,
human rights, and the preservation of international peace.
The general public can grasp the importance of the work
Concerns such as these need to be accessible to the general public. Thus one
of the aims of this research project (and not just the dissertation) is to offer
to the general public my justification for doing this work.
Human rights matter for everyone. The way I chose to get that point
across in a public forum was to show how difficult it can be to defend your
own rights if there is no documentation to support them. Appendix B con­
tains the main finding of Chapter 6 distilled down to a three­minute mono­





Cyberwarfare: the new threat on
the block
2.1 The desire to control cyberwarfare
Sometimes the initial response to a new means of warfare is along the line
of “This changes everything!” This reaction greeted the use of nuclear and
chemical weapons, and there are somewho believe the same about cyberwar­
fare. It is tempting to conclude that the international laws of armed conflict
are not relevant to this new reality of war. International law is generally pro­
hibitive, not permissive, so actions that may cause harm to another state but
are not explicitly proscribed by treaty, law, or convention are presumptively
lawful.1 Thus any act of cyberagression is permissible, and no international
law governs cyberwar. One presentation of this view has been articulated
by Randall Dipert.2 Dipert develops an argument to justify the claim that
1Permanent Court of International Justice ﹙PCIJ﹚,TheCase of the SSLotus (France v. Turkey),
1927 PCIJ (ser. A) 10, September 7, 1927, ¶¶44–7, accessed November 24, 2020, http://www.
worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1927.09.07_lotus.htm (hereafter cited as Lotus),
cited in Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 9(h).
2Dipert, “The Ethics of Cyberwarfare.” Further developments have shown that the in­
ternational community has not bought into the argument Dipert presents, and Dipert may
no longer be a defender of this view. Even so, the argument Dipert offers is an important
one, for the reasoning is plausible, and it raises important questions about the applicability
of international law to cyberwarfare. Responding to the argument requires a careful anal­
ysis of warfare in general, cyberwarfare in particular, and the international laws of armed
conflict.
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“most legal frameworks do not clearly apply to many instances of cyberwar­
fare, and cyberwarfare involves aspects of damage or harm that are typically
not addressed by law,”3 including the international laws of armed conflict.
With this statement, Dipert kickstarts the dialogue to ascertain the extent to
which existing international law may apply to cyberwarfare—if it does at all.
The number of proposals for some kind of international treaty to govern
the use of cyberspace lends a small degree of indirect support to this view.
If international law does not apply, then parties negotiating in good faith
might negotiate a new treaty—and new international law (at least among
parties)—that will apply. Yet only a few limited treaties have been negoti­
ated concerning cyberspace, and only two were concluded before Dipert’s
article appeared. The first is the 2001 Budapest Convention onCybercrime.4
However, that treaty does not address cyberwarfare in the context of interna­
tional armed conflict, only the treatment of criminal activity by non­state
actors.5 The second is the 2009 agreement among Russia, China, Kaza­
khstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan,6 but this agreement goes
beyond cyberspace to any means of conveying information and to the con­
trol of information itself (“the global information space”7) regardless of the
medium.8 Thus it is not strictly a cyberspace treaty. Subsequent attempts
to arrive at a comprehensive treaty concerning either cyberspace as a bat­
tlespace (analogous to the Outer Space Treaty9) or cyberoperations as a
3Dipert, “The Ethics of Cyberwarfare,” 395.
4Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, November 23, 2001, ETS 185, accessed
November 24, 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/
libe/dv/7_conv_budapest_/7_conv_budapest_en.pdf.
5Rex Hughes, “A Treaty for Cyberspace,” International Affairs 86, no. 2 (March 2010):
524n5, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00894.x.
6Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Agreement between the Governments of the
Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Cooperation in the Field of
International Information Security, June 16, 2009, unofficial translation, accessed Novem­
ber 25, 2020, http://media.npr.org/assets/news/2010/09/23/cyber_treaty.pdf
(hereafter cited as Shanghai Cooperation Agreement); Kristen E. Eichensehr, “Interna­
tional Agreements—and Disagreements—on Cybersecurity,” Just Security, October 24, 2014,
accessed November 23, 2020, https://www.justsecurity.org/16706/international-
agreements-and-disagreements-on-cybersecurity/.
7Shanghai Cooperation Agreement, preamble.
8Shanghai Cooperation Agreement, Annex 2, ¶5.
9United Nations, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explo­
ration andUse of Outer Space, including theMoon andOther Celestial Bodies, January 27,
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means of war (analogous to the Chemical Weapons Convention10) have also
failed, most recently during negotiations at the United Nations in 2017.11
Even so, these attempts do not establish the claim that international law
does not apply to cyberwar, only that as yet there is no treaty or convention
explicitly governing cyberwar.
I discern two key points that directly support the argument Dipert offers:
the novelty and nature of cyberweapons. In response, I argue that neither
the novelty of cyberwarfare nor the lack of explicit mention of cyberwarfare
in existing international law require a wholesale revision of the international
laws of armed conflict. The limitations on methods and means of warfare12
and the anticipation of new kinds of weapons set out in the 1977 Additional
Protocols13—long after the development of nuclear and chemical weapons—
suggest this. I will also show that these limitations have support in earlier
statements of international law. I further argue that there is no relevantly
significant difference between cyberwarfare and conventional warfare, so in­
ternational law applies to cyberwarfare in an analogous way to other means
of warfare. If my argument in this chapter succeeds, then it follows that
cyber means of war can not only be used lawfully, but also that existing
international law is adequate to address in general terms the permissibility
and limitations of cyberwarfare. I do this by responding to each of the main
questions Dipert raises about cyberwarfare.
1967, 610 UNTS 205, accessed November 28, 2019, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/
ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html (hereafter cited as Outer Space
Treaty).
10United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Paris, January 13,
1993, 1974 UNTS 45, accessed January 3, 2021, https : / / ihl - databases . icrc . org /
applic / ihl / ihl . nsf / xsp / .ibmmodres / domino / OpenAttachment / applic / ihl / ihl .
nsf / 9D3CCA7B40638EF5C12563F6005F63C5 / FULLTEXT / IHL - 87 - EN . pdf (hereafter cited
as Chemical Weapons Convention); Ido Kilovaty and Itamar Mann, “Towards a Cyber­
Security Treaty,” Just Security, August 3, 2016, accessed November 23, 2020, https://www.
justsecurity.org/32268/cyber-security-treaty/.
11Michael Schmitt and Liis Vihul, “International Cyberlaw Politicized: UN GGE’s Failure
to Advance Cyber Norms,” Just Security, June 30, 2017, accessed November 23, 2020, https:
//www.justsecurity.org/42768/international-cyber-law-politicized-gges-failure
-advance-cyber-norms/.
12AP I, Art. 35.
13AP II, Art. 36.
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2.2 Bounding cyberwarfare
The word cyberattack has become commonplace in news headlines, and the
corresponding articles often place responsibility on an international group
of hackers (in the sense of persons interfering with systems rather than seek­
ing a deep understanding of them) or agents of another state’s government.
These attacks are often used to copy sensitive information and use it for a
harmful purpose. While these acts do some harm to the affected parties,
there are some who believe that these kinds of aggressive cyberoperations
cannot be acts of war because their effects are either too small or too local­
ized to be a significant threat to the state from which the data were copied.14
But what if the effects of a cyberattack do cause significant physical harm?
What if the cyberattack is against a privately­owned civilian data centre? Are
those cyberattacks act of cyberwar? If so, what responses to those cyberat­
tacks might a state lawfully make?
There are several descriptions of what might fall under the concept of
cyberwarfare. Jeffrey Carr pithily describes cyberwarfare as “the art and sci­
ence of fighting without fighting; of defeating an opponent without spilling
their blood.”15 Carr’s description misses significant aspects of warfare. The
lack of bloodshed is not unique to cyberwarfare. Not all acts of war are in­
tended to kill or injure people, but to disrupt critical infrastructure such as
transportation, dams, and power generating stations. Further, cyberwarfare
is not inherently bloodless. Some aggressive cyberoperations—particularly
those that are designed to cause critical infrastructure such as hydroelectric
generating stations to fail—can produce human injuries and deaths in the
target state. Dipert’s analysis avoids Carr’s oversight. Dipert begins with
what he calls a cyberharm: a disruption of the normal functioning of some
system (“a person, a machine, software or an economy”16) brought about by
means of data itself or a data communication system. He also recognizes
there must be a measure of intent to inhibit some command or information
14International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, “International Humanitarian Law
and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts,” in 31st International Conference of the
RedCross andRedCrescent, doc. 31IC/11/5.1.2, report (Geneva, CH: International Committee of
the RedCross, November 28–December 1, 2011), 37, accessedNovember 27, 2020 (hereafter
cited as Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict (2011)).
15Jeffrey Carr, Inside Cyber Warfare, 2nd ed. (Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly Media, 2011), 7.
16Dipert, “The Ethics of Cyberwarfare,” 397.
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system from working as expected for the cyberharm to be considered a cy­
berattack. However, intent by itself is not sufficient to call these cyberattacks
acts of cyberwar. That requires the involvement of state­controlled political
or military agents.17 For the purposes of his argument, Dipert considers only
“cyberattacks (intentional cyberharms) that are instigated or controlled by
political institutions (or their military services) on other political organiza­
tions or military services.” If the belligerents are recognized states, and “the
attacks between political entities are sufficiently ‘widespread’ we might then
speak of a cyberwar.” But then he “stipulate[s] that war in its usual sense in­
volves the intentional use of deadly force on human beings,” concluding that
“[a] cyberwar might not then literally be a war in this stricter sense, unless
death or severe injury of human beings was the further intended result.”18
A current American military publication defines offensive cyberspace oper­
ations as “[c]yberspace operations intended to project power by the appli­
17Non­state parties such as corporations, activist groups, and criminal organizations do
not have authority to declare or initiate war in anything more than a figurative sense. UN
Charter, Art. 51; Michael N. Schmitt, “Cyber Operations in International Law: The Use of
Force, Collective Security, Self­Defense, and ArmedConflicts,” in Proceedings of aWorkshop on
Deterring Cyber Attacks: Informing Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy, ed. Committee
on Deterring Cyberattacks: Informing Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy
and National Research Council [USA] (Washington, DC: National Research Council [USA],
TheNational Academies Press, June 10–11, 2010), 171, http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12997/
proceedings-of-a-workshop-on-deterring-cyberattacks-informing-strategies-and
(hereafter cited as Cyber Operations in International Law). Cyberattacks conducted by
or against these parties are, with rare exceptions, governed by international and domestic
criminal law, not laws of armed conflict, and as such should be considered acts of cybercrime,
not cyberwar. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., “Perspectives for Cyberstrategists on Cyberlaw for Cy­
berwar,” chap. 13 in Conflict and Cooperation in Cyberspace: The Challenge to National Security, ed.
Panayotis A. Yannakogeorgos and Adam B. Lowther (Boca Raton, FL: Taylor & Francis,
2013), 214–15, https://doi.org/10.1201/b15253-17; Randall R. Dipert, “The Essential
Features of an Ontology for Cyberwarfare,” chap. 5 in Yannakogeorgos and Lowther, Con­
flict and Cooperation in Cyberspace: The Challenge to National Security, 35. This requirement does
not address acts of non­state terrorism, which are often treated as acts of war in political
rhetoric. However, terrorist groups are not recognized by the international community as
having the authority to declare war against a state. On this account, then, terrorism is an
international criminal matter. I do not intend to defend or affirm this stance. I only note
that despite the extensive harms caused by terrorist activity, international law excludes ter­
rorism from the discussion at hand.
18Dipert, “The Ethics of Cyberwarfare,” 398. Emphasis in original.
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cation of force in or through cyberspace.”19 This falls in line with Dipert’s
politically­motivated cyberattacks. However, not all applications of force
by cyberspace operations (cyberoperations) are acts of war.20 Dipert acknowl­
edges this, requiring that thresholds of scale (“sufficiently ‘widespread’ ”)
and intended effect (“death or severe injury of human beings”) bemet before
an aggressive cyberoperation can be called an act of war. Further, the inter­
national community’s understanding of an act of war is somewhat broader
than what Dipert stipulates. For example, the United Nations General As­
sembly has resolved that “[b]ombardment by the armed forces of a State
against the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State
against the territory of another State’’21 should be construed as an act of
aggression in United Nations Security Council deliberations. Nonetheless,
Dipert’s stipulation is useful for the purpose of argument, for if human in­
jury or death results, the threshold of being an aggressive action is clearly
met. I show the significance of these thresholds in Chapter 5.
The international laws of armed conflict cannot precisely define cyberwar­
fare because they do not define acts of war. The terms use of force and armed at­
tack, both of which help the international community determine what might
be considered acts of war, are themselves open­textured. Correctly deter­
mining what falls under each of them depends upon the quality of informa­
tion used to assess multiple imprecise criteria. Further, even though there is
no explicit mention of cyberwarfare in current international law, there are
guidelines and precedents to consider when determining what intentional
acts of international cyberharm could meet existing criteria for being de­
clared an armed attack. The TallinnManual,22 developed for the Cooperative
Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence ﹙CCDCOE﹚ located in Tallinn, Estonia,
presents some of these considerations. The Tallinn Manual also does not de­
19Department of Defense [USA], Joint Publication 1­02: Department of Defense Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms, 8 November 2010 (As Amended through 15 June 2015) (June 15, 2015),
174, accessed October 23, 2015, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.
20Cyber Operations in International Law, 163.
21United Nations General Assembly, “Definition of Aggression,” Resolution 3314 ﹙XXIX﹚,
December 14, 1974, Art. 3(b), accessed January 30, 2016, http://www.un.org/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3314(XXIX). The resolutions of the General Assembly do not
establish international law until the Security Council adopts them in a separate vote, but
they are indicative of the direction the supporters of the resolution believe international
law should go.
22Tallinn 1.0; now superseded by Tallinn 2.0.
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fine what an act of war is, so it, too, cannot define cyberwarfare. Instead, it
considers multiple imprecise, but principled, criteria to determine whether
a particular cyberoperation meets the thresholds of being a use of force and
an armed attack. Roughly, this requires that the effects of the cyberopera­
tion are at least equivalent to what would be caused by an armed attack con­
ducted by conventional means such as bombs, missiles, or troops. Given the
lack of a clear definition of cyberwarfare, and the standards by which an ag­
gressive act is judged to be an act of war, a robust but imprecise description
of cyberwarfare seems appropriate. For the purposes of this project, then, the
term cyberwarfare is constrained to describe military actions of states against
other states as a means of attaining political goals, where such actions target
or involve the disruption, degradation, or destruction of some computing
device, its programming, its data, or its communication systems by means
of an operation conducted in cyberspace, and where the effects of such ac­
tions rise to the level of harm equivalent to that of an armed attack, and/
or are conducted in the course of an ongoing international armed conflict.
This description accommodates most of Dipert’s analysis, but also acknowl­
edges the difficulty (if not impossibility) of establishing a one­size­fits­all set
of rules for calling a cyberattack an act of war. The open texture of this de­
scription is not a fatal flaw, but is a desirable characteristic shared with other
concepts in legal contexts: edge cases require careful, nuanced deliberation
to determine whether the concept reasonably applies.
2.3 Some terminology and concepts
The international laws of armed conflict have their own terms of art for
specific concepts. Four are particularly significant: necessity, proportionality,
means of warfare, and methods of warfare. The first two have their roots in just­
war theory; these terms are connected to the conditions required for a state
to enter a war lawfully (jus ad bellum, set out in Table 2.1) and the obliga­
tions imposed upon a state’s military forces in order to conduct that armed
conflict lawfully (jus in bello, set out in Table 2.2). Just­war theory and some
international laws (but not the international laws of armed conflict yet) are
evolving to incorporate the moral requirements to end a war in a way that
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Jus ad bellum conditionsa
just cause self­defence, protection of innocents from
aggression
right intentionb objective is to secure the just cause and nothing
more
public declaration citizens of declaring state and governments of
enemy states are informed of the declaration
appropriate authority declaration made in accordance with declaring
state’s constitution and/or legislation
last resort all other plausible means of resisting aggression
have failed
probability of successb engaging in war will not be a futile exercise
undertaken in exasperation or desperation
proportionality expected benefit to all parties supports the
anticipated universal cost borne by all parties
Table 2.1: Jus ad bellum conditions of just­war theory. All of these conditions must
be satisfied before an initial act of war is permissible under just­war theory.
a Summarized from Brian D. Orend, “War,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring
2016, ed. Edward N. Zalta (July 28, 2005), §2.1, accessed October 27, 2015, http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/war/.
b Not incorporated within the international laws of armed conflict.
re­establishes “minimally just societ[ies],”23 ideally with no further cause to
engage in an international armed conflict (jus post bellum, described in Ta­
ble 2.3). Some of these concepts will show up again in Chapters 4 and 6.
Necessity
Necessity is not a term that appears in the jus ad bellum or jus in bello principles
of just­war theory. Nonetheless, it is a term that shows up in the discussion
23Brian D. Orend, “War,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2016, ed. Edward
N. Zalta (July 28, 2005), §2.3, accessed October 27, 2015, http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/fall2008/entries/war/.
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Jus in bello obligationsa
no prohibited weapons in accordance with “public conscience”b and
international law
discrimination of combatants and military facilities from
civilians and purely civilian facilities
proportionality of degree of force employed to the effort required
for achieving the anticipated military objective
no means evil in them­
selves
precludes the use of indiscriminate,
dehumanizing, or treacherous activities
no reprisals against enemy states’ violations of these criteria
that violate these criteria themselves
benevolent quarantine for enemy personnel no longer actively engaged
in the conflict, such as prisoners of war
respect for the rights of the warring state’s own citizens
Table 2.2: Jus in bello obligations of just­war theory. The first five of these obliga­
tions are constraints on the use of force. For any use of force in an armed conflict to
be permissible, it must fall within the parameters established by these constraints.
The last two obligations preserve the rights of non­combatants.
a Summarized from Brian D. Orend, “War,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring
2016, ed. Edward N. Zalta (July 28, 2005), §2.2, accessed October 27, 2015, http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/war/.
b Hague Peace Conferences, Convention ﹙IV﹚ Respectting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, The Hague, October 18, 1907, preamble, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachm
ent/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/4D47F92DF3966A7EC12563CD002D6788/FULLTEXT/IHL-19-
EN.pdf (hereafter cited as HC IV (1907)).
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Jus post bellum requirementsa
proportionality negotiated settlement is reasonable and does not
impose excessive punishment on the defeated
party; analogous to proportionality in both jus ad
bellum and jus in bello
public proclamation informs civilians, combatants, allied states, and
the rest of the international community that the
armed conflict is ended; corresponds to public
declaration in jus ad bellum
vindication of rights secures the “basic rights whose violation”b served
as just cause for the conflict under jus ad bellum
discrimination of leaders, combatants, and civilians when
imposing punishment; analogous to
discrimination in jus in bello
just punishment of
leaders




for any war crimes and rights violations
committed, regardless of which side of the
conflict the combatant was on
restitution for harm done by defeated state, while leaving
the means “to begin its own reconstruction”;b
this may need to be symbolic
rehabilitation of institutions required to support a minimally
just society and a legitimate government
Table 2.3: Jus post bellum requirements of just­war theory. These emerging require­
ments are intended to ensure that the defeated states will establish minimally just
societies under legitimate governments, while leaving no need to resort to armed
conflict under jus ad bellum.
a Summarized from Brian D. Orend, “War,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring
2016, ed. Edward N. Zalta (July 28, 2005), §2.3, accessed October 27, 2015, http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/war/.
b Orend, “War,” §2.3.
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of what actions may be permissible under international law in response to
different scenarios. One particularly fraught instance of the term appears
to permit a state to absolve itself of responsibility for taking an action that
violates an international obligation by pleading necessity in situations where
the offence
(a) is the only way for a State to safeguard an essential interest
against a grave and imminent peril; and
(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State
or States toward which the obligation exists, or of the inter­
national community as a whole.24
However, there are elements of existing international law that preclude mak­
ing such a plea, and asMarco Sassòli notes, “international humanitarian law
is a law that wasmade for armed conflicts, which are by definition emergency
situations. It therefore explicitly excludes the defence claim of necessity, ex­
cept where explicitly stated otherwise in some of its rules.”25 Pleading self­
defence also preclude judgements of wrongfulness “if the act constitutes a
lawful measure of self­defence undertaken in conformity with the Charter of
the United Nations,”26 which is settled international law. For the purposes
of this project, then, necessity refers to its usage in the limited context of the
international laws of armed conflict.
In the jus ad bellum context of international law, necessity presumes that
there is a legitimate state authority to publicly declare a war for just cause.
24United Nations International Law Commission, “Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,” supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), ch. IV.E.1, Novem­
ber 2001, Art. 25(1), accessed December 11, 2020, https://legal.un.org/ilc/reports/
2001/english/chp4.pdf (hereafter cited as Responsibility of States). These articles are
not yet part of a convention or treaty, though many state and international organizations,
including courts, make reference to them as customary international law. United Nations,
“Tackling State Responsibility, Diplomatic Protection Drafts, Sixth Committee Delegates
Argue over Elaborating Texts into Conventions,” meetings coverage, Sixth Committee,
Seventy­Fourth Session, 13th & 14th Meetings ﹙AM & PM﹚, GA/L/3598, October 15, 2019,
accessed December 11, 2020, https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/gal3598.doc.htm.
25Marco Sassòli, “State Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian
Law,” Revue Internationale de la Croix Rouge 84, no. 846 (June 2002): 415–6, accessed Decem­
ber 11, 2020, https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/401_434_sassoli.pdf,
with further references.
26Responsibility of States, Art. 21.
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Making such a declaration further presumes that all other available means
for resolving the dispute have been exhausted. (International law acknowl­
edges the difficulty of judging right intention, and so does not incorporate
this just­war criterion. Nevertheless, starting a war certainly indicates that
state authorities believe they have, at the very least, plausible deniability
against charges of acting without a right intention.) Restricting the decla­
ration of war to appropriate state authorities and requiring the declaration
to be communicated to the enemy state or states limits the right to engage
in armed conflict to states, thereby excluding non­state organizations from
lawful participation in their own right. Moreover, only states (and not non­
state actors such asDaesh, Google, Alberta, or drugs) can be on the receiving
end of the declaration. The state authorities that have the right of declaring
war are determined by each state in accordance with its constitution and
other relevant legislation, provided that the government is recognized by
the international community. So­called failed states, that is, states lacking a
minimally functioning government, do not have an internal authority that
can declare war or receive a declaration of war on behalf of the state, and
so do not have a right to participate lawfully in an international armed con­
flict.27 With respect to just cause, the international laws of armed conflict
recognize only two that might support the necessity of declaring war: self­
27An ICRC preparatory document sets out the reasoning:
Under international law, a State is an entity that has a defined territory and
a permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that
engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such
entities.
The disintegration of State structures seems to occur when the third consti­
tutive element of statehood, a government in effective control, fades away.
[ . . . ]
A situation of this type . . . involves the implosion of national institutions,
authority, law and order, in short, the body politic as a whole. It also implies
the breakdown of a set of values on which the State’s legitimacy is based . . .
The State itself does not physically disappear, but gradually loses the capacity
to carry out the normal functions of government.
International Committee of theRedCross ﹙ICRC﹚, “ICRC,Disintegration of State Structures,”
How Does Law Protect in War? Online Casebook, 1998, §1, accessed December 15, 2020, https:
//casebook.icrc.org/case- study/icrc- disintegration- state- structures#part_
ii_2. A state’s functional disintegration does not absolve factions within the state of the
obligation to observe international humanitarian law.
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defence (as determined by the victim state, but also subject to a standard
of reasonableness)28 and whatever the United Nations Security Council de­
clares (presumably after reasoned deliberation).29
Within the jus in bello context of international law, necessity takes on a dif­
ferent sense, that of military necessity with respect to particular objectives.30
This sense of necessity has no corresponding concept in the jus in bello obliga­
tions of just­war theory. However, having established some claim that the
use of force has become permissible under jus ad bellum, any uses of force are
subject to the restrictions set out under jus in bello in order to respect “the
protection of the civilian population and civilian objects” and to prevent
“unnecessary suffering of combatants” as a result of any use of force.31 The
principle of proportionality is of particular importance here.
Proportionality
Proportionality is a feature of both the jus ad bellum conditions and the jus in
bello obligations, but with different senses within each context. With respect
to entering into an armed conflict, proportionality requires that the benefits
expected to accrue globally (and not just across all parties involved in the
conflict or an individual state) will be greater than the accumulated harms
inflicted globally (and not just upon all parties in the conflict or an individ­
ual state). As with necessity, this assessment is fraught. First, it is difficult
to assess all of the effects because of the human tendency to discount un­
foreseen or distant consequences. Second, the assessment is easily biased to­
ward the narrow interests of each individual state involved in the conflict.32
(The probability of success criterion of just­war theory is connected to this as­
sessment, since a brutally honest and comprehensive assessment resulting
in a non­positive total signals a low probability of achieving the intended
outcome. However, this is not a criterion of international law because it de­
28UN Charter, Art. 51.
29UN Charter, Art. 42.
30Tallinn 2.0, Rule 72, comment 1.
31International Court of Justice ﹙ICJ﹚, Legality of theThreat or Use of NuclearWeapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 ICJ 226, July 8, 1996, ¶78, accessed November 24, 2015, http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf (hereafter cited as Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion).
32Orend, “War,” §2.1.
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prives militarily weaker and/or economically poorer states of their sovereign
right to enter into armed conflict in self­defence.33)
Once an armed conflict is under way, each military action must be as­
sessed with respect to the degree of force required to achieve each particular
military objective. Having determined that there is a military necessity for
taking a particular action, the jus in bello obligation of proportionality prohibits
using excessive force (that is, causing more than the justifiable expected
damage to civilian persons and objects) to achieve a military advantage.34
This is connected to the jus in bello obligation of discrimination, which specifies
that only combatants and military facilities are lawful targets.35 Any use of
force that cannot discriminate between combatants and non­combatants or
between military and civilian facilities is likely to be disproportionate with
respect to the degree of force that may be permissible under international
law because the effects go beyond what is militarily necessary to achieve the
particular objective.
Means andmethods of warfare
Means of warfare “generally refer to the weapons being used” in an armed
conflict, and methods of warfare “generally refers to the way in which such
weapons are used.”36 The methods and means of warfare are subject to the
jus in bello obligations of international law. Thus some means of warfare are
permissible when used against enemy combatants, but indiscriminate use
of those means, such as disregarding protection for civilians, are prohibited
methods of warfare.37 Other means and methods of warfare are prohibited
under international law because they cannot be used in away that recognizes
the principle of distinction (for example, chemical or biological weapons).38
33Orend, “War,” §2.1.
34AP I, Art. 51(5)(b), referenced in Tallinn 2.0, Rule 113, comment 1.
35AP I, Art. 51, 52.
36Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, and Bruno Zimmermann, eds., Commentary on the
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva, CH: Mar­
tinus Nijhoff, 1987), §1957, accessed January 6, 2016, http : / / www . loc . gov / rr / frd /
Military_Law/pdf/Commentary_GC_Protocols.pdf (hereafter cited as Commentary on the
Additional Protocols). Sometimes the word conflict is used in place of warfare.
37Commentary on the Additional Protocols, §1402.
38International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Rules, vol. 1 of Customary International
Humanitarian Law, ed. Jean­Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald­Beck (Cambridge, UK:
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There are also means and methods deemed to be evil in themselves (mala in se)
because they result in excessive suffering beyond what is required to render
an enemy combatant unable to participate further (such as land mines or
blinding weapons),39 or are gross violations of non­combatant or fundamen­
tal human rights (actions like perfidy, rape, starvation, or enslavement).40
2.4 Why international law might not apply
Dipert poses five questions to challenge the uncritical assumption that cy­
berattacks (military­political intentional cyberharms) and responses to such
attacks are permissible under international law:
1. Is a cyberattack ever morally justified in response to an en­
emy conventional attack?
2. Is a cyberattack ever morally justified in response to an en­
emy cyberattack?
3. Is a conventional attack ever morally justified by an enemy
cyberattack?
4. Is a cyberattack ever morally justified in cases where the
enemy has launched neither a cyber­ nor a conventional at­
tack? (With United Nations sanction, preemptively, pre­
ventively, or for some other reason.)
5. Once a war (cyber­ or conventional) has begun what kinds
of cyberattacks are morally justified?41
Dipert suggests that the answer to justifying a cyberattack in response to
cyber­ or conventional attacks (his first two questions) is a provisional yes,
subject to being able to justify using cyberattacks at all (his fifth question).42
He calls the third and forth of these questions—responding to a cyberat­
tack by conventional means, and making an initial cyberattack—“the hard
Cambridge University Press, 2005), Rules 1, 7, accessed April 20, 2018, https://www.icrc.
org/en/doc/assets/files/other/customary- international- humanitarian- law- i-
icrc-eng.pdf.
39Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, ¶78.
40International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Rules, Rules 53, 58–65, 88–99, 103.
41Dipert, “The Ethics of Cyberwarfare,” 392–393
42Dipert, 392.
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cases”43 because they force us to examine just what a cyberattack is and
whether it is significantly different from other kinds of attacks when con­
sidered under international law.
Dipert’s first “hard case” concerning justifiable responses to cyberattacks
depends on reliably identifying the attacker (the “Attribution Problem”).44
This can be particularly difficult to do in a timely fashion, for sources of
cyberattacks are readily obfuscated.45 The attribution problem identifies an
epistemic requirement for launching a counterstrike to a cyberattack, and
Dipert rightly observes that this requirement in a cyber context is similar to
what is required before responding to a conventional attack.46 A strike made
by conventional means leaves clues about its origin: the bordering state in
the case of troops, the flight path for aircraft and projectiles, the identifica­
tion on any pieces of ordnance that remain after impact. These are difficult
to disguise, so identifying the attacking party is relatively simple. But the
origin of a cyberattack is often more difficult to determine, and unravelling
the multiple possible layers of obfuscation through encryption and forgery
of identifying information takes time. Nonetheless, this complexity does
not change the epistemic requirement to identify the source of the attack be­
fore launching a lawful counterstrike. As a result, Dipert’s question about
responding to a cyberattack by conventional means really asks whether a
cyberattack that causes only non­lethal and temporary harm to a state is
just cause for a conventional war, even taking into account the death and
destruction that would follow.47 If a cyberattack turns out to be similar to
conventional attacks that are just cause for a response, then the answer to
this question is yes; if not, then the answer is no unless there is some other
way to justify an armed response.
Dipert’s second “hard case” is about the justification of an initial cyber­
attack. This problem is similar to the problem of justifying a preemptive
strike in a conventional context, though he anticipates that any preemptive
cyberattack would be “free of the usual death and destruction of traditional
43Dipert, “The Ethics of Cyberwarfare,” 393.
44Dipert, 393.
45Ned Moran, “A Cyber Early Warning Model,” chap. 12 in Carr, Inside Cyber Warfare,
179.
46Dipert, “The Ethics of Cyberwarfare,” 393.
47Dipert, 394.
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forms of warfare.”48 However, Dipert claims that on a literal reading of Ar­
ticles 2(4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter,49 the definitionally vague
notion of armed attack “seems . . . to designate soldiers using ‘arms,’ roughly
as artifacts for inflicting injury, death, or causing physical destruction of
objects.”50 But a cyberattack executed by “an information­theoretic entity”
such as (but not limited to) a general­purpose computer is not carried out
using such artifacts, and so is not addressed under international law.51 Fur­
ther, he claims that cyberwarfare is too novel for ethical and policy discus­
sions to resolve how cyberweapons may be used in international conflict,52
so international law cannot yet be written to address cyberwarfare. Thus the
international law of armed conflict is not fit to address his notion of cyberwar­
fare. The answer to this question depends on the similarity of cyberattacks
to other attacks and to what extent international law has already accounted
for new means of war. If cyberattacks are in some way equivalent to conven­
tional attacks and so are covered under existing international law, then this
question has the same answer as one would give to the question of preemp­
tive strikes in general. If they are something different, then some of Dipert’s
conclusion has merit. This would leave open the possibility that preemptive
cyberattacks may be justifiable on some ground other than current interna­
tional law.
I address two parts of Dipert’s argument for excluding cyberwarfare from
the reach of international law: his concerns about the nature of cyberwar­
fare, which affects the answer to both of these hard cases, and the novelty of
cyberwarfare, which affects the answer to the second hard case.
2.5 Novel means, similar effects
Dipert wants to distinguish between cyberattacks from traditional kinetic at­
tacks for two reasons. First, cyberattacks are a novel development in warfare.
Second, cyberattacks appear to be different in some significant way from ki­
netic attacks. Dipert draws on a National Research Council [USA] report (the
48Dipert, 393.
49UN Charter.




Owens report) acknowledging that cyberattacks are different from kinetic
attacks in important ways and identifying the need for some careful think­
ing about the legal and ethical concerns around cyberwarfare.53 However,
another chapter of the Owens report also notes that there are other non­
cyber weapons in the warfarer’s arsenal that are not kinetic in the sense that
thermochemical bombs and projectiles are, yet are considered “weapons of
mass destruction (for example, nuclear, chemical or biological weapons).”54
These weapons were also once novel means of war, and their development
resulted in a great deal of ethical, legal, and political work concerning their
justifiable use or prohibition in war. The Biological Weapons Convention of
197255 and the Chemical Weapons Convention of 199356 affirm and extend
the principles expressed in the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting bacterio­
logical weapons57 and the second 1899 Hague Declaration prohibiting the
use of poisonous gases in warfare.58 (Appendix A sets out brief descriptions
53Owens report, 239–240.
54Owens report, 26. While nuclear weapons are bombs that cause damage by a sudden
release of energy as some kinetic weapons do, they are not considered conventional kinetic
weapons under most interpretations of international law. They are distinguished from con­
ventional thermochemical bombs because of the wide­ranging, long­lasting (possibly for
generations) effects they produce that traditional explosives do not. Nuclear Weapons Advi­
sory Opinion, ¶¶35–36. This places them under the category weapons of mass destruction, which
is also imprecise.
55United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
London, Moscow and Washington, April 10, 1972, 1015 UNTS 163, accessed January 3, 2021,
https://ihl- databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/
OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/BACF97285A9CB2A2C12563CD002D6C88/FULLTEXT/
IHL-68-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as Biological Weapons Convention).
56Chemical Weapons Convention.
57Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition,
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Geneva, June 17, 1925, accessed January 3, 2021,
https://ihl- databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/
OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/921B4414B13E58B8C12563CD002D693B/FULLTEXT/
IHL-36-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as Geneva Gas Protocol).
58Hague Peace Conferences, Declaration (IV,2) Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, The
Hague, July 29, 1899, accessed January 3, 2021, https : / / ihl - databases . icrc . org /
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/
B0625F804A9B2A64C12563CD002D66FF/FULLTEXT/IHL-13-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as HD IV.2
(1899)).
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of documents incorporating significant innovations, refinements, and exten­
sions of international law from 1854 to 2021.) It is clear that biological and
chemical attacks, though they are not kinetic in the traditional sense, are ad­
dressed by particular conventions that have become international law, and
the laws of armed conflict extend to such non­kinetic attacks. Moreover,
carefully crafted cyberattacks against control systems for critical infrastruc­
ture (say, a hydroelectric generating station or a natural gas pipeline) can
lead to the destruction of those facilities and loss of human life.59 If this
destruction causes harm to civilians or renders critical national (civilian) in­
frastructure useless, the effects are indistinguishable from those of a well­
placed bomb strike, and international law speaks more to the effects than
the means of an attack. I will say more about these effects shortly. But if
the effects of a particular means of warfare are comparable to the effects of
others, and if international law already provides a way to classify kinetic and
non­kinetic means of war as permissible and impermissible, then the differ­
ence Dipert sees between traditional kinetic attacks and cyberattacks is not
sufficient to exempt cyber means of warfare from the international laws of
armed conflict.
Indeed, the international laws of armed conflict anticipate novel means
and methods of war. Consider the emergence of nuclear warfare. While
until recently there was no similar convention to the Biological Weapons
Convention or Chemical Weapons Convention that prohibits the use of nu­
clear weapons in war, the international community has agreed that the use
of any novel weapon is subject to the international laws of armed conflict.
The fourth Hague Convention of 1907 states that combatants in any inter­
national conflict among contracting parties have a duty “[t]o conduct their
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.”60 Where such
59One instance known to be caused by an aggressive cyberoperation (a logic bomb) is
the explosion of a pipeline in Siberia in 1982. Even though it was Soviet workers who in­
stalled the software, they unwittingly acquired the logic bomb by stealing specially crafted
control software from a Canadian company. This may be more an act of sabotage and not
of war, but it shows that malicious code can produce harm rising to the level of an armed
attack. Owens report, 195. I thank Terry Terriff of the University of Calgary for a question
about distinguishing sabotage from an armed attack andwhether cyberattacks aremore like
sabotage. It is worth looking at in another project, but for the purposes of this one, I am
following the assumption of many states that at least some cyberattacks may be considered
armed attacks. I will revisit this particular incident in Chapter 5.
60Hague Peace Conferences, Convention ﹙IV﹚ Respectting the Laws and Customs of War
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laws have not yet been codified, “the inhabitants and the belligerents remain
under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as
they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the
laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.”61 The Inter­
national Court of Justice ﹙ICJ﹚ upheld this principle, known as the Martens
Clause, in its 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion: “ . . . the Court points to
the Martens Clause, whose continuing existence and applicability is not to
be doubted, as an affirmation that the principles and rules of humanitarian
law apply to nuclear weapons.”62 Thusnuclear warfare, while it had not been
addressed by specific agreements until 2017,63 still fell under international
law by the Martens Clause. Moreover, the preamble to the new Nuclear
Weapons Treaty notes that “any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary
to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, in particular
the principles and rules of international humanitarian law,”64 regardless of
on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
The Hague, October 18, 1907, Annex, Art. 1, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-datab
ases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/
ihl/ihl.nsf/4D47F92DF3966A7EC12563CD002D6788/FULLTEXT/IHL-19-EN.pdf (hereafter
cited as HC IV (1907)).
61HC IV (1907), preamble, qtd. in Tallinn 2.0, Rule 80, comment 11. A slightly different
version of the Martens Clause also appears in the preamble to Hague Peace Conferences,
Convention ﹙II﹚ with Respect to the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land,TheHague, July 29,
1899, accessed January 1, 2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/
xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/CD0F6C83F96FB459C125
63CD002D66A1/FULLTEXT/IHL-10-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as HC II (1899)), which has ben
superseded, leaving the 1907 formulation as the oldest one still in effect.
62Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, ¶87, quoted in Geoffrey Darnton, “Information War­
fare and the Laws of War,” chap. 9 in Cyberwar, Netwar, and the Revolution in Military Affairs,
ed. Edward Halpin et al. (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 147.
63United Nations, Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, July 7, 2017, accessed
December 19, 2020, https://documents- dds- ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N17/209/
73/PDF/N1720973.pdf (hereafter cited as Nuclear Weapons Treaty). This treaty came into
force for 51 states parties, none of them in possession of nuclear weapons, on January 22,
2021. The effectiveness of the terms of the treaty is still limited, since neither the nine known
nuclear powers (China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [North Korea], France,
India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
and the United States of America) nor any states believed to have aspirations of becoming
nuclear powers (in particular, Iran) have signalled any intention to accede to the treaty.
Even so, those states are not exempt from existing international law outside the treaty.
64Nuclear Weapons Treaty, preamble.
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the existence of the treaty. By extension, any novel means of warfare not oth­
erwise addressed explicitly in international law is also subject to whatever
guidance international law provides with respect to any and all means and
methods of warfare. The ICJ opined, “[T]he newness of nuclear weapons has
been expressly rejected as an argument against the application to them of
international humanitarian law.”65 Like nuclear weapons once were, cyber
weapons are also novel and not otherwise governed by specific conventions.
But an analogous argument applies to cyber weapons, and it is reasonable
to conclude that cyber weapons, too, are already governed by international
law. Thus the novelty of cyberwarfare is not sufficient to exempt cyberwar­
fare from the international laws of armed conflict, either. Both of Dipert’s
reasons for placing cyberattacks outside the scope of international law are
unsustainable.
As mentioned earlier, there is a good reason to believe that cyberattacks
do properly merit consideration under the laws of armed conflict: the scale
and effects of any damage resulting from such an attack. The ICJ introduced
this notion when it ruled that the United States of America had launched
an armed attack against Nicaragua in the early 1980s, even though its own
armed forces were not engaged in combat.66 It found that American spon­
sorship and direction of armed bands of non­Americans opposed to the
Nicaraguan government67 was equivalent to an armed attack because “its
scale and effects[] would have been classified as an armed attack . . . had it
65Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, ¶86.
66In 1979 the Sandinista National Liberation Front (named for Augusto Sandino, who
led a rebellion against the American military occupation of Nicaragua during the 1920s
and ’30s) overthrew the dictatorial government that, had been financially supported by
the USA until funding was pulled over human rights violations. Sara Chimene­Weiss et al.,
“Understanding the Iran­Contra Affairs: Nicaragua and Iran Timeline,” Brown University,
2010, accessed May 24, 2020, https://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_
Iran_Contra_Affair/timeline-n-i.php. The Sandinistas embraced elements of Marxist­
Leninist governance, but when the new government began repressing opposition, groups of
counter­revolutionaries known as contras formed and eventually received arms, equipment,
and funding from the USA under President Ronald Reagan. It is in this context that the
Sandinista government petitioned the ICJ for a finding that the American government had
engaged in an illegal use of force against Nicaragua.
67International Court of Justice ﹙ICJ﹚, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.United States of America), 1986 ICJ 14, June 27, 1986, ¶¶93, 100, accessed
October 13, 2015, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6503.pdf (hereafter cited
as Nicaragua Judgement).
31
been carried out by regular armed forces.”68 There are twomain implications
for cyberwarfare. First, the means and methods of aggression do not deter­
mine whether a particular action is an armed attack that justifies an armed
response. A reasoned analysis of “the qualitative and quantitative factors”
of the harm caused by the act of aggression—that is, a judgement about the
scale and effects of the operation—is required before calling a hostile action
an armed attack.69 Since some hostile cyberoperations may cause merely a
short­term inconvenience to a population, not all hostile cyberoperations
can be considered armed attacks. But those that result in death and destruc­
tion quite likely are, because the harm done could reasonably also be done
by other means of warfare that are readily recognized as armed attacks.70 If
the scale and effects of a cyberattack are comparable to what could result
using non­cyber means, it is reasonable to conclude that the cyberattack is
an armed attack for the purposes of the laws of armed conflict, and so those
laws can be applied to cyberwarfare. Second, if a state contracts out the
work of conducting a cyberattack to a non­state third party, that state can
be deemed to be the aggressor because it sponsored and directed the work,
just as the USA was held responsible for armed attacks against Nicaragua.
If the scale and effects of that cyberattack are enough to justify an armed
response, that response could lawfully be made against the state directing
the attack.71 Arm’s­length sponsorship of a cyberattack does not mitigate
responsibility for it.
TheWannaCry ransomware attack that began onMay 12, 2017, illustrates
these points. WannaCry used a vulnerability inMicrosoftWindows that had
been discovered, but not disclosed to Microsoft for correction, by the USA’s
National Security Agency ﹙NSA﹚. Details of the exploit were made public on
WikiLeaks in April 2017.72 The malware was designed to take control of an
unprotected computer, encrypt all of the files stored on the machine, and
68Nicaragua Judgement, ¶195, referenced in Tallinn 2.0, Rule 71.
69Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 1.
70Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 9.
71Since the attack itself may have been launched from, but not by, another state, an
armed response against that other state is not readily justified under international law. A
diplomatic one reminding a state of its responsibility to begin a criminal investigation of
the third party’s role in the cyberattack would be appropriate.
72Lily May Newman, “The Leaked NSA Spy Tool That Hacked the World,” Wired,
March 7, 2018, accessed December 21, 2020, https://www.wired.com/story/eternalblue-
leaked-nsa-spy-tool-hacked-world/.
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spread to other unprotected computers.73 Computers running Windows XP
were particularly vulnerable, as updates, including malware signature up­
dates, were no longer being provided for that version of the operating sys­
tem.74 Then it displayed a message on the screen demanding a few hundred
dollars’ worth of Bitcoin (a cybercurrency) in exchange for the decryption
key—but not the removal of the remote access malware that was installed
alongside the ransomware.75
WannaCry was not specifically targeted against a particular party.76 It
was indiscriminate and opportunistic. Organizations inmore than 150 differ­
ent countries were affected within three days of its first detection.77 The UK’s
National Health Service ﹙NHS﹚ was particularly hard­hit: of the 236 health
trusts across England, 37 were directly affected and 44more suffered indirect
effects. “[M]ore than 1,200 pieces of diagnostic equipment were infected by
the ransomware, although further devices were put out of use after being
disconnected from IT [information technology] systems to prevent the infec­
tion spreading.”78 While there were no patient deaths directly attributable to
73Norton Rose Fulbright, “WannaCry Ransomware Attack Summary,” Data Protecton Re­
port, May 17, 2017, accessed December 21, 2020, https://www.dataprotectionreport.com/
2017/05/wannacry-ransomware-attack-summary/.
74Newman, “The Leaked NSA Spy Tool That Hacked the World.” Windows XP was first
released in 2002. Microsoft’s published lifecycle policy was to provide support for ten
years. Microsoft Corporation, “Fixed Lifecycle Policy,” April 13, 2010, accessed Decem­
ber 21, 2020, https://docs.microsoft.com/en- us/lifecycle/policies/fixed. Mi­
crosoft continued to issue security patches for that version of the operating system until
April 2014 and malware signature updates until July 2015. Microsoft Corporation, “Sup­
port for Windows XP Ended,” May 3, 2018, accessed December 21, 2020, https://www.
microsoft.com/en-ca/microsoft-365/windows/end-of-windows-xp-support. Three
new versions of the Windows operating system (Vista, 7, and 8) had been released by the
time support for Windows XP came to an end, and Windows 10 was also available before
WannaCry was unleashed. A security patch against this vulnerability was made available
for these newer systems in March 2017. Microsoft later issued an emergency patch for older
systems that were no longer supported.
75Norton Rose Fulbright, “WannaCry Ransomware Attack Summary.”
76Gordon Corera, “NHS Cyber­Attack Was ‘Launched from North Korea’,” BBC News,
June 16, 2017, accessed December 22, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-
40297493.
77John Kennedy, “Impact of WannaCry: MajorDisruption As Organisations Go Back to
Work,” Silicon Republic, May 15, 2017, accessed December 19, 2020, https://www.siliconr
epublic.com/enterprise/wannacry-impact-organisations-attack.
78Owen Hughes, “WannaCry Impact on NHS Considerably LargerThan Previously Sug­
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the attack,79 more than 19 thousand appointments were cancelled—at least
130 of them for cancer screening—because of the attack.80 Thus WannaCry
had a direct, measurable impact to health care practitioners and their pa­
tients, even if the effects on patient well­being could not be measured. The
estimated follow­on financial impact to the NHS for services it could provide
was 5.9 million pounds (about 10.4 million Canadian dollars);81 the cost for
personnel to repair the systems would be in addition to that. Personal and
financial harm extended beyond that done to the computer systems them­
selves.
There is a good case for thinking that North Korea was involved with
the attack, though it is not sufficiently strong to assign responsibility for
the harm caused by WannaCry to North Korea. Early reports from Great
Britain’s National Cyber Security Centre ﹙NCSC﹚ suggested that a group of
North Korean hackers called “Lazarus” was behind the ransomware,82 and
a confident assertion of the same followed from the UK’s Foreign Office af­
ter a deeper investigation.83 Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and
the USA concurred with this opinion.84 The remaining question is whether
WannaCry was developed and deployed for the North Korean government.
There is insufficient evidence to confirm the suspicion that it was, in part
because it acted more like a cybercriminal shakedown than an attack target­
gested,” Digital Health, October 27, 2017, accessed December 19, 2020, https : / / www .
digitalhealth.net/2017/10/wannacry-impact-on-nhs-considerably-larger-than-
previously-suggested/.
79Saira Ghafur et al., “A Retrospective Impact Analysis of the WannaCry Cyberattack
on the NHS,” NPJ Digital Medicine 2, no. 98 (October 2, 2019): 2, accessed December 20, 2020,
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41746-019-0161-6.
80Hughes, “WannaCry Impact on NHS Considerably Larger Than Previously Sug­
gested.”
81Ghafur et al., “A Retrospective Impact Analysis of the WannaCry Cyberattack on the
NHS,” 2.
82Corera, “NHS Cyber­Attack Was ‘Launched from North Korea’.”
83United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office, “Foreign Office Minister Con­
demns North Korean Actor for WannaCry Attacks,” press release, December 19, 2017, ac­
cessed December 22, 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign- office-
minister-condemns-north-korean-actor-for-wannacry-attacks.
84Michael N. Schmitt and Sean Fahey, “WannaCry and the International Law of Cy­
berspace,” Just Security, December 22, 2017, accessed December 19, 2020, https://www.
justsecurity.org/50038/wannacry-international-law-cyberspace/.
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ing a specific state or facility.85 However, in either case North Korea had
responsibilities to the international community.
IfWannaCry was not released under the control of the North Korean gov­
ernment, then the North Korean government had an obligation to at least
attempt to put an end to the attack86 once it became aware of the effects it
was having in other states. These effects ordinarily would not be considered
violations of the affected state’s sovereignty because non­state actors can­
not violate a state’s sovereignty “unless [their] actions are attributable to a
State.”87 However, WannaCry did affect the UK’s sovereign right to provide
health services to its citizens,88 so it could be claimed that North Korea did
not undertake the principle of due diligence to end the attack.89
On the other hand, if the attack was attributable to the North Korean
government, things get more complicated. As social services are deemed
to be an inherent function of government, the loss of functionality suffered
by the NHS could be considered a violation of the UK’s sovereignty under
international law.90 The harm to the UK was inflicted by cyber means, and
if North Korea was in “effective control” over the Lazarus group’s devel­
opment and deployment of WannaCry, it could be assigned responsibility
for that harm. If deaths could be attributed to the WannaCry attack, and
responsibility for them to North Korea by the reasoning expressed in the
Nicaragua Judgement, then some threshold of significant harm would have
85Schmitt and Fahey.
86Tallinn 2.0, Rule 2, comment 12, Rule 7, comments 2, 6, 24, 25.
87Tallinn 2.0, Rule 4, comment 2.
88Tallinn 2.0, Rule 4, comments 15, 16. Social services such as public health care are
considered to be “inherently governmental functions” as a right of the state.
89Tallinn 2.0, Rule 6, comment 1, with references. One aspect of this principle is “Use
your own property so as to not injure that of another.” Tallinn 2.0, Rule 6, comment 1, note
34. While the equipment that launched or controlled WannaCry may not have been gov­
ernment property, any such equipment in North Korea is subject to the state’s sovereignty.
Tallinn 2.0, Rule 2, comment 1. Sovereignty over equipment imposes an obligation on the
state to address the use of that equipment if it violates other states’ rights. Tallinn 2.0, Rule
6, comments 21, 22.
90Tallinn 2.0, Rule 4, comments 13, 15, 16. Sovereignty over internal affairs and protec­
tion from forceful interference by other states are grounded in the provisions of Article 2
of the UN Charter, particularly ¶¶(1), (2), (4), and (7). There is a robust discussion over
the evolving understanding of this principle, particularly with respect to universal human
rights, since 1948. However, the Charter is still foundational, and the debate goes beyond
the scope of this project.
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been reached, perhaps even one that could be considered a “use of force”
under the UN Charter. Dipert’s questions revolve around issues made real
by WannaCry: the means of the attack and the permissibility of a forceful
response if the effects support it.
2.6 Applicability of international laws of armed conflict
I now show that Dipert’s moral questions about cyberwarfare are no more
challenging than their non­cyber analogues are under international law.
Dipert’s third question (and one of his hard ones) about responding to a
cyberattack by conventional means is probably the easiest one to address. If
Dipert’s question is about responding to an initial use of force using cyber
means, the answer depends on the scale and effects of that use of force. If
the scale and effects are comparable to what could result from an armed
attack by non­cyber means, then Article 51 of the UN Charter allows a state
to respond in self­defence.91 The attack gives just cause for entering into
war. However, just cause alone is not sufficient to justify a use of force in
response. If an enemy uses a conventional means of exercising force (kinetic,
but not nuclear, chemical, or biological) that reaches the level of an armed
attack, then any permissible means of war may be used in response, subject
to international law’s jus in bello constraints. However, nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons can also produce the scale and effects of a kinetic armed
attack (if not worse), and there is nothing in the nature of those attacks
that negates a victim state’s right to self­defence following those kinds of
attacks.92 If an aggressive cyberoperation against a state has the scale and
effects of an armed attack then, by analogy to these other means of warfare,
the state likely has just cause for responding with force.93 Once a war has
begun, the use of any conventional means of war permitted under the jus in
bello obligations is justified. Thus Dipert’s third question, “Is a conventional
attack ever morally justified by an enemy cyberattack?”94 is answered in the
affirmative for both ad bellum and in bello contexts.
91UN Charter, Art. 51, quoted in Tallinn 2.0, Rule 71, comment 1.
92The capability to mount a counterattack is a separate question.
93Tallinn 2.0, Rule 71, comment 4, also makes this point.
94Dipert, “The Ethics of Cyberwarfare,” 392.
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Dipert’s first two questions ask if a cyberattack is morally justified in
response to either a conventional or cyberattack, and his fifth asks what
kinds of cyberattacks are permissible once a cyber­ or conventional war is
in progress. It will suffice to justify the use of cyber means of war. Chemi­
cal and biological means of war are prohibited by international law because
of their uncontrollable effects on humans and, to a lesser extent, the envi­
ronment. They are considered “evil in themselves.”95 Unlike those kinds
of weapons, the most severe effects arising from cyberweapons would not
(usually) extend to the uncontrolled spread of agents harmful to human
life. If this is so, then cyberweapons are not inherently evil in themselves,
so international law does not prohibit their use on that ground. Further, I
have already shown that the novelty of cyberweapons is not sufficient rea­
son to prohibit them. Finally, there is nothing in international law or state
practices that explicitly forbids using cyberweapons as means of warfare.96
Consequently, if cyberattacks are permissible means of warfare—and there
appears to be insufficient reason to say otherwise—then they are justified
provided the jus ad bellum conditions and jus in bello obligations of the laws
of armed conflict are met.
First, consider the jus ad bellum conditions for responding with a cyberat­
tack. A state acting in self­defence does not need to respond—and in some
cases is legally barred from responding—with the same kind of counterattack
if a permissible, less destructivemeans of respondingwill end the aggression.
Suppose a state launches a chemical attack against its neighbour. Using
this means of war violates international law, so the victim state is prohib­
ited under international law from responding in kind under the no reprisals
obligation of jus in bello. If a kinetic counterattack will end the threat, then
95Orend, “War,” §2.2. Orend also notes that there are other means of war that, for dif­
ferent reasons, are also evil in themselves. The judgement that some means of war are evil
in themselves comes from the consensus declared in the Geneva Gas Protocol. It reads,
in part, “ . . . the use on war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analo­
gous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the
civilised world,” and extends this sentiment to bacteriological weapons. These declarations
are reaffirmed in the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Conven­
tion. The preambles of these two conventions also affirm the desire for “the prohibition
and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction.” The preamble to the Nuclear
Weapons Treaty specifically mentions “unacceptable suffering of . . . the victims of the use
of nuclear weapons,” which also places them in the category of “evil in themselves.”
96Tallinn 1.0, 3.
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using that different means of war is not only justified, but also permissible if
non­forceful means cannot end the threat.97 Moreover, the proportionality
constraint may also bar responding in kind. Suppose a state makes a con­
ventional kinetic attack against another state. If a less forceful response by
diplomacy or another permissible means of war will deliver the minimum
amount of force required to end the threat, then international law permits
that response, but nothing more severe, such as a conventional kinetic coun­
terstrike. For example, following the assassination of Qasam Soleimani, the
head of the foreign arm of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, on
January 3, 2020,98 Iran had a legitimate grievance against the USA for the
harm—but perhaps not the right to an armed response, particularly since
Soleimani was in Iraq at the time, so Iran itself was never threatened. Iran
is not capable of winning a war against the USA at this point in time, but still
perceived a need to save face by threatening a forceful retaliation.99 A small­
scale cyberattack against critical American infrastructure would be such an
act, and this was one of the scenarios the US Department of Homeland Se­
curity warned about in the terrorism advisory issued the following day.100
Cyberweaponsmay provide thatmaximumpermissible amount of force.101
Some existing cyberweapons are very discriminating in discovering and act­
ing on onlymilitary targets or facilities used in support of military activity.102
These highly discriminating cyberweapons may be sufficient to put an end
to a state’s aggressive behaviour without being an excessive use of force. If
97Tallinn 2.0, Rule 72, comment 5.
98Natasha Turak, “Cyberattack and Proxy Violence Warnings As Iran Threatens ‘Night­
mare’ Revenge against US,” CNBC, January 7, 2020, accessed May 24, 2020, https://www.
cnbc.com/2020/01/07/how-iran-could-retaliate-against-the-us-after-solemani-
killing.html.
99Aniseh Tabrizi, qtd. in Turak.
100Department of Homeland Security [USA], National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin, Jan­
uary 4, 2020, accessed May 24, 2020, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ntas/
alerts/20_0104_ntas_bulletin.pdf.
101The Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University,
HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (New York, NY: Cam­
bridge University Press, 2013), Rule 8 (hereafter cited as HPCR Manual), makes the same
point concerning precision guided weapons.
102The best­known example is the Stuxnet virus, which sought out particular industrial
controllers driving centrifuges in Iran used for enriching uranium. See Eric P. Oliver,
“Stuxnet: A Case Study in Cyber Warfare,” chap. 10 in Yannakogeorgos and Lowther, Con­
flict and Cooperation in Cyberspace: The Challenge to National Security, 127–160.
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they will provide the appropriate degree of force required to accomplish the
military goal, and any other means would be excessive force, then cyber­
weapons ought to be preferred to those other means. This would satisfy
the proportionality constraint in the ad bellum context better than any other
means of counterattack. For this reason, a cyberattack may not only be jus­
tified in responding to either a cyber­ or conventional attack. It may be the
only justifiable effective response, and therefore the only one permitted by
international law. Thus Dipert’s questions about the permissibility of cyber­
attacks in response to armed attacks are also answered in the affirmative.
Second, consider the jus in bello obligations that apply in the context of
an ongoing armed conflict. These restrictions apply to all means of war.
Cyberweapons are not prohibited on the ground of being inherently evil in
themselves.103 Cyberweapons can be highly discriminating betweenmilitary
targets and civilian objects, and they may also satisfy the proportionality cri­
terion with respect to achieving a military objective.104 If no other means
will accomplish the destruction or neutralisation of a military target with
minimal civilian loss, then a cyberattack may be the only appropriate and
permissible means to achieve a military objective. So cyberattacks may be
justified in ongoing conflict situations. This answers Dipert’s fifth question
on what kinds of cyberattacks can be justified: those that satisfy the propor­
tionality and discrimination constraints of jus in bello.
That leaves Dipert’s fourth question, the other of his two hard ones: “Is
a cyberattack ever morally justified in cases where the enemy has launched
neither a cyber­ nor a conventional attack?”105 Like the third question, this
is not as difficult as it looks. If cyberattacks are permissible in self­defence
and ongoing war, they are permissible where any other kind of attack with
similar anticipated effects is permissible. This reduces his question to the
permissibility of a preemptive, preventive, or United Nations­approved first
strike. The United Nations Charter enjoins member states to “settle their in­
ternational disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international
103Some applications of cyberweapons, such as those involving perfidy or other forms of
deception intended to cause harm to persons, could be considered “evil in themselves.”
Such uses would be prohibited under existing international law. This is discussed in Chap­
ter 4.
104Ryan Jenkins, “Is Stuxnet Physical? Does it Matter?,” Journal of Military Ethics 12, no. 1
(April 17, 2013): 75, https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2013.782640.
105Dipert, “The Ethics of Cyberwarfare,” 392.
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peace and security, and justice, are not endangered” and “refrain . . . from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen­
dence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations.”106 But the United Nations Security Council does
have nominal power, at least over member states, to “take such action by air,
sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security.”107 Since cyberwarfare may be conducted by air, sea, or
land forces broadly construed, and theUnitedNations Charter forms part of
the international laws of armed conflict, international law answers this part
of Dipert’s question in the affirmative. Even so, preemptive or preventive
strikes are fraught regardless of the means of attack, for they rely on pre­
sumptions concerning intent and ability. The claim that in 2003 Iraq was
in possession of weapons of mass destruction was mistaken, and while there
may have been just cause on other grounds to engage in armed conflict with
Iraq, this was not one of them.108 Cyberwarfare neither clarifies nor further
confuses the questions around these kinds of strikes.
A preemptive or preventive cyberattack could take many forms. One at­
tempt at a preventive cyberattack took place between 2007 and 2010 against
Iran’s uranium­enrichment facility at Natanz.109 Even though this attack,
called Stuxnet, infected many computers worldwide, its payload targeted
a specific industrial control system with a particular configuration match­
ing the uranium­enriching gas centrifuge cascades at Natanz.110 These cen­
106UN Charter, Art. 2(2), 2(3).
107UN Charter, Art. 42.
108Glenn Kessler, “The Iraq War and WMDs: An Intelligence Failure or White House
Spin?,” Washington Post, March 22, 2019, accessed December 23, 2020, https : / / www .
washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/22/iraq-war-wmds-an-intelligence-failure-
or-white-house-spin/.
109While preemptive and preventive are similar terms, preemptive carries the additional sense
of fending off an imminent or near­term attack. Iran was more than a few months away
from launching a nuclear attack, so the strike against the Iranian facility was more a pre­
ventive measure to slow down development of nuclear weapons rather than preempting an
imminent nuclear strike.
110James P. Farwell and Rafal Rohozinski, “Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War,” Global
Politics and Strategy 53, no. 1 (January 28, 2011): 24–5, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.
2011.555586; Jon R. Lindsay, “Stuxnet and the Limits of CyberWarfare,” Security Studies 22,
no. 3 (August 2013): 383–4, 400, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2013.816122. En­
richment is necessary because the most prevalent isotope of uranium, uranium­238, is not
fissile; the lighter uranium­235 isotope is. Naturally­occurring uranium does not contain a
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trifuges could be used to produce either lightly­enriched uranium for use in
electricity­producing light­water reactors, or highly­enriched uranium for
use in nuclear weapons. The lightly­enriched uranium could also be used
to convert much of the uranium­238 into the fissile plutonium­239 while
still producing electricity, and this plutonium could be extracted for use in
nuclear weapons. Regardless of Iran’s stated intentions concerning the en­
riched uranium, its production was taken as evidence that Iran was planning
to develop nuclear weapons, and that Israel was a likely target.111 From Is­
rael’s point of view (shared by the USA112), Iran’s nuclear program, if it was
for developing weapons, would pose an “existential threat” to the state.113
Given that Israel had launched air strikes on nuclear facilities in Iraq in 1981
and Syria in 2007,114 Israel would argue that a preventive strike made in
self­defence was justified.115 The Stuxnet attack was the most discriminating
and proportionate means that would meet Israel’s military objective, while
posing less risk of harm to persons on both sides than an air strike might.116
While this is not an argument in favour of preemptive or preventive strikes,
it is evidence that cyberattacks may be the preferred method for executing
such a strike. The best that can be said is this: preemptive or preventive
cyberattacks are permissible if and only if preemptive or preventive strikes
sufficiently high proportion of uranium­235 to be used in particular kinds of reactors with­
out increasing the ratio of uranium­235 to uranium­238. The gas centrifuges used in enrich­
ment separate uranium hexafluoride gas containing the lighter isotope from gas containing
the heavier one. An earlier version of Stuxnet manipulated the valves controlling the flow of
gas between stages, varying the pressure within each centrifuge. This variant had a higher
risk of causing more serious harm, including the release of radioactive material. Kim Zetter,
“Stuxnet Missing Link Found, Resolves Some Mysteries Around the Cyberweapon,” Wired,
February 26, 2013, accessed December 27, 2020, https://www.wired.com/2013/02/new-
stuxnet-variant-found/.
111Farwell and Rohozinski, “Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War,” 28, with the obser­
vation that some Arab states also had concerns about Iran’s nuclear program.
112Oliver, “Stuxnet: A Case Study in Cyber Warfare,” 133n16.
113Farwell andRohozinski, “Stuxnet and the Future of CyberWar,” 33; Lindsay, “Stuxnet
and the Limits of Cyber Warfare,” 398.
114Lindsay, 398.
115Farwell and Rohozinski, “Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War,” 33.
116Farwell and Rohozinski, 29; Lindsay, “Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare,” 379;
Peter W. Singer, “Stuxnet and Its Hidden Lessons on the Ethics of Cyberweapons,” Case
Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 84–5, accessed Decem­
ber 27, 2020, https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol47/iss1/10.
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in general are permissible, and if such attacks are permissible in general, a
cyberattack may be permitted where a conventional attack could not be jus­
tified. Like the rest of Dipert’s questions, this question can be answered by
referring to what the international community has already agreed upon.
2.7 Conclusion
I have shown that Randall Dipert’s influential concerns about cyberwar and
the international laws of armed conflict can be resolved or reduced to con­
cerns about more general applications of international law. Cyberwarfare
is a new development in waging war, but neither its novelty nor its differ­
ences from other means of war exclude it from the reach of current inter­
national law. If cyberwarfare is placed on the same ontological footing as
other means of warfare, then international law permits, with constraints, the
use of cyber means in warfare, both in self­defence and in ongoing conflict.
I turn now to an examination of a particular interpretation of the interna­
tional laws of armed conflict as they apply to cyberwarfare.
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Chapter 3
The Tallinn Manual: a response to a
cyberattack
3.1 Why the Tallinn Manual?
Evolution of international law
International law develops slowly. In contrast, warfaring technology ad­
vances rapidly, particularly when states provide funding to accelerate the
process. Moreover, new interpretations of existing laws, and any necessary
new laws, can only be produced in response to new developments, and not in
advance of them. It is, then, no surprise that questions like Randall Dipert’s,
examined in Chapter 2, arise. Cyberwarfare is new and different, and opens
up new possibilities for both war and peace. The international community,
recognizing that cyber means and methods of war are constrained by inter­
national law, has the task of figuring out how to interpret those constraints
with respect to the novel aspects of cyberwarfare. The Tallinn Manual1 is a
step toward filling that gap. It continues the process of codifying interna­
tional law, a process that began as a result of a bloody continental war.
After the Treaty of Paris ended the Crimean War in 1856, the seven sig­
natories (the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the [second]
French Empire, the Kingdom of Prussia, the Kingdom of Sardinia, the Aus­
trian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the Russian Empire) issued the fol­
lowing declaration:
1Tallinn 1.0; now superseded by Tallinn 2.0.
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The Plenipotentiaries who signed the Treaty of Paris of the thir­
tieth of March, one thousand eight hundred and fifty­six, assem­
bled in Conference, —
Considering:
That maritime law, in time of war, has long been the subject of
deplorable disputes;
That the uncertainty of the law and of the duties in such a matter,
gives rise to differences of opinion between neutrals and belliger­
ents which may occasion serious difficulties, and even conflicts;
That it is consequently advantageous to establish a uniform doc­
trine on so important a point;
That the Plenipotentiaries assembled inCongress at Paris cannot
better respond to the intentions by which their Governments are
animated, than by seeking to introduce into international rela­
tions fixed principles in this respect;
The above­mentioned Plenipotentiaries, being duly authorized,
resolved to concert among themselves as to the means of attain­
ing this object; and, having come to an agreement, have adopted
the following solemn Declaration:
1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished;
2. The neutral flag covers enemy’s goods, with the exception
of contraband of war;
3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war,
are not liable to capture under enemy’s flag;
4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective, that
is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent
access to the coast of the enemy.
The Governments of the undersigned Plenipotentiaries engage
to bring the present Declaration to the knowledge of the States
which have not taken part in the Congress of Paris, and to invite
them to accede to it.
Convinced that the maxims which they now proclaim cannot
but be received with gratitude by the whole world, the under­
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signed Plenipotentiaries doubt not that the efforts of their Gov­
ernments to obtain the general adoption thereof, will be crowned
with full success.
The present Declaration is not and shall not be binding, except
between those Powers who have acceded, or shall accede, to it.2
The Paris Declaration is arguably the first modern attempt to establish a for­
mal international agreement on the conduct of war,3 even though its scope
is very narrow. The value of such an instrument seemed clear to the 55 states
that adopted the declaration, because it established a measure of certainty
concerning the treatment of their military and commercial ships should they
encounter a vessel belonging to a state involved in an international war. This
declaration remains in force for the still­extant states that acceded to it,4 and
its declaration concerning the effectiveness of naval blockades has become
a rule of international law.5 The significant innovations, refinements, and
extensions of international law from the Paris Declaration to 2021 are set
out chronologically in Appendix A as a way of capturing the evolution and
acceptance of international law.
The recognized need for some consistency with respect to expected be­
haviour during war inspired development of these norms along two distinct
but related lines: one concerning the means and methods of war (jus in
bello), and the other concerning the humanitarian needs of the wounded—
2Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Paris, April 16, 1856, accessed December 28,
2020, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/
OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/10207465E7477D90C12563CD002D65A3/FULLTEXT/
IHL-1-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as Paris Declaration).
3It is the oldest entry in the International Committee of the Red Cross database of
treaties. International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, “Historical Treaties and Docu­
ments: By Date,” Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, accessed December 28, 2020, https:
//ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesHistoricalByDate.xsp.
4International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, “Declaration Respecting Maritime
Law, Paris, 16 April 1856,” Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, accessed December 28,
2020, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=
10207465E7477D90C12563CD002D65A3&action=openDocument.
5International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo Manual on International Law Ap­
plicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, ed. Louise Doswald­Beck (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Uni­
versity Press, 1985), Rule 95 (hereafter cited as San Remo Manual).
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and eventually of non­combatants in general.6 A third line concerning both
human rights and the deleterious effects of armed conflict in facilitating
these rights emerged in the second half of the twentieth century.7 The first
two of these lines, along with a new consideration of jus ad bellum, are present
in the 2013 edition of the TallinnManual (Tallinn 1.0); incorporating the third
of these lines in the 2017 edition (Tallinn 2.0) is both a daring but not unrea­
sonable innovation and an invitation to continue the implications of, and
the gaps within, international human rights law as it applies in cyberspace.
The Tallinn Manual also continues the interpretive tradition of codifying
existing international law into actionable rules of conduct for ready consul­
tation. This practice started with the 1880 Oxford Manual concerning the
laws of war on land,8 and was continued by the 1994 San Remo Manual9 and
2009 HPCR Manual10 concerning naval and aerial warfare respectively. In
the same way, Tallinn 2.0 draws on 55 international treaties, 51 international
court cases, and 58 other documents (military manuals, non­treaty resolu­
tions and declarations, commentaries, books, and manuals analogous to the
TallinnManual with respect to other domains of warfare)11 to establish its 154
black­letter rules12 concerning cyberoperations. With respect to form and
content, the Tallinn Manual is both consistent with past expressions of inter­
6Frits Kalshoven and Liesbeth Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction
to International Humanitarian Law, 4th ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 3,
accessed December 30, 2020, https://shop.icrc.org/constraints-on-the-waging-of-
war-an-introduction-to-international-humanitarian-law-pdf-en (hereafter cited as
Constraints on the Waging of War).
7Universal Declaration; Constraints on the Waging of War, 22.
8Instittute of International Law ﹙IIL﹚, The Laws of War On Land, September 9, 1880,
accessed January 1, 2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/
.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/40371257507EBB71C12563CD0
02D6676/FULLTEXT/IHL-8-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as Oxford Manual (1880)).
9International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San RemoManual on International Law
Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, June 12, 1994, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/5B310CC97F166BE3C12563F6005E3E09/FULLTEXT/IHL-89-EN.pdf
(hereafter cited as San Remo Manual).
10HPCR Manual.
11Tallinn 2.0, xxviii–xxxvii.
12Black­letter rules are “[b]asic standard rules that are generally known and free from
doubt.” Legal Information Institute, “Black letter law,” Wex, accessed December 31, 2020,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/black_letter_law.
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national law (see Appendix A) and a model for future ones.
The keepers of the Internet
I have shown that the Tallinn Manual is not obviously out of place in the
context of international law. I turn now to showing why it is a useful and
relevant contemporary expression of it.
The Internet, and cyberspace more generally, has a reputation for being
a lawless domain. (Russia and China have expressed, and taken advantage
of, this idea.13) Certainly the volume of malicious software, criminal activ­
ity, and disruptive disinformation travelling over the Internet provides some
reason to think this. However, on reflection, such a claim is overbroad, even
though there are calls for laws providing bothmore and less regulation of the
Internet. On the one hand, there is little legislation or government enforce­
ment over the content of Internet traffic. The two main exceptions come
from states that have acceded to the Convention on Cybercrime,14 or have
a policy of censoring Internet traffic. On the other hand, defenders of “free
speech” would like to see laws prohibiting Internet services and infrastruc­
ture companies from using vague acceptable­use policies to arbitrarily take
down content that would, in a public context, have protection from govern­
ment censorship.15 The Internet may not have many explicit laws, but its
operators have rules that can be applied when the threat of government reg­
ulation or the glare of public scrutiny gets uncomfortably intense. These two
positions are not mutually exclusive. Protected speech does not include un­
lawful material such as child pornography or incitement to hatred. But ad­
dressing the concerns of parties arguing for more or less regulation is largely
a matter of domestic or criminal concern, not of cyberwarfare.
13ThomasWingfield (US Department of Defence and member of the international group
of experts that produced Tallinn 1.0), qtd. in Dwight Weingarten, “International Cyber
Laws Remain Work in Progress, DoD’s Wingfield Says,” MeriTalk, June 19, 2020, accessed
January 18, 2021, https://www.meritalk.com/articles/international- cyber- laws-
remain-work-in-progress-dods-wingfield-says/.
14Council of Europe; Patricia N. Harke, Cyberspace: A Lawless World, research report
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, Air University, 2016), ac­
cessed January 20, 2021, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1041050.pdf.
15Nicholas P. Suzor, Lawless: The Secret Rules That Govern Our Digital Lives (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2019), 8.
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However, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
﹙ICANN﹚, the not­for­profit non­governmental organization with primary re­
sponsibility for “the operational stability of the Internet” through the man­
agement of Internet addresses, the top level of the domain name system
﹙DNS﹚, and the “authoritative Internet DNS server system,”16 explicitly sub­
jects itself to international law. ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation declare
that it will “operate . . . in conformity with relevant principles of interna­
tional law and applicable international conventions and local law.”17 This
is the third ball that must pass between the two hands: there is some law
that governs the Internet. Some of that law is international law, particu­
larly with respect to state sovereignty over and responsibility for different
physical segments of the global Internet infrastructure. Discerning how they
apply is the problem.18 The TallinnManual offers the first articulation of how
those parts of international law apply should warfare be conducted through
the Internet.
“Web War One”
The Tallinn Manual is a measured response to real cyberharms inflicted by
international, politically­motivated, and likely state­sponsored, actors. In
2007 Estonia became the first state to face a large­scale cyberattack.19 Esto­
nia, having been subject to the Russification project of the Russian Empire
and, after a brief period of independence, the Sovietization project of the
USSR,20 has a large Russian minority population (roughly 25% at the begin­
16Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ﹙ICANN﹚, “Articles of Incorpo­
ration,” November 21, 1998, Art. 3, accessed January 20, 2021, https://www.icann.org/
resources/pages/articles-2012-02-25-en.
17Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ﹙ICANN﹚, Art. 4; Wolfgang
Kleinwächter, “International Law and Cyberspace: It’s the ‘How’, Stupid,” CircleID, De­
cember 10, 2020, accessed January 20, 2021, http://www.circleid.com/posts/20201210-
international-law-and-cyberspace-its-the-how-stupid/.
18Kleinwächter.
19Helen Popp (counsellor for cyber issues, Embassy of the Republic of Estonia, Wash­
ington, DC), qtd. in Emily Tamkin, “10 Years After the Landmark Attack on Estonia, Is the
World Better Prepared for Cyber Threats?,” Foreign Policy, April 27, 2017, accessed Septem­
ber 7, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/27/10-years-after-the-landmark-
attack-on-estonia-is-the-world-better-prepared-for-cyber-threats/.
20Jiri Valenta and Leni Friedman Valenta, Russia’s Strategic Advantage in the Baltics: A Chal­
lenge to NATO?, Mideast Security and Policy Studies 143, report (Ramat Gan, IL: The Begin­
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ning of 202021). In 1947 the USSR erected in downtown Tallinn a bronze
statue of a Red Army soldier to commemorate the Soviet victory over Nazi
Germany.22 On April 27, 2007, the government of Estonia relocated the
monument (with plans to also move any graves found at the memorial) to a
military cemetery.23 To the Russian ethnic minority in Estonia—and the Rus­
sian government in Moscow—this was an insult; to the Estonian majority, it
was removing a painful reminder of Soviet occupation and annexation.24
Since reclaiming its independence in 1991 Estonia has been a pioneer
in providing government services through the Internet,25 so that by 2007
Estonian society was functionally dependent on network­based services.26
Shortly after the statue had beenmoved, Estonians found that they could no
longer access online government, information, or banking services.27 This
was the opening strike in what is sometimes called “Web War One.”28
For days afterward Estonia’s Internet­based services were being strangled
by a distributed denial of service ﹙DDOS﹚ attack, a coordinated effort involving
thousands of compromised computers around the world flooding servers
inside Estonia with enough nuisance requests that they could not receive,
never mind respond to, legitimate requests.29
Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar­Ilan University, January 2018), 20, accessed Jan­
uary 19, 2021, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep16828.
21Statistics Estonia, “RV0222U: Population, 1 January by Year, Sex, County and Ethnic
Nationality,” January 1, 2020, accessed January 15, 2021, https : / / andmed . stat . ee / e
n/stat/rahvastik__rahvastikunaitajad- ja- koosseis__rahvaarv- ja- rahvastiku-
koosseis/RV0222U/table/tableViewLayout1.
22Jari Tanner, “Violence ContinuesOver Estonia’s Removal of SovietWar Statue,” Boston
Globe, April 28, 2007, accessed January 14, 2021, http://archive.boston.com/news/world/
asia/articles/2007/04/28/violence_continues_over_estonias_removal_of_soviet_
war_statue/; Davis, “Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe.”
23Tanner, “Violence Continues Over Estonia’s Removal of Soviet War Statue.”
24Davis, “Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe.”
25Nick Heath, “How Estonia Became an E­Government Powerhouse,” Tech Republic,
February 19, 2019, accessed January 15, 2021, https://www.techrepublic.com/article/
how-estonia-became-an-e-government-powerhouse/.
26Tamkin, “10 Years After the Landmark Attack on Estonia, Is theWorld Better Prepared
for Cyber Threats?”
27Davis, “Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe,” Tamkin, “10 Years
After the Landmark Attack on Estonia, Is the World Better Prepared for Cyber Threats?”
28Davis, “Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe.”
29Damien McGuinness, “How a Cyber Attack Transformed Estonia,” BBC News, April 27,
2017, accessed January 14, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/39655415; Tamkin, “10 Years
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That was just the warm­up act. Russia commemoraties its victory in the
Second World War on May 9, and the Estonians discovered that something
bigger was in the works. Russian­language online chat rooms were being
used to recruit and coordinate people and computers for a concentrated at­
tack on Estonia on that day. At the stroke of midnight Moscow time, a new
assault began. But Hillar Aarelaid, the head of Estonia’s computer emer­
gency response team ﹙CERT﹚, had recruited help from the keepers of one of
the Internet’s root DNS servers, the devices that direct the global routing
of Internet traffic.30 Those experts coordinated a global reactive effort to
blunt 59 distinct waves of Internet traffic arriving at a rate of four million
packets per second, more than enough to suffocate Estonia’s network infras­
tructure.31 Estonia’s Internet withstood the assault, but it took the global
Internet service provider network—and a great deal of trust among the high­
ranking members of that community—to hold it up. And while those who
took responsibility for the attack were indeed from Russia, they denied that
the Russian government put them up to it, though the Russian government
had no interest in putting the attack down, either.32 Still, the weight of ev­
idence pointed to the cyberattack on Estonia as a Russian operation, and
more cyberattacks were likely to be launched against other targets.
The cyberattacks on Estonia served as a wake­up call. Cyberwar, if not
already a reality, was now a very real near­term possibility. A year after the
attacks, Estonia and six other European nations announced the formation
of the CCDCOE, based in Tallinn, to address international and global cyber
security issues and how to respond to or prevent them.33
Development of state policies
Around the time of the founding of the CCDCOE a number of states were de­
veloping their own strategy documents to guide their military cyberopera­
After the Landmark Attack on Estonia, Is the World Better Prepared for Cyber Threats?”;




33NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, “About Us,” August 17, 2020,
accessed January 19, 2021, https://ccdcoe.org/about-us/.
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tions.34 The2010 version of the United Kingdom’s national security strategy
rated cyberattacks among the most significant risks to the state, a greater
threat than nuclear or conventional attacks by other states.35 Part of the
USA’s strategy is to assume that computing devices and networks have been
breached by non­state and foreign state actors.36 TheCanadian government,
while acknowledging that cyberattacks can be an effective military strategy
on their own or in conjunction with other strategies,37 recognized that cy­
berattacks are not equally severe, noting, “[t]he severity of a cyberattack de­
termines the appropriate level of response and/or mitigation measures.”38
The Russian Federation considers cyberattacks within the larger framework
of information warfare, which extends to “undermining the political, eco­
nomic, and social system, and massive brainwashing of the population for
destabilizing the society and the state, and also forcing the state to make
decisions in the interests of the confronting party,”39 but it also explicitly
declares that international humanitarian law applies to information war, at
least with respect to limiting harm.40
Together these state documents capture important aspects of cyberwar­
fare: the threat of significant harm, the inability to trust computing systems,
the inappropriateness of treating all cyberattacks in the same way, and the
34Tallinn 1.0, 2 explicitly mentions the documents produced by the USA, Canada, the UK,
and the Russian Federation.
35Great Britain Cabinet Office, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security
Strategy (London, UK: The Stationary Office, October 18, 2010), 27, accessed September 9,
2019, https : / / assets . publishing . service . gov . uk / government / uploads / system /
uploads/attachment_data/file/61936/national-security-strategy.pdf.
36Department of Defense [USA], Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (July 2011), 6, accessed
September 9, 2019, https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/ISPAB/documents/
DOD-Strategy-for-Operating-in-Cyberspace.pdf.
37Government of Canada, Canada’s Cyber Security Strategy: For a Stronger andMore Prosperous
Canada (Ottawa, ON: Public Safety Canada, 2010), 3, accessed September 9, 2019, http:
//publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2010/sp-ps/PS4-102-2010-eng.pdf.
38Government of Canada, 2 (box).
39Russian Federation, Conceptual Views Regarding the Activities of the Armed Forces of the Rus­
sian Federation in the Information Space, trans. NATO CCD COE, unofficial translation (2011), 5,
accessed September 9, 2019, http://ccdcoe.eu/uploads/2018/10/Russian_Federation_
unofficial_translation.pdf.
40Russian Federation, 6. There is also a clause that understands international humanitar­
ian law as requiring “the establishment of special protection for information objects, which
are particularly dangerous sources of technogenic catastrophes.”
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recognition that cyberspace is not exempt from at least some of the prin­
ciples of international law. Moreover, the policy of at least some states is
moving toward treating a cyberattack of “significant consequence” as an act
of war, taking into account “loss of life, physical property, economic impact,
and . . . foreign policy.”41
Governments and businesses are still seeking clarity with respect to ag­
gressive cyberoperations—both as plausible causes for military responses
and as permissible operations in international dealings. The 2020 Sunburst
spyware attack makes this clear. In the Sunburst attack, malicious code
was injected into SolarWinds’ Orion network monitoring software at build
time42 so it could be installed as part of an otherwise legitimate security up­
date.43 The code appears (so far) to have just exfiltrated information from
Orion users, but it also gathered user login details so it could imperson­
ate them, providing some degree of remote control over infected systems.44
When it was discovered that several US government departments had been
attacked,45 some politicians declared that the Sunburst attack was “virtually
a declaration of war”46 that required the USA to “retaliate, and not just with
sanctions.”47 Officials with actual expertise were more circumspect, but the
41Thomas Atkin (US Acting Assistant Secretary of Defence for Homeland Defence and
Global Security), qtd. in Bryant Jordan, “US Still Has NoDefinition for Cyber Acts ofWar,”
Military.com, June 22, 2016, accessed January 18, 2021, https://www.military.com/daily-
news/2016/06/22/us-still-has-no-definition-for-cyber-act-of-war.html.
42SolarWinds Corporation, United States Security and Exchange Commission Form 8­
K, December 17, 2020, accessed January 18, 2021, https://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.
net/CIK-0001739942/6dd04fe2-7d10-4632-89f1-eb8f932f6e94.pdf (hereafter cited as
SolarWinds 8­K); Gareth Corfield, “SolarWinds Malware Was Sneaked Out of the Firm’s
Orion Build Environment 6 Months Before Anyone Realised It Was There—Report,” The
Register, January 12, 2021, accessed January 18, 2021, https://www.theregister.com/2021/
01/12/solarwinds_tech_analysis_crowdstrike/.
43Tallinn 2.0, Rule 17, comment 7 anticipated this supply­chain attack scenario.
44Simon Sharwood, “SolarWinds Mess That Flared in the Holidays: Biz Confirms Mal­
ware Targeted Crocked Orion Product,” The Register, January 4, 2021, accessed January 18,
2021, https://www.theregister.com/2021/01/04/solarwinds_malware_confirmed/.
45Brian Fung, “Why the US Government Hack Is Literally Keeping Security Experts
Awake At Night,” CNN Business, December 16, 2020, accessed January 18, 2021, https://www.
cnn.com/2020/12/16/tech/solarwinds-orion-hack-explained/index.html.
46Dick Durbin (US senator), qtd. in Ian Wolfe and Brendan Pierson, “Explainer—US
Government Hack: Espionage or Act of War?,” Reuters, December 19, 2020, accessed Jan­
uary 18, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/global-cyber-legal-idUSKBN28T0HH.
47Marco Rubio (US senator), qtd. in Wolfe and Pierson.
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suspected involvement of Russian actors has again led to a call for “a set of
binding rules . . . to hold authoritarian regimes accountable, so they keep
their hands off civilians in this time of peace when it comes to cyberspace.”48
A treaty would be the ideal, but as pointed out in Chapter 2, one is not likely
in the near term. The TallinnManual is a step toward that desired set of rules.
Multinational support
TheCCDCOE gained visibility and support quickly. TheNorth Atlantic Treaty
Organization ﹙NATO﹚ accredited the CCDCOE as an international military or­
ganization with subject­matter expertise “not already found within NATO”49
only months after the centre was founded in 2008.50 At the end of 2020 the
CCDCOE included participants from 27 European nations, the USA, and the
UK.51 Even though the centre has NATO’s endorsement, NATO does not fund
or control the work of the centre, and the centre does not establish policy
for its member states or NATO. Moreover, the CCDCOE is not a law­making
body or a treaty organization. However, as an international centre of exper­
tise, it researches and advises on cyber technology, operations, strategy, and
law.52 As such, the CCDCOE is well­equipped to do the work of analyzing and
applying legal principles and practices to cyberoperations.
3.2 Constructing the Tallinn Manuals
Tallinn 1.0: international law and cyberwarfare
The first Tallinn Manual emerged from the confluence of these concurrent
developments. The reality of aggressive cyberoperations and the possibility
of cyberwar, the desire for clarity around states’ responsibilities and rights
with respect to cyberoperations, the evolution of international law in multi­
48Brad Smith (president of Microsoft), qtd. in Fung, “Why the US Government Hack Is
Literally Keeping Security Experts Awake At Night.”
49North Atlantic Treaty Organization ﹙NATO﹚, “Centres of Excellence,” November 3,
2020, accessed January 19, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_
68372.htm.
50NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, “About Us.”
51NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence.
52NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence.
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ple relevant dimensions, the tradition of codifying the current state of inter­
national law, and multinational (though not necessarily universal) interest
in such a project prompted the CCDCOE to convene a meeting involving ex­
perts in international law in 2009, with the goal of identifying and setting
down what parts, if any, of the existing international laws of armed conflict
could reasonably be applied to cyberwarfare.53
Over the following three years legal, academic, and technical experts
(both military and civilian) from nine states worked under the direction of
Michael Schmitt to prepare a peer­reviewed manual of rules drawn from
international law and an accompanying commentary explaining how those
rules are relevant to cyberwarfare. Schmitt is a highly­regarded scholar of
international law,54 a participant in the drafting of the HPCR Manual on air
andmissile warfare,55 and a pioneer in researching the relationships between
cyberwarfare and international law.56 This international group of experts
agreed to the text of the rules (with any exceptions noted), and affirmed
that the accompanying commentary reflected “all reasonable . . . competing
views” with respect to the application of each rule.57 In 2013 the TallinnMan­
ual on the International Laws Applicable to CyberWarfare (Tallinn 1.0) was released.
Unlike other domain­specific manuals on the rules of war, Tallinn 1.0 went
beyond jus in bello to set out some rules concerning jus ad bellum, analyzing
what cyberoperations against a state might be just cause for a use of force in
response. These are described in detail in Chapter 4 and applied to different
scenarios in Chapter 5.
Tallinn 1.0 was a significant development in the attempt to pin down how
existing international law applies to cyberwarfare. It addresses all of the
questions raised byDipert in his ground­breaking paper, establishing a strong
argument that cyberoperations in the context of an international armed con­
flict are governed by the same international law governing other means and
methods of warfare.
Just as important as Tallinn 1.0 itself is for establishing how international
53Tallinn 1.0, 1.
54NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, “About Us.”
55HPCR Manual, 413.
56James E.McGhee, “Cyber Redux:The Schmitt Analysis, TallinnManual and US Cyber




law applies are some of the criticisms it received. While none of the critics
doubted the credentials each of the experts brought to the process, there
were concerns that Tallinn 1.0 represented only Western—and particularly
American—interests,58 and that Tallinn 1.0 only codified the obvious by bolt­
ing the term cyber­ onto already­accepted international law concerning ki­
netic weapons.59
Tallinn 2.0: Cyberoperations in peacetime
Even though these criticisms misrepresented the goals of Tallinn 1.0, they did
not go unheeded. The sponsors of the project saw a need for interpreting
other aspects of international law in the cyber context. In particular, it was
observed that “States have to deal with cyber issues that lie below the use
of force threshold on a daily basis,”60 a problem that Tallinn 1.0 did not aim
to address. In 2013 the CCDCOE invited a second group of experts, again
under the direction of Michael Schmitt, to assess and set down how interna­
tional law controls cyberoperations more generally, particularly where state
sovereignty or international obligations are implicated.
58Elena Chernenko, “Russia Warns Against NATO Document Legitimizing Cyberwars,”
Russia Beyond, May 29, 2013, accessed January 25, 2021, https : / / www . rbth . com /
international/2013/05/29/russia_warns_against_nato_document_legitimizing_
cyberwars_26483.html; Chris Colvin, Daniel B. Garrie, and Siddartha Rao, “Cyber War­
fare and the Corporate Environment,” Journal of Law & Cyber Warfare 2, no. 1 (Spring 2013):
5–6, accessed January 25, 2021, https://www.jlcw.org/wp- content/uploads/2016/
09 / 2013 - JLCW - SpringVol _ 2 _ 1 . pdf; McGhee, “Cyber Redux: The Schmitt Analysis,
Tallinn Manual and US Cyber Policy,” 102; Ashley Deeks, “Tallinn 2.0 and a Chinese View
on the Tallinn Process,” Lawfare, May 31, 2015, accessed January 25, 2021, https://www.
lawfareblog.com/tallinn-20-and-chinese-view-tallinn-process. While *Tallinn 1.0*
aligns fairly closely with elements of American policy at the time, it diverges with respect to
the severity of an initial cyberattack required to justify a use of force in response. Michael
N. Schmitt, “International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and Tallinn Manual Juxta­
posed,”Harvard International Law Journal 54 (December 2012): 15, 21–2, accessed January 25,
2021, https://harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2012/12/HILJ-Online_
54_Schmitt.pdf. Chernenko’s report reveals an unwillingness to believe that Tallinn 1.0
does not reflect NATO policy. Deeks was a peer reviewer for both Tallinn 1.0 and Tallinn 2.0.
59McGhee, “Cyber Redux: The Schmitt Analysis, TallinnManual and US Cyber Policy,”
90; Lianne J. M. Boer, “ ‘Restating the Law “As It Is” ’: On the Tallinn Manual and the
Use of Force in Cyberspace,” Amsterdam Law Forum 5, no. 3 (Summer 2013): 10, accessed
January 25, 2021, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2338066.
60Tallinn 2.0, 1.
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This renewed analysis “does not deal with international criminal law, trade
law, . . . intellectual property[,] . . . private international law or domestic
law,”61 because these areas are not matters that affect a state’s sovereignty
over its territory. However, it does include interpretations of international
law as they apply to international organizations such as NATO, the European
Union, and UN agencies.62 The revised edition clarifies the applicability of
international law to peacetime cyberespionage and the non­applicability of
international law to non­state actors.63 It also includes sections on the pro­
tections afforded cyber infrastructure and operations under different inter­
national treaties concerning diplomatic practice, telecommunications, and
activities at and under the sea, in the air, and in space.64 This work required
doing more than just adding cyber­ or electronic to terms referring to objects
or activities that do not require cyberoperations, but also setting out posi­
tions on the novel activities (for example, communicating over social media
or distributing video from a civilian ship in international waters) facilitated
by advances in network and computing technology.
While these are all significant expansions of the original Tallinn Manual
in their own right, the most ambitious addition is the statement that inter­
national human rights law (at least to the extent that the treaties each state
has signed, and subject to states’ means to implement it) also applies to cy­
beroperations. Tallinn 2.0 observes that “the principle that the same rights
people have offline are to be protected online has been asserted repeatedly
in numerous multilateral and multisatkeholder fora,”65 a view that stands
in concord with the one expressed by the UN Human Rights Council.66 The
sticking point is not somuch that human rights law applies (even Russia and
61Tallinn 2.0, 3.
62Tallinn 2.0, Rules 32, 33.
63Tallinn 2.0, Rules 32, 33, though there are states that, under the guise of plausible
deniability expressed through the “plain meaning” of words, exert control over what are
officially represented as non­state actors.
64Tallinn 2.0, Rules 39–64.
65Tallinn 2.0, Rule 34, comment 1.
66United Nations Human Rights Council, Resolution on the Promotion, Protection and
Enjoyment of Human Rights on the Internet, June 30, 2016, A/HRC/32/L.20, Art. 1, ac­
cessed February 11, 2021, https://www.article19.org/data/files/Internet_Statement_
Adopted.pdf (hereafter cited as Resolution on Human Rights on the Internet).
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China acknowledge the existence of the idea of human rights67), but how.68
While the Tallinn Manual recognizes that cyber “technology is an enabler
of rights,”69 the Shanghai Cooperative Organization sees “new information
and communication technologies,” including cyber technology, as a threat
to “international security and stability in both civil and military spheres.”70
The views expressed in the Tallinn Manual favour individual rights and free­
doms more highly than the ones expressed in the Shanghai Cooperation
Agreement, which give more power to the state to curtail individual rights,
particularly with respect to access to information.71 The positive vision of
cyber technology is more in keeping with the spirit of the Resolution on
Human Rights on the Internet and the open, cooperative, international na­
ture of the Internet. I address some implications of Tallinn 2.0’s claim in
Chapter 6.
Though the Tallinn Manual acknowledges the rules and commentary are
the consensus opinion of the international group of experts and not the of­
ficial position of any states,72 it would be unfair to say that state representa­
tives were not consulted during the preparation of the new edition. Drafts
were presented to more than 50 “States of diverse regional backgrounds”73
and other international organizations for unofficial comment on current
states’ practices with respect to international law.74 It is important to un­
derstand that though the states and organizations that participated in this
consultation were not asked to endorse the drafts or the final product, the
information they provided gave better shape and nuance to the final ver­
sion in such a way that it can no longer be considered purely the opinion of
Western states.
Along the way, the group of experts revisited the first 9 rules, along with
67Shanghai Cooperation Agreement, Art. 4(1).
68Tallinn 2.0, 3.
69Tallinn 2.0, Rule 35, comment 22; cf. United Nations, Final Act of the International
Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, April 22–May 13, 1968, A/CONF.32/41, Res. XI,
preamble, p. 12, accessed February 11, 2021, https://documents- dds- ny.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/N68/958/82/PDF/N6895882.pdf?OpenElement.
70Shanghai Cooperation Agreement, preamble.
71Shanghai Cooperation Agreement, Art. 2.
72Tallinn 2.0, 2.




26 pages of commentary, of Tallinn 1.0 concerning state sovereignty, jurisdic­
tion, responsibility, and countermeasures. They were replaced with 30 rules
and 143 pages of commentary interpreting how international law around
these concepts applies during both times of peace and times of armed con­
flict.75 This expansion lays the foundation for broad individual, corporate,
and state freedoms in cyberspace while respecting the (nominally) equal
sovereignty customarily afforded to each state. The end result is the Tallinn
Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations,76 or Tallinn
2.0.
Toward Tallinn 3.0: State practice and emerging norms
TheUN statute establishing the ICJ makes it clear that the court’s decisions do
not necessarily establish international law for parties other than the ones con­
testing a particular case.77 The ICJ Statute also states that the court can draw
on principles identified both in earlier cases and by “the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means
for the determination of law.”78 The primary source of international law is
the collection of treaties between states, and those apply only to states that
have agreed to be bound by them.79 However, multinational treaties with
broad acceptance are international law for more than whichever two states
happen to be arguing their case before the ICJ. While the ICJ interprets these
treaties with respect to particular cases and parties, the Tallinn Manuals inter­
pret them with the understanding that, while they apply only to states party
to them, they apply equally to each state party, so the Tallinn Manuals can
present a codification of treaty law for general application.
The ICJ also applies international custom, determined by the degree of
75Tallinn 2.0, 2.
76Tallinn 2.0, 1–2.
77United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, Can TS
7 (1945), Art. 59, accessed January 28, 2021, https://www.icj- cij.org/en/statute
(hereafter cited as ICJ Statute).
78ICJ Statute, Art. 38(1)(d).
79ICJ Statute, Art. 38(1)(a).
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convergence of individual states’ practices,80 in its deliberations.81 While
treaty law does not bind non­party states, states can assert by their practices
that they believe some principles articulated in treaties have the weight of
law (opinio juris).82 Similarly, the Tallinn Manual treats state practice with
respect to a principle as an opinion to be noted in the commentary without
inferring that practices themselves necessarily establish a definitive rule cap­
turing international law. Even so, state practices are a key to interpreting
international law and identifying emerging agreement with respect to inter­
national norms.83 Toward the end of 2020, the CCDCOE announced that
work would soon begin on Tallinn 3.0, once again under the direction of
Michael Schmitt, to do just that.84
Tallinn 3.0 “will reflect current State practice regarding cyber operations,
including States’ official statements on international law,” the work of the
UN’s group of government experts and others on “responsible State behaviour
in cyberspace,” relevant academic scholarship, and “multistakeholder initia­
tives involving governments, industry, and civil society players.”85 It will
be difficult work. Perhaps the greatest challenge to this process will be con­
vincing states to overcome their reticence to make a substantial and candid
disclosure of their practices with respect to their own cyberoperations.86 It
is far easier to object to other states’ practices than admit that one’s own
80David Kennedy, “The Sources of International Law,” American University International
Law Review 2, no. 1 (March 1987): 37n70, accessed January 25, 2021, https://digitalcomm
ons.wcl.american.edu/auilr/vol2/iss1/1/, with references.
81ICJ Statute, Art. 38(1)(b).
82Legal Information Institute, “Opinio juris (international law),” Wex, accessed Jan­
uary 28, 2021, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/opinio_juris_(international_law).
The extent to which opinio juris establishes international custom is unsettled, but the ICJ has
the freedom to decide that a particular principle has become sufficiently customary to apply
in a particular case or advisory.
83Weingarten, “International Cyber Laws Remain Work in Progress, DoD’s Wingfield
Says.” Thomas Wingfield was a member of Tallinn 1.0’s international group of experts.
84NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, “CCDCOE to Host the Tallinn
Manual 3.0 Process,” December 14, 2020, accessed January 18, 2021, https://ccdcoe.org/
news/2020/ccdcoe-to-host-the-tallinn-manual-3-0-process/.
85NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence.
86Deeks, “Tallinn 2.0 and a Chinese View on the Tallinn Process”; Gary Corn, “Tallinn
Manual 2.0—Advancing the Conversation,” Just Security, February 15, 2017, accessed Jan­
uary 25, 2021, https://www.justsecurity.org/37812/tallinn-manual-2-0-advancing-
conversation/; Tallinn 2.0, 3.
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practices fall deep within what H.L.A. Hart described as the “penumbra of
uncertainty.”87 If the international group of experts can succeed there, then
Tallinn 3.0 may well be considered one of “the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations,”88 an expression of existing inter­
national law without creating new international law. Then Tallinn 3.0, follow­
ing in the spirit of eirenic clarification expressed by the Paris Declaration,89
will inform further development of international law while highlighting con­
flicting opinions that have made negotiating a full­blown cyberspace treaty
difficult.
3.3 The authority of the Tallinn Manual
Even though it is not a binding instrument of international law,90 its subject
matter—existing international law—is already binding.91 This distinction ap­
pears to have been overlooked bymanywho referred to Tallinn 1.0 in contexts
beyond jus ad bellum and jus in bello in the cyber realm.92 Michael Adams, a
former deputy general counsel to the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of
Staff and a 25­year veteran of the US Navy, noted that this could be because
the international group of experts may have done “too good of a job”:93
the quality of the commentary is such that readers do not take note of the
experts’ repeated declaration94 that the Tallinn Manual is not, on its own, es­
tablishing international law. Adams points out the potential consequence:
“the cyber lawyer is likely to turn to the Tallinn Manual as the leading cyber­
87Michael N. Schmitt, “Cyberspace and International Law: The Penumbral Mist of Un­
certainty,”Harvard Law Review Forum 126, no. 5 (March 2013): 178, accessed January 25, 2021,
https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/forvol126_schmitt.pdf.
88ICJ Statute, Art. 38(1)(d).
89Paris Declaration.
90Tallinn 2.0, 2.
91“To the extent the Rules accurately articulate customary international law, they are
binding on all States, subject to the possible existence of an exception for persistent objec­
tors.” Tallinn 1.0, 6; Tallinn 2.0, 4.
92Michael J. Adams, “A Warning About Tallinn 2.0 … Whatever It Says,” Lawfare, Jan­
uary 4, 2017, §1, accessed January 20, 2021, https://www.lawfareblog.com/warning-
about-tallinn-20-...-whatever-it-says.
93Adams, §1.
94Tallinn 1.0, 1, 5, 7, 11.
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warfare reference that he or she has, find the applicable rule, and restate the
Manual’s opinion as authoritative to the facts at hand.”95
Tallinn 2.0’s expanded scope keeps its readers from applying jus ad bel­
lum and jus in bello principles to contexts outside of armed conflict. But it
is still prone to being treated as the last, best word on international law in
cyberspace when, in many regards, Tallinn 2.0’s commentary is the first or
second comprehensive collection of the reasonable interpretations of inter­
national law. The international groups of experts hold that existing interna­
tional law already supports the general statement of Tallinn 2.0’s black­letter
rules, but the interpretations of each rule will not be consistently univocal.
To what extent, then, is the Tallinn Manual authoritative with respect to
international law applicable to cyberoperations? The experts involved in cre­
ating the Tallinn Manual are highly regarded in the international legal com­
munity, either as practitioners or as scholars (and sometimes both). Their
opinions, even when they disagree with each other, merit careful consider­
ation. The text of the rules presented in the Tallinn Manual were, with rare
noted exception, accepted unanimously by the group of experts. The inter­
national character of the group, the peer­review process, and, for Tallinn 2.0,
the international consultation, ensure that the Tallinn Manual is not biased
toward a particular state or alliance of states. Thus the TallinnManual carries,
as a minimum, the authority of a robust, rigorous academic and legal study.
With respect to settled law, the international groups of experts agreed, again
as legal practitioners and scholars, that their work is not authoritative as law,
but it is authoritative and comprehensive with respect to the ways interna­
tional law may apply, either by treaty or by international custom. It is up to
the states to agree on how international law applies in cyberspace, and the
expert analysis of the Tallinn Manual enables that discussion. In the absence
of such an agreement, the evolving Tallinn Manual may be left by default as
the clearest expression of international law and the associated “penumbra
of uncertainty” with respect to cyberoperations—against the desire of the
groups of international experts that develop it.96
95Adams, “A Warning About Tallinn 2.0 … Whatever It Says,” §2.
96Deeks, “Tallinn 2.0 and a Chinese View on the Tallinn Process.”
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3.4 Conclusion
The respect and attention given to Tallinn 1.0 is a testimony to its status as
a presentation of international law. The broader international consultation
that informed the creation of Tallinn 2.0 gives assurance that it represents
fairly the reasonable contrasting opinions with respect to international law
in cyberspace. The announcement of Tallinn 3.0 and some of its objectives
demonstrates that the project of codifying treaty and customary interna­
tional law continues to have merit, particularly as humans conduct more
and more of their lives online. The Tallinn Manual stands as an authorita­
tive study and representation of the current state of international law, so it
is useful for understanding the rights, responsibilities, and risks that come
with being a state actor in cyberspace, even as it encourages the interna­
tional community to continue work on crafting acceptable norms of state
behaviour in the cyber realm.
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Chapter 4
The Tallinn Manual and just­war
theory
4.1 From international law to just-war theory
The Tallinn Manual is regarded as a fair representation of the aspects of in­
ternational law that are relevant to cyberoperations. In turn, international
law, and in particular international humanitarian law, incorporate elements
of just­war theory. But, as noted in Chapter 2, international humanitarian
law does not incorporate all of just­war theory. I now turn to how well the
Tallinn Manual accords with those criteria and requirements.
With respect to jus in bello, the Tallinn Manual’s innovation is interpreting
those principles in the cyber context, following the pattern of other domain­
specific manuals. Tallinn 1.0 is the first domain­specific manual to address
jus ad bellum conditions. Tallinn 2.0 is the first to incorporate international
human rights law, which connects to jus post bellum, even though Tallinn 2.0
does not use that term. Jus post bellum requires that, in the process of con­
cluding a war justly, the parties to the conflict establish the means to defend
and provide for the free exercise of fundamental human rights. By incor­
porating human rights law, Tallinn 2.0 sets down the plausible cyber­related
aspects of a minimally just society—something which jus post bellum, if exe­
cuted well, provides. Thus Tallinn 2.0 incorporates at least the ultimate goal
of jus post bellum. I now assess how closely the Tallinn Manual follows these
aspects of just­war theory.
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4.2 The Tallinn Manual and jus in bello
The largest part of the rules set down in the Tallinn Manual concern the con­
duct of an armed conflict once it has begun.1 For the purposes of determin­
ing when an armed conflict exists, the Tallinn Manual follows the lead of the
International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚ set out in common Arti­
cle 2 of the four Geneva Conventions: any international conflict involving
the occupation of a state or hostilities between states triggers the applica­
tion of international humanitarian law, regardless of whether a state of war
has been declared.2 It does not matter that the jus ad bellum conditions were
met at the outset. Conflicts unjustly begun must still be conducted by just
means.3
The Tallinn Manual interprets each the seven jus in bello obligations of just­
war theory (see Table 2.2) in the cyber context. It makes explicit reference4
to the Martens Clause and similar wording in other conventions asserting
that the waging of war is constrained by “the principles of the law of na­
tions, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples,
from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience.”5 Fol­
1There is no significant difference between the two editions with respect to jus in bello.
Tallinn 1.0 contains 76 rules associated with jus in bello (Rules 20–95); Tallinn 2.0 contains 75
(rules 80–154). One new rule addressing individual responsibility under the laws of armed
conflict was added, while the rules on peacekeeping operations and diplomatic protections
were moved to sections containing rules that apply in times of peace as well as war.
2International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Commentary on the First Geneva Conven­
tion: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field, 2nd ed., ed. Knut Dörmann et al. (March 22, 2016), ¶¶193,194, 201, 202, accessed
October 2, 2019, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCI-commentary (hereafter
cited as GC I Commentary, 2016); Tallinn 2.0, Rule 80, comment 2.
3Tallinn 2.0, Rule 80, comment 9, Rule 80, comments 17, 18.
4Tallinn 2.0, Rule 80, comments 11, 12.
5HC IV (1907), preamble; International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Convention
﹙I﹚ for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, Geneva, August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 31, Art. 63, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/
applic / ihl / ihl . nsf / 4825657B0C7E6BF0C12563CD002D6B0B / FULLTEXT / GC - I - EN . pdf
(hereafter cited as GC I); International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Convention
﹙II﹚ for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members




lowing the guidance of the ICJ in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion,6 the
Tallinn Manual affirms “that the general rules that determine the legality of
weapons will also determine the lawfulness of cyber methods and means of
warfare.”7 Consequently, states have an obligation to determine how the
use of cyber weapons and infrastructure stays within the bounds of jus in
bello obligations.8 The ICJ classifies these obligations under two “cardinal
principles” with respect to means and methods: “protection of the civilian
population and civilian objects,” and prohibition of “unnecessary suffering
of combatants.”9
Protecting the civilian population and civilian objects
The first of these cardinal principles, the principle of distinction or discrimina­
tion, grants formal protection to civilians who are not engaged in conflicts
between states. Similar protection is granted to objects and facilities that do
not serve a military purpose. This protection means simply that they cannot
be targets of a lawful attack, not that they cannot be harmed or damaged in
the act of neutralizing a military target through a lawful attack. The Tallinn
Manual reaffirms this principle10 and offers guidance for determining if a po­
tential target is a lawful objective. This protection includes a responsibility
to take “constant care . . . to spare the civilian population, individual civil­
GC-II-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as GC II); International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚,
Convention ﹙III﹚ Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, August 12, 1949,
75 UNTS 135, Art. 142, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl- databases.icrc.org/ap
plic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/
77CB9983BE01D004C12563CD002D6B3E/FULLTEXT/GC-III-EN.002.pdf (hereafter cited as
GC III); International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Convention ﹙IV﹚ Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 287, Art.
158, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/
xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/AE2D398352C5B028C1256
3CD002D6B5C/FULLTEXT/ATTXSYRB.pdf (hereafter cited as GC IV). AP I, Art. 1(2) reads, “ . . .
the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of
humanity, and from the dictates of public conscience.”
6Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, ¶¶86, 87.
7Tallinn 2.0, introductory remarks to Rules 103–110.
8Tallinn 2.0, Rule 110.
9Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, ¶78.
10Tallinn 2.0, Rules 93, 94, 99; cf. International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Rules,
Rules 1, 7.
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ians, and civilian objects.”11 Persons who provide medical and chaplaincy
services to those engaged in the conflict, along with the necessary equip­
ment to support those services, are also granted protection under the terms
of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols.12 Importantly, this
protection extends to “[c]omputers, computer networks, and data that form
an important part of the operations or administration of medical units and
transports,” provided that the same equipment is not used to support mili­
tary activity against the opposing parties.13 This is an important clarification,
because it extends to personal data relevant to patient care.14 Protecting pa­
tient data benefits all parties in the conflict because it helps medical staff
provide the benevolent treatment owed to any prisoners of war.15 This is
the first time data is explicitly given protection separate from its underlying
storage and processing technology. I will take up the implications of this in
Chapter 6.
Another application of the principle of distinction involves infrastructure
that facilitates intercontinental cyberoperations. This draws in multiple cri­
teria for distinguishing the lawfulness of targeting long­range infrastructure
during an armed conflict: what is it being used for, who owns it, and what
non­belligerent states are making legitimate use of it? One kind of long­
range cyber infrastructure is the undersea cable.16 The Tallinn Manual notes
that, under the principle of distinction with respect to non­belligerents, un­
dersea cables are protected objects. Many undersea communication cables
are owned by private groups, even though they are used (in part) for gov­
ernment purposes;17 thus they are technically civilian objects. Further, they
terminate in two different states (and may cross the continental shelf that
belongs to other states),18 so the cables are governed by multiple govern­
11Tallinn 2.0, Rule 114.
12Tallinn 2.0, Rule 131.
13Tallinn 2.0, Rule 132.
14Tallinn 2.0, Rule 132, comment 3.
15Tallinn 2.0, Rule 135, comments 2–4; cf. International Committee of the Red Cross
﹙ICRC﹚, Rules, Art. 109–11.
16Data can also be transmitted using satellite links. The laws of war around satellite
communications are less clear, because they involve both space and international telecom­
munications law. Tallinn 2.0, 272–73. Some of the open questions will be presented in
Chapter 7.
17Tallinn 2.0, Rule 54, comment 2.
18Tallinn 2.0, Rule 54, comments 6, 10; cf. United Nations, Convention on the Law of the
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ments’ territorial authority as well as the Convention on the Law of the Sea
﹙CLOS﹚.19 For the most part, then, cables cannot be lawfully disrupted, for
it would be incongruent to provide States a right to lay such
cables without a corresponding obligation on the part of other
States to protect them. Thus, for instance, the Law of The Sea
does not provide a legal basis for a State to cut another State’s
submarine fibre optic cable in order to reduce trans­continental
Internet traffic in times of tension.20
There are two possible lawful exceptions, only one of which is detailed
in the Tallinn Manual. If a state has become an “Occupying Power” over ter­
ritory containing a submarine communication cable, and that cable is con­
nected to neutral territory, then it may “be seized or destroyed [only] in the
case of absolute necessity.”21 The other exception is found in the San Remo
Manual: submarine communication cables in areas “beyond national juris­
diction” and that “do not exclusively serve the belligerents” must be given
particular care against damage.22 If it can be ascertained that only belliger­
ent states are using the cable (both a high technical bar and an improbable
scenario with respect to Internet traffic) for military purposes, it might then
be a legitimate military objective subject to lawful attack.23
The Russia­based shutdown of Estonia’s Internet, even if it had been a
military response to an actual use of force on Estonia’s part (and the moving
of a statue is not one), clearly flouts the principle of discrimination. The
cyberattack affected the whole country, not just the Estonian military forces.
Civilians had no access to banking or government services, for even if they
had gone to a branch or an office for in­person service, the person behind
the counter could well not have been able to satisfy the request because their
workstation used the public Internet. Civilian persons and infrastructure
Sea, December 10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, Art. 79, 87(1)(c), 87(2), 112(1), accessed November 28,
2019, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.
pdf (hereafter cited as CLOS).
19Tallinn 2.0, Rule 54, comment 1.
20Tallinn 2.0, Rule 54, comment 15.
21Tallinn 2.0, Rule 149, comment 10; cf. HC IV (1907), Annex, Art. 54. Compensation is
required as part of establishing peace.
22San Remo Manual, Art. 36, 37.
23Tallinn 2.0, Rule 150, comment 5.
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were the cyberattack’s intended targets. The harm they suffered was direct,
not incidental to an attack on a military target.
Prohibition of unnecessary suffering
The cardinal principle of avoiding unnecessary suffering is also relevant to
cyberwarfare. One way to avoid unnecessary suffering is to abide by the
principle of distinction, thereby limiting the effects of an aggressive cyber­
operation to lawful targets. However, even the lawful harm done to com­
batants is limited to what is justifiably necessary (that is, proportionate) to
render them unable to continue in the conflict.24 The Tallinn Manual notes
that, for the most part, cyberattacks will not inflict this kind of unnecessary
suffering.25 Even so, there are some cyberattacks that can fall under the cat­
egory of means and methods mala in se (that is, evil in themselves). The data
connection built in to personal assistive devices (for example, pacemakers,
insulin pumps, prosthetic limbs, or cochlear implants) provides an avenue
for a cyberattack to take control of that device and use it to inflict more
harm than required to render the person unable to participate any further
in the conflict.26 In addition, cyberattacks that are designed to be indiscrim­
inate with respect to civilian targets (persons or objects) are prohibited,27
as are “cyber booby traps,” pieces of software designed to result in death or
injury that is unexpected by the person triggering it. To count as a booby
trap, this software has to be associated with a limited class of objects that ap­
pear innocuous to a “reasonable observer”: medical equipment, items used
for training or caring for children (including toys), kitchen utensils or ap­
pliances, or objects associated with cultural or spiritual heritage.28 As an
example, consider malware deployed to an Internet­connected game con­
sole. After a triggering condition is met (perhaps time, a sequence of but­
ton presses, or a number of interactions), the malware modifies the signals
that activate the feedback mechanism in the controller. These signals induce
rapid overheating in the controller so it catches fire, burning the player. This
24Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, ¶78.
25Tallinn 2.0, Rule 104, comment 6.
26Tallinn 2.0, Rule 104, comment 6.
27Tallinn 2.0, Rule 105.
28Tallinn 2.0, Rule 106, comment 3.
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would be a cyber booby­trap, and thus a violation of both the principle of
distinction and the principle of avoiding unnecessary suffering.
Further, the TallinnManual points out that cyberattacks designed “for the
exclusive purpose of disrupting transportation of food to civilian popula­
tion centres” or “target[ing] food processing and storage facilities in order
to cause civilian food stocks to spoil”29 are prohibited because they are in­
tended to starve civilians, not weaken the enemy’s military personnel.30 In
a similar vein, the natural environment31 has protected status both under
the principle of distinction as a civilian object and under the principle of
proportionality should some part of it be used in support of a state’s mili­
tary activity.32 The Tallinn Manual only affirms that the natural environment
is a civilian object,33 noting that signatories to AP I have additional obliga­
tions to not use “cyber methods or means of warfare which are intended, or
may be expected, to cause widespread, long­term, and severe damage to the
natural environment.”34 This points to a developing recognition that using
environmental harm as ameans of war against a civilian population can have
the same effect as using starvation or otherwise depriving the civilian pop­
ulation of the means of subsistence, and so could justifiably be included in
the category of methods mala in se. A cyberattack that results in this kind of
harm, such as causing a rupture in an oil pipeline where it crosses an aquifer,
would qualify as such a prohibited attack.
Children receive specific consideration with respect to armed conflict in
the Tallinn Manual. The use of child soldiers is considered a war crime and
29Tallinn 2.0, Rule 107, comment 4.
30International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Rules, Rule 53.
31The term natural environment does not have an agreed­upon definition within interna­
tional law. Tallinn 2.0, Rule 143, comment 3 follows United Nations, Convention on the
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Tech­
niques, December 10, 1976, 1108 UNTS 151, Art. II, accessed November 26, 2019, https://
treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1978/10/19781005%2000-39%20AM/Ch_XXVI_01p.pdf
(hereafter cited as ENMOD): “the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, includ­
ing its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere.” ENMOD includes outer space, but
the Tallinn Manual committee did not have consensus on this point.
32Tallinn 2.0, Rule 143, comment 4; cf. GC IV, Art. 147 (“extensive destruction and ap­
propriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly”); International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Rules, Rules 43–45.
33Tallinn 2.0, Rule 143(a).
34Tallinn 2.0, Rule 143(b).
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an offence against the rights of children, and is therefore prohibited under
accepted international law.35 The Tallinn Manual extends this prohibition to
the cyber domain: “[s]tates must . . . take all feasible measures to ensure that
children do not participate in hostilities. . . . There is no reason to exclude
engaging in cyber activities from the ambit of participation.”36
This is a reasonable position to advance. For example, convincing a child
to follow a set of instructions that launch a DDOS attack against a network
(without the child knowing that the network belongs to a hospital system)
because it would be a fun learning experience seems less serious than send­
ing a child soldier into armed combat. However, it is just as exploitive and
just as great a violation of the child’s rights for a child to be used as a cyber
warrior as it is for that child to be sent to shoot up a school or movie theatre.
Any involvement of children in combat is prohibited as exploitive.37 In a
way, it is also perfidious:38 it takes advantage of other states acting in good
faith to mitigate harm to children, leveraging that protection to achieve a
military objective against a state acting in good faith. Further, this places
the children at greater risk of harm. Any children participating in hostilities
by cyber means become combatants, and so become legitimate targets for
attack.
The proportionality obligation of jus in bello, understood as the avoidance
of excessive force or harm,39 can also be slotted under this rubric of avoiding
unnecessary suffering, because those requirements align with two distinct
aspects arising from the principle of distinction. The first is intended to pro­
tect lawful combatants. Any suffering inflicted upon enemy combatants is
limited to that caused by the minimum justifiable force (using permissible
means and methods) required to render the targeted part of the enemy’s
military capability ineffective.40 The second aspect establishes the same re­
striction with respect to civilian harm, at least for adherents to AP I.41 The
35International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Rules, Rules 136, 137; cf. Rights of
the Child, Art. 38.
36Tallinn 2.0, Rule 138, comment 4.
37Rights of the Child, Art. 36.
38International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Rules, Rule 65.
39Tallinn 2.0, Rule 113, comment 1.
40International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Rules, Rule 70, comment on pp.
240–241.
41International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Rules, Rule 14; cf. AP I, Art. 51(5)(b),
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Tallinn Manual acknowledges this constraint for cyber means and methods
with respect to both combatants and civilians.42
Finally, in the spirit of not responding to an injustice with another injus­
tice, the limits on reprisals against states that do violate the other jus in bello
obligations are intended to serve as additional safeguards against unneces­
sary suffering. TheGeneva Conventions affirm that “[t]heHigh Contracting
Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Conven­
tion in all circumstances.”43 This expectation extends to the whole of interna­
tional humanitarian law as it has developed since then,44 regardless of how
closely other parties to the conflict adhere to them.45 While the prohibition
of reprisals against civilians is not yet taken as international law, it does ap­
ply to the states that have signed or acceded to AP I.46 There is also a growing
recognition that reprisals, even when targeted against belligerents only and
not civilians, are ineffective in curtailing delinquent behaviour,47 and that
reprisals made against civilians often lead to escalating counter­reprisals.48
The Tallinn Manual follows the current state of international law and not
the full jus in bello obligations of just­war theory in this regard. It acknowl­
edges that reprisals made by cyber means against civilian targets may not
be carried out by the states party to AP I that have not issued a reservation
or alternative understanding against this prohibition.49 Any cyber­based
reprisals against belligerents are limited to government­approved actions
of last resort “for the purpose of inducing the adversary to comply with
the law.”50 In other words, reprisals are not meant to be punitive but co­
ercive, though the state on the receiving end of them will likely treat them
57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b). There is increasing recognition that this rule has become part of
international law applicable to all states, not just the states party to AP I. International
Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Rules, Rule 14, commentary on pp. 47–48.
42Tallinn 2.0, Rule 104, comments 2, 3, Rule 113.
43GC I–IV (1949), Common Art. 1.
44International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Rules, Rule 139.
45International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Rule 140.
46International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Rules, Rule 146, commentary on p.
520; AP I, Art. 51(6).
47International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Rules, Rule 145, commentary on p.
514.
48International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Rule 146, commentary on p. 522.
49Tallinn 2.0, Rule 109, comment 1.
50Tallinn 2.0, Rule 108, comment 5.
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as punitive. Even so, the jus in bello obligation to avoid unnecessary suffer­
ing, the commitment of many states to refrain from reprisals for violation of
international law, and the observed escalation of ineffective reprisals argue
in favour of this prohibition eventually becoming accepted as international
law.51
There is a real­world example of a cyberattack causing unnecessary suf­
fering. WannaCry (described in Chapter 2), if it had been definitively at­
tributable to theNorthKorean government, would fall afoul of the principle
of avoiding unnecessary suffering as well as the principle of discrimination.
While no deaths were attributable to WannaCry in the UK, the malware did
affect civilians waiting for treatment, and for patients whose conditions pro­
duced suffering, it prolonged that suffering unnecessarily. In the context
of an armed conflict, this could have been prosecuted as a war crime, one
committed by cyber means, for it would have been a grave breach of inter­
national humanitarian law.52
Respect for rights of citizens
All of the foregoing jus in bello obligations are focused on the protections
that apply to combatants and civilians from an enemy or neutral state. The
remaining one, articulated in part in GC IV, focuses on a belligerent state’s
treatment of non­combatants under its protection: a state at war must re­
spect at least some rights of all non­combatants, including its own citizens,
within its own territory or any other territory it occupies:
Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect
for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious
convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They
shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected es­
pecially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against
insults and public curiosity.
. . . [A]ll protected persons shall be treated with the same con­
sideration by the Party to the conflict in whose power they are,
51International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Rules, Rule 145, commentary on p.
513.
52International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Rule 90.
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without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, re­
ligion or political opinion.
However, the Parties to the conflict may take such measures of
control and security in regards to protected persons as may be
necessary as a result of the war.53
This is a minimal set of rights. Despite the existence of the Universal Dec­
laration of Human Rights, the human rights treaties that refer to it (such
as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR], the In­
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Political Rights [ICESCR],54
and other regional treaties) protect different, but overlapping, sets of rights.
These treaties also impose differing obligations with respect to facilitating
the exercise of those rights, and may permit suspending a very few rights on
a temporary basis in times of declared national emergency.55 This process
is called derogation, though the matter of which rights may be suspended
and what reasons justify that suspension is very much not settled. Treaty
law makes it clear that any derogation from rights is discouraged, as most
rights treaties contain language upholding all non­derogation clauses in
other rights treaties to which a state is party.56 In other words, if a right
is non­derogable under one rights treaty, it is also non­derogable under all
applicable rights treaties.
Despite the lack of agreement in treaty law concerning which rights are
inviolable and which ones states may derogate from,57 the Tallinn Manual as­
serts that whatever human rights a person enjoys in meatspace58 also extend
to cyberspace.59 The Tallinn Manual articulates not just respect for human
rights in a cyber context,60 but also a state’s obligation to protect them in
53GC IV, Art. 27.
54United Nations General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, December 16, 1966, 993 UNTS 3, accessed June 26, 2018, https://treaties.
un.org/doc/Treaties/1976/01/19760103%2009-57%20PM/Ch_IV_03.pdf (hereafter cited
as ICESCR).
55Tallinn 2.0, introductory comments to Rules 34–38, pp. 179–82; ICCPR, Art. 4.
56ICCPR, Art. 5; ICESCR, Art. 5.
57Tallinn 2.0, Rule 38.
58Meatspace is a colloquial term used by some people in the computing industry to refer
to things and activities outside of cyberspace.
59Tallinn 2.0, Rules 34, 35.
60Tallinn 2.0, Rule 34, comment 1.
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cyberspace.61 This protection is understood as the obligation to “ensure re­
spect for” rights by not engaging in unlawful interference against them.62
Some rights are particularly important in the cyber context: “freedom of
expression, privacy, freedom of opinion, and due process.”63 These are ap­
propriate extensions of rights associated with older public and private forms
of communication. However, some treaties permit all but due process and
freedom of opinion to be curtailed “to the extent required by the exigencies
of the situation” should a significant threat to the “life of the nation” arise,64
and this is also acknowledged in the Tallinn Manual.65 The upshot is that,
even in times of armed conflict, the Tallinn Manual asserts, with reasons and
qualifications, that there are some human rights that states are obliged to
protect in cyberspace as well as in meatspace during times of armed conflict.
The matter of human rights comes up again with respect to jus post bellum.
4.3 The Tallinn Manual and jus ad bellum
Determining when an armed conflict may be justly begun is maddeningly
difficult. Under the UN Charter, this is a matter for the United Nations Se­
curity Council to decide,66 a time­consuming process often frustrated by the
competing interests of its permanent members. There is one exception per­
mitted: a statemay declare unilaterally that it is acting in self­defence against
a use of force by another state.67 The UN Charter does not consider a plau­
sible threat of a use of force to be sufficient ground for a state to launch a
pre­emptive strike in self­defence without the consent of the Security Coun­
cil.68
61Tallinn 2.0, Rule 36, comment 1.
62Tallinn 2.0, comment 5, introduction to Rules 34–38, p. 181.
63Tallinn 2.0, Rule 35, comment 1.
64ICCPR, Art. 4(1).
65Tallinn 2.0, Rule 38.
66UN Charter, Art. 39.
67UN Charter, Art. 51.
68UN Charter, Art. 39–42. Brian Orend puts this idea bluntly: “The mere threat of war,
and the presence of mutual disdain between two communities, do not suffice as indicators
of war.” Orend, “War.” Some states do not accept this restriction, and there may be some
situations where the protection of civilians might provide just cause for an armed attack
against a state that does not honour the rights of its civilians under the emerging doctrine
of responsibility to protect. Gareth Evans et al., The Responsibilty to Protect: Report of the Interna­
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The Tallinn Manual aims to provide guidance on how an aggressive cy­
beroperation can justly be declared a use of force or an armed attack. The UN
Charter is not helpful here, since it neither defines nor clearly describes what
a use of force or an armed attack is.69 This draws in the idea of just cause, one of
the jus ad bellum conditions (see Table 2.1) that must be satisfied to justify en­
gaging in an armed conflict. The Tallinn Manual proposes eight criteria, set
out in Table 4.1, to consider when making this determination.70 This study
is particularly interested in four of these: severity, immediacy, directness, and
measurability of effects. Should there be enough evidence to declare the ini­
tial aggressive act a use of force or an armed attack, the target state has just
cause for responding, but only in accordance with the other jus ad bellum con­
ditions. For example, even if a state has demonstrated that there is just cause
for a forceful response, the methods that do not satisfy the proportionality
constraint are not lawful responses.
It may not be possible to precisely determine the severity of any harm­
ful effects caused by a use of force. However, some of the effects can be
compared to those produced by other uses of force that have already been
judged to be armed attacks. This is part of assessing what the ICJ has labelled
the scale and effects of the action.71 The Tallinn Manual’s severity and measura­
bility of effects criteria for establishing just cause are intended to capture this
important idea.72 Immediacy and directness look at the causes of those effects.
The first concerns the amount of time between the primary cause leading to
tional Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa, ON: International Development
Research Centre, 2001) (hereafter cited as Responsibility to Protect).
69Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 2. The UN Charter only preserves the right of a state to
respond in self­defence to an armed attack. UN Charter, Art. 51. Otherwise, unless the UN
Security Council has decided that the use of force is justified, the Charter enjoins member
states to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state . . . ’’ UN Charter, Art. 2(4).
70Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 9. The Tallinn Manual provides a minimal list that in­
cludes the six criteria proposed inMichael N. Schmitt, “Computer Network Attack and the
Use of Force in International Law:Thoughts on a Normative Framework,” Columbia Journal
of Transnational Law 37, no. 3 (1999): 914–15, https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=
hein.journals/cjtl37&id=893. It further notes that other factors may be taken into ac­
count depending on the political context. Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 10. This leaves it
open for the target state, and not the international community, to determine whether an
armed response is justified.
71Nicaragua Judgement, ¶195; Tallinn 2.0, Rule 71, comment 7.
72Tallinn 2.0, Rule 71, comment 8 makes indirect reference to these criteria.
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Cyber just­cause criteriaa
severity “scope, duration, and intensity” of harm to state
interests; physical damage to objects and injury
or death of humans are most severe
immediacyb rapid progress of consequences
directnessb clear, proximate causal connection of attack to its
effects
invasivenessb degree of effect on target state’s interests and
degree of effort required to produce them
measurability of effects objectively quantifiable description of extent of
damage
military characterb carried out by a state military organization,
targets a military system, or increases the
effectiveness of an armed attack
state involvement participation or support from an organ of the
state in the development and execution of the
attack
presumptive legality qualitative assessment of similarity to operations
that have clearly been determined are not uses of
force or are not barred by international law
Table 4.1: Cyber just­cause criteria. All of these criteria must be evaluated before
making a forceful response to a cyberattack. No single one is decisive with respect
to classifying the action as a use of force; conversely, failure to meet certain criteria
does not necessarily rule out such a classification.
a Summarized from Michael N. Schmitt and Liis Vihul, eds., Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the
International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations: Prepared by the International Group of Experts
at the Invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2017), Rule 69, comment 9 (hereafter cited as Tallinn 2.0).
b Failure on this criterion is not necessarily decisive.
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the effects, and the second concerns the length and complexity of the causal
chain itself. I explore the relationships among these four criteria further in
Chapter 5.
The four remaining qualitative just­cause criteria aremilitary character, state
involvement, invasiveness, and presumptive legality.73 Each of these is a littlemore
nuanced in the cyber context than in the context of conventional warfare.
Military character
An aggressive cyberoperation is more likely to be considered to havemilitary
character when a state’s armed forces have some degree of involvement in
launching or facilitating the cyberoperation, or when the target serves a mil­
itary purpose.74 In conventional warfare the involvement of a state’s armed
forces is usually readily visible because the combatants, vehicles, vessels, and
aircraft are expected to display, at least in most circumstances, some mark
identifying them as belonging to a military force.75 In contrast, determining
whether a state’s armed forces are involved in a cyberattack may be difficult
to do quickly. (Edward Cardon of US Cyber Command has noted that mili­
tary character and state involvement may be easier to determine than is com­
monly believed. He recalled that, while US Cyber Command was preparing
a cyberattack to curtail Daesh’s Internet presence in 2016, intelligence ex­
perts preferring subtle disruption “would say, ‘If you do it like that, they’ll
know it’s you!’ . . . I’d just look at them and say, ‘Who cares? When I’m us­
ing artillery, attack aviation, jets—you think they don’t know it’s the United
States of America?”76) However if, on the basis of available evidence, the
cyberattack appears to have a military origin, then it is more likely to be a
just cause for an armed response than if there is no such involvement, just
as it is in conventional armed conflict.
A cyberattack definitively targeting a military facility, such as Israel’s
hacking of Syria’s air defences as part of a strike against a potential nuclear
73Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 9.
74Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 9(f).
75HC IV (1907), Annex, Art. 1; San Remo Manual, Art. 110; HPCR Manual, Art. 1(x); AP I,
Art. 44(3).
76Garrett N. Graff, “The Man Who Speaks Softly—and Commands a Big Cyber Army,”
Wired, October 13, 2020, §5, accessed October 14, 2020, https://www.wired.com/story/
general-paul-nakasone-cyber-command-nsa/.
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facility in 2007,77 also satisfies the military character criterion for having
just cause. If a military facility is the target of a cyberattack by activist or
criminal groups, the military character criterion is again satisfied, but with­
out state involvement (at least at the outset) the attack is not likely a use of
force under the terms of international law.78 On the other hand, the 2007
cyberattack on Estonia did not explicitly target a military facility, and it was
not clearly connected to Russian armed forces, so that attack did not have a
clear military character. Yet the attack was still severe enough to merit con­
sideration as a use of force against Estonia. All this demonstrates that failing
to meet the military character criterion is not, by itself, sufficient reason to
judge a cyberattack as not being a just cause for a use of force in response.
State involvement
If an aggressive cyberoperation is directly connected to a military organiza­
tion, it is sufficient to satisfy the criterion of state involvement in the attack.
However, it is not a necessary condition for finding a foreign state’s involve­
ment, in part because states can contract out the disruptive dirty work. This
is easier to do in the cyber realm than in the realm of land­based combat, but
it is a land­based conflict that established this principle: the American sup­
port for the contras against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua in the
1980s.79 While the armed forces of the USA were not active participants in the
ground­based aspect of the conflict, the USA funded, trained, and equipped
the rebel forces that did participate. The ICJ ruling observed that
while the arming and training of the contras can certainly be said
to involve the threat or use of force against Nicaragua, this is
not necessarily so with respect to all of the assistance given by
the United States Government. In particular, . . . the mere sup­
ply of funds to the contras, while undoubtedly an act of interven­
77Sharon Weinberger, “How Israel Spoofed Syria’s Air Defence System,” Wired, Octo­
ber 4, 2007, accessed February 1, 2021, https://www.wired.com/2007/10/how-israel-
spoo/.
78This does not mean that the state from which the attack was launched has no respon­
sibility to end it. Tallinn 2.0, Rule 6.
79Chimene­Weiss et al., “Understanding the Iran­Contra Affairs: Nicaragua and Iran
Timeline”; see also the summary in Chapter 2 on p. 31.
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tion into the internal affairs of Nicaragua, . . . does not in itself
amount to a use of force.80
By analogy, even though a state organization may not be involved di­
rectly or immediately in an aggressive cyberoperation (say, one mounted by
a skilled activist group), if it can be shown that there is a connection to a
state body, such as providing training or equipment to the aggressors that
enabled them to carry out an attack (something more than funding), then
the criterion of state involvement in the particular operation might also be
met.81 This kind of connection would weigh in favour of judging the ac­
tion as meeting the threshold of a use of force, and thus more likely to pro­
vide just cause for a forceful response. In a similar vein, if a state provides
sanctuary to such a group while leaving it to its own devices to launch a
cyberattack against another state, the sheltering state has not made a use
of force, but failing to take steps to end the attack is likely a violation of
the target state’s sovereignty82 through a failure of due diligence.83 In other
words, while money and shelter may be instrumental to launching an aggres­
sive cyberattack, they are not the means of carrying out any attack. Merely
providing these things to a group is not sufficient to demonstrate state in­
volvement in the attack itself. Considering an armed response on this basis
alone amounts to acting on hearsay, not direct evidence connected to the
cyberoperation. On the other hand, equipping and training are strong in­
dicators of some kind of state sponsorship. For example, while the Russian
nationalist activists who acknowledged their part in the 2007 cyberattack
on Estonia denied receiving state funding, training or direction,84 the Sand­
worm group of Russian hackers responsible for the NotPetya malware that
did an estimated US$10 billion worth of damage worldwide in 2017,85 was not
80Nicaragua Judgement, ¶228.
81Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 4.
82Tallinn 2.0, Rules 6, 7.
83Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 5.
84Davis, “Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe.”
85Andy Greenberg, “The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack
in History,” Wired, August 22, 2018, accessed February 4, 2021, https://www.wired.com/
story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/. Like the
Sunburst attack, NotPetya was injected into a Ukranian software developer’s build system
and was released through a legitimate piece of accounting software. It spread rapidly, en­
crypting hard drives on every system it could get into, but unlike other encryption attacks,
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known to have a verified association with the Russian government, so state
involvement could not be asserted. However, the discovery that Sandworm
was part of Russia’s GRU (Chief Intelligence Office)86 changed that: Not­
Petya is now widely recognized as a state­sponsored cyberattack, and six
members of Sandworm have been indicted in the USA for their involvement
in NotPetya.87
Invasiveness
Even in cases where there is evidence of state involvement in an aggressive cy­
beroperation, that operation has to intrude on a state’s sovereignty in some
significant way in order to be considered a use of force under the Tallinn
Manual’s interpretation of just cause. Invasiveness is difficult to assess, be­
cause if a cyberoperation’s only effect is exfiltration of data, then the action
is only at the level of espionage, which is permissible under international
law,88 even though it required invading a system in the target state to get
that information. If there is no effect more severe than exfiltration of data
or unauthorized access to a system within the targeted state, the operation is
not considered invasive, and the right to an armed response is not triggered.
However, the invasiveness criterion is not a simple yes or no test based on the
absence or presence of harm done to the system. If there is a more severe
effect on the system, then invasiveness is to be understood as a matter of de­
gree, not in absolute terms.89 A cyberoperation directed against a family’s
media server (for example) would not be considered invasive with respect
to state interests, but one directed against a power generation plant or a mil­
itary facility might be considered highly invasive, depending on the efforts
that had been made to secure the computing systems before the attack was
it did not provide a way to decrypt the drives.
86Ellen Nakashima, “Russian Military Was Behind ‘NotPetya’ Cyberattack in Ukraine,




87Andy Greenberg, “US Indicts Sandworm, Russia’s Most Destructive Cyberwar Unit,”
Wired, October 19, 2020, accessed February 4, 2021, https://www.wired.com/story/us-
indicts-sandworm-hackers-russia-cyberwar-unit/.
88Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 9(d).
89Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 9(d).
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launched.90 In contrast, if a system has been left vulnerable to exploitation,
as the UK’s NHS had been when they were struck by WannaCry (see Chap­
ter 2), little effort or planning is needed to disable that system. It is hard to
claim invasiveness when the door to a targeted system is left wide open for
anyone with the inclination to disrupt the system to do so readily.91
Themore secure a system is, the greater effort required to disrupt its oper­
ation. Just as it takes a great deal of planning and circumvention of security
systems to steal a 100­kilogram gold coin from a museum (even with low­
technology methods),92 disruptions of systems with strong cybersecurity in­
dicate a degree of intent and planning on the part of the attacker to cause
90“For example, an intrusion into a military system that has been accredited at Evalua­
tion Assurance Level 7 ﹙EAL7﹚ of the Common Criteria is more invasive than openly exploit­
ing vulnerabilities of an openly accessible non­accredited system at a civilian university
or a small business.” Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 9(d). The Common Criteria are stan­
dards for independently verifying a computing system’s ability to satisfy particular security
objectives. Common Criteria, Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 1: Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5 (April 2017), ¶¶1, 2, 5, ac­
cessed October 29, 2019, https : / / www . commoncriteriaportal . org / files / ccfiles /
CCPART1V3.1R5.pdf. EAL7 is the highest degree of assurance, certifying that the system
(“target of evaluation”) has undergone formal design verification, including mathematical
proof where necessary, and testing against the owner’s security requirements. Common
Criteria, Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Access
Components, Version 3.1, Revision 5 (April 2017), ¶¶129–132, accessed October 30, 2019,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART3V3.1R5.pdf. As of
2019, only one such system has been deployed, and that in the Netherlands. Common Cri­
teria, “Certified Products List–Statistics,” 2019, accessed October 29, 2019, https://www.
commoncriteriaportal.org/products/stats/.
91One strategy for understanding cyberattacks is to set out what looks to be a vulner­
able system and use it to capture data on how attacks progress. These so­called honeypot
systems are carefully managed to not become a part of the cyberattack, but the activity they
record often provides key information about how the attack is managed and can be shut
down. Owens report, 148–9, Box 2.4; Tallinn 2.0, Rule 32, comment 15; Steve Symanovich,
“What Is a Honeypot? How It Can Lure Cyberattackers,” NortonLifeLock, May 26, 2020,
accessed February 5, 2021, https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-iot-what-is-a-
honeypot.html.
92Austin Davis, “Berlin Gold Coin Heist: 3 Sentenced to Jail,” DW, February 20, 2020,
accessed June 11, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/berlin-gold-coin-heist-3-sentenced-
to-jail/a-52441680. The theft occurred on March 27, 2017; three persons were convicted
of the theft on February 20, 2020. A recently­hired security guard participated in the theft.
At the time of the theft the gold content of the coin was worth about 5.4 times its face value
of C$1 million.
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an effect inside the target state. Stuxnet (see Chapter 2) took a great deal
of planning and was carefully crafted with a single target in mind.93 Thus
it would score highly on the invasiveness criterion if there was also state in­
volvement in its development and deployment (which there was). NotPetya
and Sunburst are similarly complex attacks because they first targeted spe­
cific software developers and used their build and distribution systems to
gain access to the ultimate targets. That degree of effort indicates a high
degree of invasiveness with a level of indirection to cover the origin of the
attack for long enough to do its damage. Russia’s involvement in NotPetya
removes any doubt about the intention to be invasive. Sunburst only exfil­
trated data, so though it took a great deal of effort to infect its targets, it
does not meet the invasiveness criterion, even though it probably will score
highly on state involvement by Russia.94 (Chinese hackers are suspected of
exploiting another vulnerability in SolarWind’s Orion software, but this is
distinct from the Sunburst attack, and as yet there is no evidence of Chinese
involvement with Sunburst.95)
A corollary to the technical complexity of an attack is the human effort
required to implement it. This is harder to estimate, but one report of the
USA’s disruption of Daesh’s Internet presence captures some of it.
[The ARES team] had to build their battle plan from scratch. First
they had to map out how ISIS [that is, Daesh] operated online—a
laborious process in itself—then figure out how to draw the right
targets on the map. The deputy chief of Cyber Command, Kevin
McLaughlin, who chaired the targeting committee, . . . told the
team to constantly ask itself, “What are the types of things that
you can do in cyber that actually make a difference to the war­
fighting side?”
. . .
93Zetter, “Stuxnet Missing Link Found, Resolves Some Mysteries Around the Cyber­
weapon.”
94Wolfe and Pierson, “Explainer—US Government Hack: Espionage or Act of War?”
95Christopher Bing et al., “Exclusive: SuspectedChineseHackersUsed SolarWinds Bug
to Spy on ‘US Payroll Agency—Sources,” Reuters, February 2, 2021, accessed February 5,
2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us- cyber- solarwinds- china- exclusive/
exclusive - suspected - chinese - hackers - used - solarwinds - bug - to - spy - on - u - s -
payroll-agency-sources-idUSKBN2A22K8.
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Throughout, the pressure from the top was unrelenting. [Admi­
ral Mike] Rogers “wanted to pull out all the stops to pass this
test,” a senior official recalls. Even while the effort was weeks
old, Pentagon officials began complaining in the press about the
slowness of the progress. The crew was working 14­hour days,
seven days a week.96
The project took a team of between 50 and 100 persons about five months to
prepare,97 so it is not unreasonable to estimate the human effort at 150 thou­
sand hours. This investment in labour is not one a casual or even criminal
hacking organization couldmake. If a cyberattack is precise and complex, it
is likely to have had a large research and development organization behind
it. The military branches of the most powerful states fall into that category.
These examples illustrate the challenges associated with assessing the in­
vasiveness criterion. State involvement, harm to computing systems, the level
of system security, some degree of selectivity (discrimination), and the im­
plication of target states’ interests are all required for a cyberattack to be
considered invasive. Invasiveness, as a just­cause criterion, is therefore also
connected to measurability of effects, directness, and state involvement.
Presumptive legality
In contrast to the seven other just­cause criteria, presumptive legality, if it is
found, rules out treating a cyberattack as a use of force. This is a matter
of interpreting two principles found in the international law of armed con­
flict. First, the presumption under international law that activities during
an armed conflict are permissible gives wide latitude in what actions a state
can take.98 Second, there are a number of treaties containing clauses which
prohibit the use of particular means and methods of warfare or incorporate
the Martens clause concerning indefinite proscriptions against acts that de­
viate from convention, “the laws of humanity, and the public conscience”99
96Graff, “The Man Who Speaks Softly—and Commands a Big Cyber Army.”
97Graff.
98Lotus, ¶¶44–7, cited in Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 9(h).
99Hague Peace Conferences, Convention ﹙II﹚ Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws
and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, July 29, 1899, preamble, accessed January 1,
2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/
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(see Appendix A). Thus not only are there particular constraints on what is
permissible during armed conflict, but also imprecise ones that are subject
to states’ interpretations or fall deep within the “penumbra of uncertainty.”
Information warfare and psychological operations fall under this cate­
gory.100 The Internet Research Agency (IRA, not to be confused with the
Irish Republican Army) based in St. Petersburg, Russia, used social media
such as Facebook and Twitter to “denigrate Secretary Clinton . . . [and] to
advocate for President­elect Trump as early as December 2015”101 as part of
a larger campaign to influence the electoral process. Further, these “Rus­
sian trolls sought to exacerbate tensions over issues such as race, sexual
identity and guns.”102 Concurrently, Russia’s English­language broadcast
and streaming media outlets RT and Sputnik amplified the message that
“President­elect Trump [was] the target of unfair coverage from traditional
US media outlets that they claimed were subservient to a corrupt political
establishment”103—in other words, “fake news” fabricated by a “deep state.”
This contributed to the polarization of American sociopolitical discourse,
to the detriment of the state and its people. The cyber aspects of this cam­
paign had state involvement, but no measurable physical effects, and the
causal chain in a sociopolitical context is not nearly direct enough to meet
that just­cause criterion. Under the Tallinn Manual’s criteria, this campaign
would fall short of being a use of force against the USA. However, under
presumptive legality, using cyber and other means to distribute propaganda is
not prohibited, and that would also rule out just cause for a use of force in re­
sponse. This does not mean that the target state has no recourse; it has been
OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/CD0F6C83F96FB459C12563CD002D66A1/FULLTEXT/
IHL-10-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as HC II (1899) Annex).
100Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 9(h).
101Office of the Director of National Intelligence [USA], Assessing Russian Activities and Inten­
tions in Recent US Elections, intelligence community assessment, ICA 2017­01D, January 6, 2017,
4, accessed February 5, 2021, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf.
102Ellen Nakashima, “US Cyber Command Operation Disrupted Internet Access of Rus­
sian Troll Factory on Day of 2018 Midterms,” Washington Post, February 27, 2019, accessed
February 4, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national- security/us-
cyber-command-operation-disrupted-internet-access-of-russian-troll-factory-
on- day- of- 2018- midterms/2019/02/26/1827fc9e- 36d6- 11e9- af5b- b51b7ff322e9_
story.html.
103Office of the Director of National Intelligence [USA], Assessing Russian Activities and Inten­
tions in Recent US Elections, 4.
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reliably but unofficially reported that US Cyber Command “basically took
the IRA offline” during the USA’s 2018 elections104 by similarly permissible
cyber means.
Presumptive legality is also extended to most cases of espionage,105 though
there is dispute over the extent to which espionage by cyber means violates
a state’s sovereignty.106 This disagreement is a fine point that makes little
practical difference with respect to providing just cause under jus ad bellum.
On the one hand, assuming that espionage (either by traditional or by
cyber means) is a violation of sovereignty, that by itself would not be cause
for an armed response unless some degree of harm satisfying the other just­
cause criteria had occurred in the act of collecting and exfiltrating informa­
tion. But then it is the harm that provides just cause, not the act of espionage
itself. However, as a violation of sovereignty, and thus a breach of an inter­
national obligation on the part of the state doing the espionage, the limits on
countermeasures restrict the response to one where “there is no patent imbal­
ance between the underlying wrongful act and the countermeasure.”107 In
the case of a person doing the spying, an appropriate countermeasure is to
arrest the spy and lodge a diplomatic complaint, not bomb an airfield. In the
case of cyber espionage, that means taking steps to neutralize the malware
and pursuing a diplomatic complaint. The act of espionage by itself justifies
countermeasures, but is not just cause for an armed response. On the other
hand, if espionage is not considered a violation of sovereignty, then the do­
mestic laws of the target state apply with respect to the spying (perhaps with
extraterritorial complications in the case of cyber espionage108), unless any
physical harm caused while carrying out the espionage constitutes a viola­
tion of sovereignty. Again, it is this harm that would provide just cause for
an armed response, provided the relevant criteria are met. The question of
espionage as a violation of sovereignty makes no difference in this regard.
Traditionalmeans of espionage require having an agent physically present
in the target state’s territory.109 Espionage by cyber means does not require
104Nakashima, “US Cyber Command Operation Disrupted Internet Access of Russian
Troll Factory on Day of 2018 Midterms.”
105Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 9(h).
106Tallinn 2.0, Rule 4, comments 7, 8.
107Tallinn 2.0, Rule 23, comment 5.
108Tallinn 2.0, Rule 32, comment 17.
109Tallinn 2.0, Rule 4, comments 7, 8; Rule 32, comment 9.
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an agent to be present in the target state.110 If the cyber espionage is con­
ducted remotely, then the act of espionage itself will not directly violate state
sovereignty.111 This means that cyberattacks like Sunburst, when they infect
and exfiltrate data from US government departments112 to their originating
states, are not in breach of an international obligation unless and until they
cause some other harm that does.113 Since Sunburst is not yet known to have
done anything more than extract and transmit sensitive data from infected
systems, it is being treated as an act of cyber espionage,114 not an act of cy­
berwarfare, and thus not just cause for a use of force against the originating
state.
Even though espionage is a widely accepted practice among states (and
there would be a significant strategic disadvantage to eschewing the prac­
tice on a unilateral basis), there are no agreed limits on the content of the
information gathered, and very few on how that information may be used.
In the context of the laws of armed conflict, espionage can give a state valu­
able information that facilitates distinguishing betweenmilitary and civilian
targets or determining what actions would be proportionate to any threat
or objective. It may also clarify intentions with respect to activity that looks
like a threat but is really a simulation exercise. These outcomes minimize
harm. However, espionage can also feed a confirmation bias for the belief
that an attack is imminent when none is planned. But espionage (broadly
construed) is not yet limited to strictly military or foreign policy purposes,
even in the absence of armed conflict.115 The“war” on terror has been used to
justify extending espionage to a practice that approaches warrantless surveil­
lance of domestic and foreign civilians.116 The open and international char­
110Tallinn 2.0, Rule 32, comment 4.
111Tallinn 2.0, Rule 32, comment 6.
112Zachary Cohen, Vivian Salama, and Brian Fung, “US Officials Scramble to Deal With
Suspected Russian Hack of Government Agencies,” CNN Politics, December 14, 2020, ac­
cessed February 6, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/14/politics/us-agencies-
hack- solar- wind- russia; Fung, “Why the US Government Hack Is Literally Keeping
Security Experts Awake At Night.”
113Tallinn 2.0, Rule 32, comment 6.
114Wolfe and Pierson, “Explainer—US Government Hack: Espionage or Act of War?”
115Tallinn 2.0, Rule 4, comment 27.
116AdamM. Segal, “Cyberspace:TheNew Strategic Realm in US­China Relations,” Strate­
gic Analysis 38, no. 4 (July 2014): 578–80, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2014.
918447.
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acter of Internet and telephony services makes cyber surveillance (as an ex­
treme form of espionage) a tempting opportunity for states to cast the data­
harvesting net too broadly in the search for threat intelligence.
While terrorism and international criminal activity do impinge on state
interests, they are not the kind of thing that the laws of armed conflict con­
trol. They are explicitly excluded from being considered as an international
armed conflict. Though there is good reason to tacitly permit the practice of
espionage by not prohibiting it under international law, it would be better to
explicitly permit espionage for military purposes (whether it supports find­
ing a just cause in the jus ad bellum context, or attaining a legitimate military
objective or reducing potential civilian harm in the jus in bello context) and
perhaps broader foreign policy purposes. This permission should not be
broad enough to allow widespread warrantless surveillance of individuals—
a violation of the right to freedom from “arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his privacy, family, home, or correspondence”117 for persons within a
state bound by ICCPR.
Finally, presumptive legality is accorded to coercive economic disruption.
There is no acceptance by the broad international community that the dis­
ruption of another state’s economy by cyber means is a violation of state
sovereignty, and therefore a violation of international peace and security.
This is consistent with the idea that economic sanctions against a state do
not by themselves constitute a use of armed force.118 The only way an eco­
nomic disruption caused by cyber means might justify an armed response is
if the civilian population suffers immediate life­threatening harm as a result.
So, in the absence of other harms, invasive actions for economic disruption
do not provide just cause for a forceful response. They are presumptively
117ICCPR, Art. 17.
118UN Charter, Art. 41; Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 2. The ineffectiveness of economic
sanctions in promoting policy change, the disproportionate and indiscriminate effects on
civilians (in violation of the principle of distinction; Albert C. Pierce, “Just War Principles
and Economic Sanctions,” Ethics and International Affairs 10 (March 1996): 99–113, https:
/ / doi . org / 10 . 1111 / j . 1747 - 7093 . 1996 . tb00005 . x), the growing recognition that
economic inequity does pose a threat to peace and security, and the asymmetry of power
(in that sanctions are a measure that only large, wealthy states have the means to wield, and
that only against smaller, poorer ones) provide cause for rethinking this position. However,
the Tallinn Manual deals with international law as it stands, not as we might want it to be.
Tallinn 2.0, Rule 4, comment 28. While this is a fascinating and complex topic in itself,
further discussion is out of scope for this project.
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legal in the context of international law because they are not explicitly pro­
hibited,119 though some states are starting to rethink this position. In par­
ticular, the USA has reserved for its president “the right to respond using all
necessary means to defend our Nation, our Allies, our partners, and our in­
terests from hostile acts in cyberspace. Hostile acts may include significant
cyberattacks directed against the US economy. . . . ”120 The difficulty comes
in characterizing significance. If the aggressive cyberoperation’s economic ef­
fects proximally cause civilian harms proscribed by international law, there
may be cause for a lawful armed response. However, the disruption of stock,
bond, and derivative markets (by any means, not just cyber means) is not
the kind of harm the laws of armed conflict anticipated being taken as just
cause for such a response. In other words, as international law currently
stands, it is presumptively lawful for a state to wreak this kind of financial
harm against those who have the means to participate in those markets.
Departures from just-war theory
The international laws of armed conflict do not incorporate two require­
ments of just­war theory’s jus ad bellum: right intention and probability of suc­
cess.121 The Tallinn Manual, as an interpretation of existing international law,
inherits and preserves these shortcomings, with some reason. The first con­
cern, right intention, reflects a broader evidential (and thus epistemological)
problem with respect to discerning intent in a reliable way.122 While a state’s
intentionmay seem clear by its actions, gathering the documentary evidence
to prove its intention is a post bellum endeavour simply because access to se­
cret state records and facilities will not be available to adjudicators during
the conflict. Moreover, right intention does not have to be demonstrated
119Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 9(h).
120Department of Defense [USA], Department of Defense Cyberspace Policy Report: A Report to
Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Section 934, technical
report (November 2011), 4, accessed February 10, 2021, https://www.acqnotes.com/Att
achments/DoD%20Cyberspace%20Policy%20Report%20A%20Report%20to%20Congress%
20Pursuant%20to%20the%20NDA%20Act%20Nov2011.pdf; David Alexander, “US Reserves






by the target state in determining whether it has just cause to respond to
an attack in self­defence. Once a state has been subject to an armed attack,
it has that just cause. Setting out when a state may be justified in making
the first strike in an armed conflict is beyond the scope of the TallinnManual.
Rather, it presumes, in accordance with the UN Charter, that a state would
not contemplate being the initiator of an international armed conflict, only
a responder to another nation’s unlawful first strike.
The second, probability of success, tilts the balance of any conflict in favour
of states with more resources. This would preclude smaller or less power­
ful states from initiating an armed conflict against larger or stronger states,
denying them some of their rights as states in the international commu­
nity,123 such as the “sovereign equality of States.”124 Again, the Tallinn Man­
ual does not err in being silent on this matter, since it does not contemplate
being the initiator of an armed conflict by cyber means. However, the appar­
ent cost asymmetry of cyberwarfare, with the cost and resources required to
launch a cyberattack usually being much lower than the cost and resources
required to defend against one, may reduce this imbalance and increase the
probability of a smaller state succeeding in its objective against a larger one—
provided the conflict remains strictly within the cyber realm. The emergence
of cyberwarmaymake this just­war criterion economically feasible to smaller
states, and thus more accessible to them.
4.4 The Tallinn Manual and jus post bellum
Jus post bellum in international law
The idea of jus post bellum, or the just conclusion of a war in order to establish
a just peace, is a relatively recent development in just­war theory. Brian
Orend notes that international law has not yet developed to incorporate
much of this dimension of just­war theory, but that there are still somemoral
considerations that can inform the process of ending a war in a way that
promotes justice.125 These principles are set out in Table 2.3.
123Orend, §2.1.




International humanitarian law touches on some of these considerations
without couching them in terms of just­war theory. The principle of restitu­
tion for violations of an agreed convention is first set out in HC IV (1907): “A
belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall,
if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible
for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.”126 This
has been extended to apply to the state responsible for the violation, regard­
less of who committed it.127 However, this does not go as far as making
reparations for the damage caused throughout the entirety of the conflict.
The principle of just punishment for war crimes is set out in GC I–IV (1949),
which all include articles prescribing “effective penal sanctions for persons
committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the
present Convention.”128 These “grave breaches” are identified as “wilful
killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wil­
fully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health,”129 “exten­
sive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military ne­
cessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly,”130 “compelling a prisoner
of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a
prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial,”131 “unlawful deporta­
tion or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, [and] taking
of hostages.”132 All of these are prohibited under the jus in bello aspects of
international law, and so fall under the rubric of war crimes that must be
prosecuted as part of jus post bellum.133 The criminal responsibility for a war
crime always attaches to individual persons, whether they be following or­
ders or giving them, either as a military officer or a civilian (government
official) with the authority to direct military activity,134 and states must pros­
126HC IV (1907), Art. 3.
127International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Rules, Rules 149, 150.
128GC I, Art. 49; GC II, Art. 50; GC III, Art. 129; GC IV, Art. 146.
129GC I, Art. 50; GC II, Art. 51; GC III, Art. 130; GC IV, Art. 147.
130GC I, Art. 50; GC II, Art. 51; GC IV, Art. 147.
131GC III, Art. 130; GC IV, Art. 147 says the same with respect to “a protected person,”
meaning a civilian, and with an indefinite article before “hostile Power.”
132GC IV, Art. 147.
133International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Rules, Rule 156 describes other vio­
lations of international law’s jus in bello as war crimes that must also be prosecuted.
134International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Rules 151–153.
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ecute these war crimes.135 Theprinciple of discriminationmeans that ordinary
civilians are not subject to punishment (individually or collectively) for war
crimes, just as the corresponding jus in bello principle extends nominal pro­
tection from being lawful targets during an armed conflict.136
GC IV also makes a nod in the direction of the vindication of rights with
respect to life, liberty, and property, obliging parties to cancel “restrictive
measures taken regarding protected [alien] persons . . . [and] their prop­
erty . . . as soon as possible after the close of hostilities.”137 Later devel­
opments grant the right to return to any displaced persons and protection
individual property rights,138 though neither articulation goes as far as vin­
dicating the “community entitlements to territory and sovereignty”139 that
may have been violated either in the lead­up to the conflict or during the
course of it. The principles of proportionality, public proclamation, and rehabil­
itation toward a minimally just society are not part of general international
law, but should be a part of the treaty ending the armed conflict (which then
becomes international law for the parties involved).
Cyber jus post bellum
The Tallinn Manual makes no explicit mention of vindication of rights post
bellum, though, as noted in Chapter 3, it does assert the application of hu­
man rights in the cyber realm.140 Any vindication of rights would include
access to and privacy in activities conducted in cyberspace where the tech­
nology is available.141 A state is obliged to make reparations for harm caused
by “an internationally wrongful act committed by cyber means,”142 though
the consensus is that the cost of reparations extends only to “material dam­
age . . . when said harm can be assessed in financial terms.”143 This includes
“interference with cyber operations or the loss of data that results in finan­
135International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Rule 158.
136Orend, “War,” §2.3.
137GC IV, Art. 46.
138International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Rules, Rules 132, 133.
139Orend, “War,” §2.3.
140Tallinn 2.0, Rule 34, comment 1.
141Tallinn 2.0, Rule 35, though comment 6 to the rule holds that privacy is not an absolute
right and may be subject to limitations.
142Tallinn 2.0, Rule 28.
143Tallinn 2.0, Rule 28, comment 2.
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cial loss.”144 Even so, there is still no consensus about the status of data as
property that merits the protection and compensation that tangible private
property does.145 In addressing war crimes committed by cyber means, the
TallinnManual is in accord with GC I–IV (1949) and other conventions set out
in Rule 156 of Customary International Humanitarian Law,146 with civilians,147
commanders, and government officials148 all liable to individual prosecution
for committing war crimes. The Tallinn Manual, as an interpretation of exist­
ing international law, does not seek to address the requirements of jus post
bellum that international law does not already address, and so provides no
real guidance in terms of ending an armed conflict in a just manner.
4.5 Conclusion
It is fair to conclude that while the rules in the TallinnManual do not fully sat­
isfy the criteria, obligations, and requirements of just­war theory, it does no
worse in this regard than the larger body of international law does. By identi­
fying plausible criteria for assessing the jus ad bellum condition of just cause,
the Tallinn Manual includes more of international law than other domain­
specific manuals do. This is valuable because it gives insight into how dif­
ficult the determination of just cause for a use of force is. Further, the Tallinn
Manual’s assertion that at least some human rights apply in cyberspacemakes
protecting these rights an aspect of jus post bellum that must be addressed in
any just post­conflict resolution.
While the application of the laws of armed conflict to the cyber realm
is enough to make the Tallinn Manual an important contribution to interna­
tional law, the discussion of just­cause conditions under jus ad bellum and
the explicit consideration of human rights treaties set a new standard for
144Tallinn 2.0, Rule 28, comment 2.
145Tallinn 2.0, Rule 149, comment 3. This uncertainty is expressed in the context of occu­
pation of another state’s territory. If data does not have protected status within occupied
territory, even when the occupation is conducted in accordance with the laws of armed
conflict, its loss is not currently seen as a compensable harm. Following this reasoning,
loss of data through any violation of the law of armed conflict during would not likely be
compensable.
146Tallinn 2.0, Rule 84.
147Tallinn 2.0, Rule 84, comment 3.
148Tallinn 2.0, Rule 85.
92
domain­specific manuals. As such, the Tallinn Manual should be included
among the authoritative presentations of international law, and its findings—
particularly the ones where the agreement was only to the wording of the
rule and not its interpretation—given attention in matters concerning inter­
national law in the cyber realm, particularly as they approach the ideals of
just­war theory. I turn now to two specific difficulties the Tallinn Manual has




Cyber jus ad bellum: the problems
of scale and effects
5.1 Cyberharms in meatspace
When one statemakes an armed attack against another state by conventional
means such as bombs and projectiles, the attack has immediate effects over
a definable area. Biological and nuclear weapons produce longer­lasting ef­
fects over wider areas. While the physical damage produced by a nuclear
weapon is an immediate effect, the radioactive fallout continues to cause
harm for a much longer period of time. The first signs of harm from a bi­
ological attack, however, may take days or weeks to emerge, and because
of human mobility, may emerge far from the site of the initial attack. Thus
there can be temporal and geographical gaps between the attack and the
awareness that an armed attack has taken place, and a much longer tempo­
ral gap before knowing the full scale and effects of the attack. With respect
to cyberattacks, there may be a greater causal distance (in terms of number
of discrete events) between the initiation of the cyberattack and its effects.
This chapter addresses some of the problems that come with assessing the
just­cause criteria of severity, measurability of effects, immediacy, and directness,
and introduces ways of classifying cyberattacks and permissible responses
with respect to these criteria.
It is easy to think that with the speed of digital communication and con­
tinually increasing computational efficiency (at least with respect to clock
time), cyberattacks would typically be short­lived events with immediately
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visible results and few ongoing consequences with respect to the physical
world—something analogous to conventional explosive devices. For exam­
ple, a downloadedmalicious program such asWannaCry that encrypts all of
a computer’s files is a cyberattack with a short attack phase and immediate
effects. A simple logic bomb, a piece of malicious code running undetected
on a computing device, waits for a trigger before “going off,” producing its
intended harm on that device. This kind of cyberattack is analogous to con­
ventional sea or land mines.1 Unlike conventional, biological, or nuclear
weapons, these kinds of cyberattacks will not cause direct physical harm to
humans.
However, more sophisticated cyberattacks can have attack­to­effect pat­
terns that look more like those of nuclear or biological weapons, including
causing harm to humans. Some logic bombs can induce cascading software
and hardware failures that eventually result in significant physical damage
and civilian deaths. While this physical damage may be the primary goal
of such a cyberoperation, the event that finally produces that damage may
be temporally, causally, and geographically distant from the original place­
ment of the logic bomb. The stealthy spread of malicious software is similar
to the spread of a virus with a long latency or incubation period before the
effects begin to show. And while a cyberattack does not (directly) produce
widespread fallout, it can be as disruptive to computing equipment as the
electromagnetic pulse from a nuclear detonation is. Further, a well­executed
cyberattack can have damaging psychological effects with respect to security
of the state and disruption of society, just as nuclear and biological attacks
would. These psychological effects are often geographically removed from
the location of any physical damage.
The Cold War between the USA and the USSR during the mid­ and late
1900s provides a vivid, though unofficial, account of such a cyberoperation.
In 1982 a natural gas pipeline in Siberia was allegedly damaged by a cyber­
attack. The USSR was aiming to sell natural gas to states in western Europe
in order to get “hard” Western currency. As the story goes, they needed
software to control and monitor the flow of gas through a new pipeline run­
ning from Siberia to the border with the West. No American company was
willing to make the sale, so the Soviets had to get creative. American intel­
1The similarity to mines would be clearer if these were called cyber mines, but logic bomb
is the common term for this kind of malicious software.
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ligence officials uncovered the exfiltration of control software from a Cana­
dian control systems specialist, and they informed the developer that there
was reason to believe the USSR was behind it. The developer quickly devised
a logic bomb, inserted it in the code, and left it for the Soviets to retrieve
and install.2 Some time later, the pipeline burst.
While this cyberoperation’s goal was to disrupt the USSR’s economy by
preventing the sale of natural gas to western Europe,3 the cyberattack di­
rectly targeted only the pipeline’s control system; the explosion itself was
considered an indirect effect of the cyberattack.4 Further, while destroying
part of the pipeline provided a temporary physical impediment to transport­
ing natural gas westward, the greater disruption was psychological: even if
the pipeline could be repaired and the relevant control systems replaced,
there was no longer any certainty about the reliability of other pirated soft­
ware.5 Regaining trust in the control systems would take more time than
just repairing the pipeline did. The USSR had to balance the risk of further
harm against the need to make money that could be spent in the global
marketplace. This longer­lasting and more distant indirect effect was the in­
tended outcome.6 The software­facilitated explosion was the means to that
economic end.7
Assessing the harm resulting from an aggressive cyberoperation is more
complex than in conventional or nuclear warfare. However, the resolutions
of the international community, interpreted in a cyber context, do offer
2ThomasC.Reed, At the Abyss: An Insider’sHistory of the ColdWar (NewYork, NY: Ballantine
Books, 2005), 268–69.
3Owens report, 195.
4Owens report, 113. Thomas Reed described the explosion as “the most monumental
non­nuclear explosion and fire ever seen from space. . . . The Air Force chief of intelligence
rated it at three kilotons . . . ” Reed, At the Abyss, 269. There are no official reports of anyone




7There is some evidence to suggest that the story may a confabulation of Central Intel­
ligence Agency ﹙CIA﹚ Cold War strategies and an accidental explosion along the pipeline.
Thomas Rid, “Cyber War Will Not Take Place,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 1 (Febru­
ary 2012): 10–11, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2011.608939. The Owens report,
195, also refers to the incident as an alleged cyberattack, but the involvement of Admiral
Owens, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in preparing the report lends
some credibility to Reed’s account.
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some guidancewhen decidingwhether such aggressive cyberoperations have
become equivalent to an armed attack carried out by conventional means:
identify and assess the scale and effects of the harm done.8 But the distances—
geographic, temporal, and causal—from the deployment of a logic bomb
and its destructive effects complicates this judgement. One example of this
is the Stuxnet worm, which has significant distance in all three of these as­
pects. Stuxnet damaged equipment at an Iranian uranium­enriching facility
in 2010, but the worm could not be installed directly by the parties wanting
to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program. Instead, the worm was set loose on the
public Internet and relied on both Microsoft Windows’ software vulnerabil­
ities and benign human activity to cross into the private network within the
facility. An employee unknowingly brought the worm across the so­called
air gap between the public Internet and the private network by attaching an
infected USB storage device to a computer on the internal network. From
there the worm could finally find its way to its intended targets—the con­
trollers for the centrifuges used to separate different isotopes of uranium.9
8Nicaragua Judgement, ¶195, introduces this terminology, but it refers to United Nations
General Assembly, “Definition of Aggression.” Article 3(b) of the UN General Assembly
resolution declares that “the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another
State” qualifies (ceteris paribus under Article 2) as an act of aggression, and Article 4 points
out that the Security Council ultimately determines which actions, once committed, are
aggressive. The ICJ ruling gives some clarifying language around how this determination
can be made, but it does not set out specific thresholds, and its ruling only carries full legal
weight with respect to the case at hand. The 2010 amendment to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court incorporates Article 3(a)–(g) of the UN General Assembly’s
definition in its entirety as crimes of aggression. International Criminal Court ﹙ICC﹚, Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2011, 2187 UNTS 90, amended, The Hague, NL,
Art. 8 bis (2), accessed April 8, 2020, https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-
AEE9-4757-ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/RomeStatutEng1.pdf. By the end of 2020 this
amendment to the Rome Statute had been recognized by only 40 states, none of them
permanent members of the UN Security Council. However, the UN General Assembly’s def­
inition, taken together with the ICJ’s acceptance of that definition, suggest the presence of
some official support for labelling the particular actions described there as acts of aggres­
sion under international law regardless of states’ reluctance to accept the Rome Statute
amendment.
9Stuxnet had also been found on computers at the Bushehr nuclear power plant, sug­
gesting that the reactor was the target. Ryan Paul, “Iranian Power Plant Infected by
Stuxnet, Allegedly Undamaged,” Ars Technica, September 27, 2010, accessed November 23,
2020, https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2010/09/iranian-power-
plant-infected-by-stuxnet-allegedly-undamaged/. Later research would show that the
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It was ultimately determined that the actual harm and potential harm of the
Stuxnet attack, even though it was a clear violation of Iran’s sovereignty,
did not, and was not likely to, reach an equivalent to the level of an armed
attack.
If there is a complex chain of (macro­scale) events between an aggres­
sive cyberoperation and its ultimate effects, it is harder for the target state
to claim that the act of deploying malicious code by itself is a use of force
rising to the level of an armed attack. Even though the scale and effects
of that cyberoperation and subsequent events could support such a claim,10
determining what role the cyberoperation itself played may affect the jus­
tification of the claim. Similarly, some aggressive cyberoperations may be
intended to produce effects at a distant location at an indeterminate time
in the future through a causally short and relatively direct, but temporally
prolonged, set of events. But these kinds of cyberoperations are more eas­
ily disrupted than ones producing an immediate effect. While the Tallinn
Manual suggests that if a mere inconvenience results, the cyberoperation is
not a use of force justifying an armed response,11 it also suggests that if the
likely results would have been equivalent to a use of force by conventional
means, it could be argued counterfactually that the failed or thwarted cyber­
operation could be deemed a use of force because of the intention to cause
harm.12 For example, if Stuxnet had caused a release of radioactive material
from the centrifuges, or if it had targeted the nuclear reactor at Bushehr in­
stead of merely infectingmachines that controlled a reactor as it searched for
the centrifuges, then both the real effects in the former case and the poten­
tial nuclear disaster in the second would give reason to claim that the harm,
whether actual or intended, would have been equivalent to the effects of an
armed attack targeting the enrichment or reactor sites.
facility supplying uranium for the reactor was the target, and not the reactor itself. Mark
Clayton, “How Stuxnet Cyber Weapon Targeted Iran Nuclear Plant,” Christian Science Mon­
itor, November 16, 2010, accessed February 15, 2021, https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/
2010/1116/How-Stuxnet-cyber-weapon-targeted-Iran-nuclear-plant; Farwell and
Rohozinski, “Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War,” 24; Singer, “Stuxnet and Its Hidden
Lessons on the Ethics of Cyberweapons,” 81–2, 85. Regardless, it was a strike against Iran’s
nuclear program, and that aspect of Stuxnet is taken up in Chapter 2.
10Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 9(c).
11Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 9(a).
12Tallinn 2.0, Rule 92, comments 16, 17.
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5.2 Moderate and flagrant cyberattacks
As the pipeline example shows, the assessment of the scale and effects of any
aggressive act is multifaceted. There will be cases that seem easy to assess,
such as the loss of a few hundred civilian lives in a factory making armoured
vehicles or the sudden shutdown of a research assistant’s laptop computer
in a military research lab. The difficult cases fall somewhere in between. Yet
even those apparently clear scenarios will have confounds. Not only is there
no bright line dividing aggressive actions that are clearly equivalent to an
armed attack and those that are not; there are also no bright lines to bound a
messy middle ground. Any assessment will unavoidably be coloured by the
epistemic state of each party involved in the action and the relative priority
each party gives to the different criteria for assessing the severity of effects.
Development of effects
The Owens report identifies four significant time periods that are relevant
to aggressive cyberoperations.
. . . Tintelligence collection[] is the period available for collecting intelli­
gence needed to launch the attack. . . . Tattack launch[] is the period
over which the functionality required to carry out the attack on
the targeted system(s) is installed or deployed—that is, during
which the attack is launched. . . . Tcompromise[] is the period over
which the confidentiality, integrity, or availability attributes of
the targeted system(s) are compromised. . . . Teffects apparent[] is the
time period over which the victim actually suffers the ill effects
of such compromises. . . . Depending on the specific nature of
the cyberattack, these four periods may—or may not—overlap
with each other.13
These time periods provide a point of reference for treating cyberattacks
analogously to conventional ones. I show the relationships between them
in diagrammatic form in Figure 5.1.
13Owens report, 89–90. These time periods, illustrated in ‘Figure 5.1‘=latex, have coun­
terparts in the planning and execution of any response the target state may choose to make,














Figure 5.1: Owens report schematic timeline. Timelines (a) and (b) show the or­
der of significant events described in the Owens report.a Solid markers indicate the
distinct events under this schema, and open markers indicate the time period when
the target is compromised by the attack. The timeline shows the order of events and
not the amount of time between them. Timeline (a) illustrates the model of a con­
ventional attack, where the time periods of vulnerability to attack and of suffering
effects overlap. Timeline (b) illustrates the model of a cyberattack, where the target
system needs only to be compromised at some time before the effects become appar­
ent. The cyberattack can be withdrawn before, during, or after the effects manifest.
Timeline (c) shows the period of time when physical harm is occurring, from the
point in time where the physical effects are first apparent to the point in time when
the immediate physical effects end. Timeline (d) shows the period of time when
cyberharm is occurring, from the point in time where the target system is compro­
mised to the point in time where the cyberattack ends or is withdrawn. Timeline
(e) shows the period of time when harm is occurring if harm is understood as being
inflicted as soon as the target is compromised, and ending at the later of the ends of
Tcompromise and Teffects apparent, reflecting the full duration of cyber and physical harm
resulting from a cyberattack.
a Owens report, 89–90.
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All of these time periods are also relevant to attacksmade by conventional
means. For example, Tattack launch in the context of a conventional attack is the
beginning of the physical phase of the attack such as the launching of cruise
missiles, sending out a sortie for aerial bombardment, or blockading a port.
Tcompromise, the time at which the target state is compromised, occurs once the
border has been breached by the attacker—that is, the target state’s integrity
has been violated. The attacking state is now in a position to do physical
damage, but may still hold off on producing that damage (Figure 5.1(a)).
Similarly, an attacking state can leave a compromised computer operating
in an apparently normal fashion until the time when it activates the harm­
producing part of the cyberattack. The appearance of those downstream
effects may come after the target system has been restored to normal oper­
ation and is no longer vulnerable itself (Figure 5.1(b)). The beginning of
Tcompromise, then, marks the point in time when everything is in place to ex­
ecute the strike. Regardless of the means of the attack, Teffects apparent begins
when the first of the effects becomes apparent.
This time­period framework offers a starting point for grappling with the
conjoint matters of scale and effects. An argument could be made that, at
least in the case of an aggressive cyberoperation, deleterious effects begin
not with the emergence of physical harm at Teffects apparent but at the point of sys­
tem compromise, the beginning of Tcompromise (Figure 5.1(e)). After that point,
even though the operation of the target systemmay appear normal, the data
managed by the system is no longer confidential, the integrity of operational
data is no longer guaranteed, and the periodic, rarely­used functions of the
system may not be available.14 For example, the modified software could in­
tercept a shutdown command for a particular machine and transmit a series
of signals designed to break the machine, but report to the operator that
the shutdown had completed successfully. Inducing the mechanical failure
marks the beginning of Teffects apparent on the given account, but the direct effect
of the cyberoperation, the precursor to the intended one, began at Tcompromise,
when this effect was not apparent to the target state.
The UNGeneral Assembly’s definition of aggression gives limited support
to the view that Tcompromise is the point where it can be considered that an ag­
gressive action has taken place. An invasion without any further physical
14Owens report, 90.
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harm is almost always going to be considered an act of aggression.15 Com­
promising the operation of amilitary computing systemmay just be physical
enough (with respect to the physical representation of data and code in elec­
tromagnetic form) that it can be considered an invasion—provided the mal­
ware was installed under the direction of the attacking state’s armed forces.
This satisfies the just­cause criteria of invasiveness, state involvement, and
military character, but not necessarily the other criteria of severity, measur­
ability of effects, immediacy, and directness identified in Table 4.1. At this
point a response of some sort is justified. However, if no damaging attack
follows the invasion or compromise, then the same resolution that defines
aggression also grants the UN Security Council the ability to “conclude that
the determination that an act of aggression has been committed would not
be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances, including the fact
that the acts concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity.”16
In other words, even if Tcompromise is the point when amilitary operation has be­
come an act of aggression, if more serious effects do not occur (so Teffects apparent
is never reached), it is difficult to justify calling the preliminary stages any­
thing more than a threat rather than an armed attack. The target state has
to justify any response stronger than what is required to end the threat. If
that planned response is a use of force, that justification must address all of
the jus ad bellum conditions, and not only the remaining just­cause criteria.
An analogous conventional attack serves to illustrate this point. Themere
compromise of a computing system, as serious as it is, is no more an act of
war than a short­lived border skirmish is. Yet a border skirmish can cause
more physical damage than the compromise of a computer system. In this
regard, then, any claim that merely compromising a computing system is
a greater threat to a state’s sovereignty or does greater harm than a border
skirmish is difficult to sustain. But a “mere frontier incident”17 is not, on
its own, an armed attack. Unless and until significant damage results from
disrupting the normal operation of a computing system, effects comparable
to those arising from a conventional armed attack have not occurred—in
other words, the result of assessing severity using the criterion of physical
harm are exactly the same for small­scale cyber and conventional attacks:
15United Nations General Assembly, “Definition of Aggression,” Art. 3(a).
16United Nations General Assembly, Art. 2.
17Nicaragua Judgement, ¶195.
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where there are no significant and lasting physical harms to be found, there
is no just cause for a use of force in response.
Extent of the effects
Assessing the scale and effects of a particular aggressive cyberoperation against
a state is typically a qualitative judgement: how similar and how widespread
is the harm resulting from that action to any historical actions, regardless of
means, that have been deemed to be armed attacks?18 If the aggressive cy­
beroperation meets that vague comparative threshold, then (assuming the
other just­cause criteria and jus ad bellum conditions are satisfied) the target
state is permitted to act in self­defence19 using whatever means are necessary
and proportionate to the military goal of ending the threat against it.20 If a
cyber response satisfies the jus in bello obligations and will have less severe ef­
fects than a response by conventional means, it is to be preferred. If a cyber
response is not sufficient to end the threat, a limited conventional response
may be permissible; however, any conventional response risks escalating the
conflict by extending it into meatspace (and perhaps failing the jus ad bellum
condition of proportionality where the harm outweighs the global benefit).
If non­forceful means like diplomatic protestations will end the threat, then
a forceful response, either cyber or conventional, is not necessary and is
therefore not permitted.
Though all state­involved cyberattacks are attempts to violate another
state’s sovereignty in some way, state­involved cyberattacks are not of equal
consequence. This suggests classifying aggressive cyberoperations into two
categories with a messy middle:21 moderate cyberattacks that are more an­
noying or irritating than harmful, and flagrant cyberattacks that deliberately
and maliciously “impinge on critical national interests.”22 Of course, these
national interests may be impacted to a greater or lesser degree by any par­
18Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69; Rule 71, comments 6, 7.
19UN Charter, Art. 51.
20Tallinn 2.0, Rule 72, comment 5.
21I thank Brian Orend for his helpful suggestion of a thick/thin division of cyberattacks.
Flagrant captures the intention and intensity of a cyberattack in the thick sense, while mod­
erate reflects the non­trivial but comparatively mild and localized impact of a cyberattack
in a thin sense.
22Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 9(a).
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ticular cyberattack, but one of the goals of the Tallinn Manual is to provide
guidance for determining when a cyberattack is a flagrant violation of in­
ternational norms while shrinking the conceptual messy middle as far as
the collective will of the international community permits. Flagrant cyber­
attacks may provide just cause for a use of force in response provided the
other just­cause criteria are met; moderate ones will not. Corresponding to
these are the different categories of permissible responses: non­forceful (or,
in the language of the UN Charter, pacific23), moderate cyber responses that
will not cause physical damage, and nocuous cyber or conventional responses
that are likely or intended to cause physical harm. Conventional responses
to cyberattacks will target physical infrastructure with the intention to dam­
age them, so they cannot fall into the moderate category.
If classifying a cyberattack depends on how it affects critical national in­
terests, it helps to give some shape to what those interests are. The idea of
critical national interests derives from a state’s sovereignty over its territory and
its exercise of “inherently governmental functions.”24 Territorial sovereignty
extends to persons, objects, and property within that territory, including cy­
ber infrastructure within that territory, regardless of who owns it25 (with lim­
ited exceptions for diplomatic purposes). It also extends to the activity that
is carried out within that infrastructure,26 whether it is government activity
or private activity. It is possible, then, for a state to violate another state’s
sovereignty through its activity in that second state’s cyber infrastructure.27
The idea of inherently governmental functions includes honouring its interna­
tional obligations (including its international human rights obligations28)
and the means by which a state facilitates its “political, social, cultural, eco­
nomic, and legal order.”29 (Matters of foreign policy, national security, and
the armed forces fall most cleanly under the political function of the state,
but they can also be associated with the other broad functions.) Disrupt­
ing any of these functions without the resolution of the UN Security Council
is very likely to be a violation of the state’s sovereignty, just as a territorial
23UN Charter, Ch. 6.
24Tallinn 2.0, Rule 4, comment 10.
25Tallinn 2.0, Rule 1, comment 4; Rule 2, comments 3, 4, 6; Rule 4, comment 5.
26Tallinn 2.0, Rule 2, comment 7.
27Tallinn 2.0, Rule 4, comment 1.
28Tallinn 2.0, Rule 2, comment 8; Rule 35.
29Tallinn 2.0, Rule 2, comment 10.
105
violation would be.30
One consideration is whether an act of aggression has consequences se­
vere enough for the action to be viewed as a use of force. Aggressive acts
that result in “physical harm to individuals or property” are clearly uses of
force,31 but where no such harm is apparent, then this determination be­
comes more difficult. Michael Schmitt’s initial formulation of this criterion
suggested the impact on human well­being (and in particular the hierarchy
of needs) be a guide to assessing severity.32 The more basic the need that
can no longer be satisfied as a result of the attack, the more severe the attack
is.
Schmitt’s description of this criterion has evolved since then, and Tallinn
2.0 contains its most recent formulation, which includes a way of assessing
what falls between the two extremes: “the more consequences impinge on
critical national interests, the more they will contribute to the depiction
of a cyber operation as a use of force.”33 Now, if states are considered to
have accepted the responsibility to be guardians and facilitators of the ex­
ercise of human rights under ICCPR, ICESCR, and the other rights treaties to
which they are party, then human rights are also a matter of critical national
interest because they involve international obligations. Human rights are
(broadly and collectively) aimed at human flourishing, and humans cannot
flourish if their basic needs cannot be satisfied. This provides a way to assess
non­physical harm on the basis of how the attack impinges upon the exer­
cise of human rights: the more fundamental the right that is violated or that
the state can no longer support, the more severe the attack is. Widespread
death or injury marks the most severe attacks under this interpretation as an
arbitrary deprivation of life,34 while the inability to access bank accounts35
would not rate highly, and the disruption of the voting process36 would be
somewhere in between. In any case, the target state needs to show how the
act violated its sovereignty in order to justify acting in self­defence. If the
30Tallinn 2.0, Rule 4, comment 16.
31Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 9(a).
32Schmitt, “Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law:
Thoughts on a Normative Framework,” 914.
33Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 9(a).
34ICCPR, Art. 6(1).
35ICESCR, Art. 6(2), understanding access to banking as an economic freedom.
36ICCPR, Art. 25(b).
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act produces widespread or persistent consequences with respect to those
sovereign interests, then the effects are more severe than if they are momen­
tary or localized. On this interpretation, assessing the just­cause criterion of
severity depends on the significance of what was harmed.
Related to severity, but still distinct from it, is the just­cause criterion of
measurability of effects.37 All successful cyberattacks have some effects, but
not all of those effects are readily apparent or quantifiable. For example, if
fifty thousand patients’ medical records were at risk of exfiltration due to a
piece of spyware, that is a quantifiable risk and a measure of the maximum
potential harm. It is not a measure of actual harm. Having a reasonable
estimate of the number of records actually exfiltrated gives some idea of the
extent of the harm, and is a better guide to the scale of the attack. If the
effects of a particular use of force cannot be expressed quantitatively, or if
they cannot be discerned at all, then it is difficult to justify claiming that the
scale and effects of the action have risen to the level of an armed attack. This
is important because in a situation like the logic bomb example, there are no
easily measurable effects until the malicious software is triggered. Indeed,
the strategic value of compromising an adversary’s computing system lies
in its remaining undetected until its effects are manifest. While the sports
maxim “no harm, no foul” may apply to church­league hockey, it is not clear
that it should apply in the context of cyberattacks. The absence of physical
harm does not mean the absence of a violation of sovereignty.
This is enough to start classifying cyberattacks as moderate or flagrant.
A flagrant cyberattack must be both a violation of state sovereignty (sever­
ity) with widespread effect (measurability of effects). A cyberattack that vio­
lates sovereignty but does not have widespread effects is best classified as
moderate. A failed cyberattack that produces no effects is not a violation
of sovereignty,38 but can be treated as a moderate cyberattack simply be­
cause it posed a threat to a state’s sovereignty. Flagrant cyberattacks that
clearly satisfy the other cyber just­cause criteria may give reason for a state
to consider responding to the cyberattack with a use of force, provided the
remaining jus ad bellum conditions are also satisfied. That use of force, as
argued in Chapter 2, does not have to be made by cyber means, though the
proportionality and discrimination obligations of jus in bello (Table 2.2) will
37Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 9(e).
38Tallinn 2.0, Rule 4, comment 24.
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likely favour a moderate cyber response because it can be precisely targeted
without causing the physical collateral damage of a nocuous response. If
a moderate response by cyber means is not likely sufficient to end the at­
tack (or threat of another imminent attack), then a kinetic response may
be justified as long as it plausibly remains within the bounds of jus in bello
obligations.
5.3 Applying the distinction
A conceptual framework does not do any good until it is put to use somehow.
A few scenarios will demonstrate its value.
Logic bombs and critical infrastructure
Suppose someone discovers a dormant logic bomb on a critical control sys­
tem, perhaps one at the operation centre for a regional electrical grid. If the
malicious code is detected before it is triggered, the cost of removing it and
validating the integrity of the affected system is comparable to removing a
software virus or recovering from any other incident that accidentally dam­
ages data.39 Any facility of critical national interest should have, for its own
sake, operational continuity processes designed to recover from such critical
data corruption events.40 The amount of effort to remove a dormant logic
bomb is no greater than what recovering the loss of important data by any
other means would be. Since typical hardware failures or software crashes
are not armed attacks, and since the harm of a dormant logic bomb, once
discovered, is comparable to the harm done by such a failure, it is not reason­
39Executable code is merely data processed by the more basic programs encoded in the
circuitry of a computer’s instruction­processing unit. System failures that affect data storage
and transmission can affect executable code, since that code is stored and transmitted using
those data systems.
40Some states and organisations have mandated this. Two examples are documented in
United States President, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC
63 (May 22, 1998), accessed August 15, 2016, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-
63.pdf and Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission
on a European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection, COM(2006) 786 (Brussels, BE, De­
cember 12, 2006), accessed August 15, 2016, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0786&from=EN.
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able to consider the physical harm to a state caused by the mere placement
of a logic bomb as anything more than an operational inconvenience.
In this example, the logic bomb would score highly on the severity cri­
terion because it targeted the electrical grid—a critical national interest for
supporting the economic and social functions of government. It would not
be a direct infringement of fundamental human rights. Even though per­
sons whose jobs rely on electricity being readily available would not be able
to work temporarily, their right to work would not impaired. The most sig­
nificant rights targeted by the logic bomb are the loss of access to health
care41 and the “benefits of scientific progress”42 that facilitated the develop­
ment of the electrical grid. Because there is no physical damage and no
lasting—if any—effect on critical national interests, there is no discernible
or significant harm to compare against the scale and effects of an armed at­
tack. Such a cyberattack would be classified as a moderate one and not a
flagrant one simply because the effect is minimal with respect to physical
harm. This does not mean it is without cost to repair, but that kind of cost
is not one that factors into the jus ad bellum deliberation. Thus there is no
basis for a state to claim that another state’s placement of a logic bomb is an
armed attack unless and until the malicious code is actually triggered.
However, placing such a logic bomb is, at least in terms of invasiveness
and potential harm (regardless of intent to produce it) is still something
that could look like a use of force against the target state. This meatspace
analogy, based on the Halifax harbour explosion on December 6, 1917, re­
veals the disanalogy between aggressive but non­damaging actions by cy­
ber and conventional means.43 Suppose that the munitions­laden freighter
Mont Blanc, instead of being struck by the Imo, had been the target of an as­
sault from a handful of German Friedrichshafen G.III bomber aircraft that
somehowmade the trip across the Atlantic Ocean.44 If the bombers had suc­
ceeded in hitting the Mont Blanc, the bombing could be treated as a permis­
sible armed attack within the current laws of armed conflict: a formal state
of war existed between Canada and Germany; the harbour was a target with
41ICESCR, Art. 12(d).
42ICESCR, Art. 15(b).
43I thank Mathieu Doucet for this example.
44Dan Alex, “Friedrichshafen G.III Bomber/Night Bomber Aircraft,” Military Factory,
July 31, 2019, accessed September 17, 2020, https://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/
detail.asp?aircraft_id=602.
109
military value; and the resulting damage to the civilian portions of the city,
despite being disproportionate to what would have been required to neu­
tralize the harbour, could still be deemed as acceptable collateral damage
provided the aircrews had no knowledge of the Mont Blanc’s cargo. Even
if the bombers had missed the Mont Blanc or any of the other ships in the
harbour area and the bombs had all failed to detonate, sinking harmlessly
in the water, the bombing run itself, without causing physical harm, would
be a use of force because of its invasive nature. Further, the threat of phys­
ical damage, including civilian deaths, would be apparent as soon as the
aircraft were detected. A proportionate defensive move would be to shoot
the aircraft down—a justifiable, nocuous response even though no harm was
inflicted.
The failed or defused logic bomb is just as invasive as the bombing run,
but the intended outcome and the extent of the potential physical harm
are not nearly so clear as they are in a failed bombing run. In the case of
a thwarted logic bomb where there is no knowledge about intended and
potential outcomes, it seems that the proportionate defensive response to
the cyberoperation must be something less forceful than a nocuous counter­
strike.45 Even a moderate counterstrike may not be permitted, since remov­
ing the malware ends the threat without the need for a counterstrike. So
while a use of force by cyber means is not significantly different from a con­
ventional use of force with respect to invasiveness or violation of sovereignty,
the state of knowledge with respect to any threatened or intended physical
harm constrains the target state’s response. The significant difference be­
tween the failed logic bomb and the failed harbour bombing is epistemic,
not metaphysical. If the logic bomb had been activated, and it succeeded
in producing an uncontrolled shutdown of the electrical grid, leading to
equipment­destroying overloads in generators, transformers, and intercon­
nections, that is enough physical harm to be considered an armed attack
since even a precision bombing run would produce the same effect. The
cyberattack would then legitimately be called flagrant. This still does not
mean a use of force is permitted in response, but it satisfies the severity and
measurability of effects criteria for determining just cause.
The cascading failure of part of the eastern electrical interconnection dur­
ing the blackout of August 14, 2003, illustrates the economic disruption that
45Tallinn 2.0, Rule 22, comment 10; Rule 69, comment 11.
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could result from a cyberattack on the electrical grid. This outage affected
portions of Ontario, Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, New York, Vermont,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Jersey.46 Some areas were without
electricity for four days, while areas had reduced supply managed for a
few days by rolling blackouts or keeping large industrial consumers shut
down.47 This outage went beyond a mere inconvenience to being a signif­
icant economic disruption for business, industry, transportation, and indi­
viduals. “Estimates of total costs in the United States range between $4
billion and $10 billion (US dollars). In Canada, gross domestic product was
down 0.7% in August, there was a net loss of 18.9 million work hours, and
manufacturing shipments in Ontario were down $2.3 billion (Canadian dol­
lars).”48 Yet there was no penalty imposed on the company for the economic
damage because American law at the time “[did] not require electric reliabil­
ity standards.”49
The international report on the causes of the 2003 blackout explicitly
ruled out a cyberattack as a contributing factor to that incident.50 However,
it did note that “[m]any malicious code attacks, by their very nature, are
unbiased.”51 In other words, they do not necessarily seek out particular tar­
gets, just systems that happen to be vulnerable to the attack. It turns out
that the company responsible for the August 2003 blackout had been the vic­
tim of an indiscriminate piece of malware a fewmonths before. The incident
took place at an off­line nuclear plant when “the ‘Slammer’ Internet worm
took down monitoring computers. . . . A subsequent report . . . concluded
that although the infection caused no outages, it blocked commands that
operated other power utilities.”52 DDOS attacks may also be indiscriminate,
46U.S.­Canada Power System Outage Task Force, Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Black­
out in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations, causal analysis (April 2004),
1, accessed September 29, 2020, https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/
DocumentsandMedia/BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf.
47U.S.­Canada Power System Outage Task Force, 1.
48U.S.­Canada Power System Outage Task Force, 1.
49Reuters, “DOE Chief Sees No Blackout Penalty for FirstEnergy,” November 19, 2003,
accessed September 29, 2020, https://web.archive.org/web/20040224080845/http:
//www.forbes.com/markets/newswire/2003/11/19/rtr1153863.html.
50U.S.­Canada Power System Outage Task Force, Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Black­
out in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations, 132.
51U.S.­Canada Power System Outage Task Force, 133.
52U.S.­Canada Power System Outage Task Force, 132.
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where the target system is whatever happens to be at the end of the network
address generated pseudorandomly.53 Another part of the epistemological
problem around responding to an aggressive cyberoperation, then, is dis­
cerning whether the attack is specifically aimed against the affected system,
a nuisance assault against a target of opportunity, or just rogue software
autonomously discovering and exploiting a system vulnerability.
Elections and other social functions
There is growing recognition that physical harm is not the only kind of harm
that can jeopardize the sovereignty or integrity of a state. The logic bomb
scenario shows how physical harm producing economic and institutional
disruption can follow both conventional and cyber attacks. Conventional
attacks will do this by physical means, so there is clear evidence of an armed
attack having taken place. In the cyber context, however, there may be no
intermediate physical harm apparent. There is no need for a cyberattack to
cause physical harm to disrupt economic or institutional functions. More­
over, a cyberattack does not even need to install malicious software on the
target system to cause these kinds of harm. All it has to do is overwhelm
the target system’s ability to communicate with other systems. As the 2007
cyberattack against Estonia (discussed in Chapter 3) demonstrated, a well­
coordinated long­duration DDOS attack can bring a halt to electronic transac­
tion processing, including the trading of securities, commodities, and deriva­
tive instruments. This would bring electronic commerce to an effective halt,
impairing the sale of goods, the fulfillment of contracts, and the flow of
money. If the target is a distributed database or equipment that facilitates
fair elections, the disruption could undermine the legitimacy of the election.
The Tallinn Manual acknowledges that cyberoperations causing effects
that do not rise to the level of an armed attack or even to the level of a use of
force may still violate international law.54 If a state’s government or armed
forces participates in or enables this kind of disruptive cyberattack without
causing physical harm, it still seems reasonable to treat it as violation of a
state’s sovereignty over its affairs. In other words, it is at least a moderate
53Pseudorandomnumbers are generated algorithmically and are not truly random. They
are “random enough” for most purposes, such as producing a number between 0 and 255.
Four or eight such numbers make up an Internet address.
54Tallinn 2.0, Rule 68, comment 6.
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cyberattack, though not likely a flagrant one. For example, if an election
is disrupted by another state, that state has usurped one of the “inherently
governmental functions” of a state,55 something that is recognized as a vi­
olation of sovereignty. It also violates the right of citizens to participate
in elections in a way that “guarantee[s] the free expression of the will of the
electors.”56 Ending the threat may mean discarding the election results. It is
not clear, though, that there are any effective countermeasures the state can
take while the threat of disruption is still active without halting the voting
process itself.57 Disrupting an electoral campaign through disinformation
attacks and faking grass­roots support for a particular position (a technique
called astroturfing) through social media is a social engineering attack done
through cyber means, but because it does not result in physical harm, it is
not a flagrant cyberattack.58 It is not even a violation of sovereignty, but a
presumptively legal means of communication “designed to achieve national
objectives.”59 These kinds of state­involved cyberoperations can be consid­
ered no more than moderate cyberattacks because they are not clear viola­
tions of sovereignty.
Economic disruption
The disruption of an economy by cyber means is a complex case. There
is currently neither widespread state practice nor international law on this
55Tallinn 2.0, Rule 4, comment 10.
56ICCPR, Rule 25(b).
57Computer scientists and software designers are almost unanimous in the opinion that
elections should not take place over the Internet. The Internet fundamentally operates
on the trust of its users, and any security methods are sophisticated afterthoughts. Voters
will not reliably take measures to secure their ballots. The secrecy of the ballot cannot be
guaranteed, and digital credentials are readily forged, so a person intending to vote may
discover that the ballot intended for them has already been marked as being cast. Digital
ballots are easily intercepted and altered, and the altered ballots can be recorded in the
audit trail. Governments, however, have a habit of not listening to experts. A network
completely separated from the Internet could be secured, but at a greater cost than using
paper ballots and tallying them by scanners or by hand.
58Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 3.
59Department of Defense [USA], Joint Publication 3­13.2: Psychological Operations (January 7,
2010), I.2.a, b, accessed February 5, 2021, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3-13-
2.pdf.
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point.60 However, “[e]conomic coercion is presumptively lawful”61 under
the international law of sanctions—which are still intrusions upon the sanc­
tioned state’s sovereignty but explicitly declared not to be a use of armed
force against it62—developed during the creation of the UN Charter.63 Eco­
nomic sanctions have been considered the least disruptive way of exercising
pressure on a state to change its behaviour without resorting to armed inter­
vention, andwere designed to bar the sanctioned state’s claim to self­defence.
It turns out that in many cases the effects of these sanctions affect the well­
being, and perhaps threaten the lives, of the state’s civilian population (a
violation of the inherent right to life64 if death does result, or perhaps of the
right to freedom from “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish­
ment”65 if it does not). Neither of these outcomes seem to be in line with
sanctions’ intended purpose, and both of them, outside of sanctions, give
a state some support for a claim of self­defence to protect the rights of its
civilians.66 A further complication is that in the context of armed conflict,
sanctions look a lot like a collective penalty against civilians for offences
they did not commit, which is prohibited under Article 33 of GC IV. It is
inconsistent, perhaps even absurd, for a freedom to be asserted under the
laws of armed conflict when it is not one recognized during times of peace.
If a state of peace between nations is asserted as the desired and normal
state of affairs (which the preamble to the UN Charter affirms), and if par­
ticular rights are given protection under the laws of armed conflict (which
the Geneva Conventions affirm), then those rights must exist during peace­
time so that the laws of armed conflict have something to protect. (In other
words, war is not the kind of action that can establish fundamental human
rights, but the almost routine claims of human rights violations during war
demonstrate the existence of fundamental human rights both prior to and
60Tallinn 2.0, Rule 4, comment 28.
61Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 10.
62UN Charter, Art. 41.
63Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 2
64ICCPR, Art. 6.
65ICCPR, Art. 7.
66Public statements do not necessarily reflect geopolitical reality. Nonetheless, a state
can assert the claim without requiring international verification of the reasoning before
taking action in self­defence. However, if such action is taken, ex post facto disproof of the
claim will not undo the consequences. Consequently reparations, further sanctions, or
armed humanitarian intervention may be in order.
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during the conflict. This makes post bellum recovery of the ability to exer­
cise rights an important means of avoiding a future war.) Therefore, as a
violation of rights in peacetime, and what would be a violation of the laws
of armed conflict during wartime, economic sanctions look like they would
provide just cause for a use of force in response were it not for the exception
carved out for them under international law.
Sanctions are not the only means of economic coercion or disruption.
Though a state’s economy is a critical national interest, the health and sta­
bility of a state’s economy is connected to the health and stability of the
economies of its largest trading partners. It is presumptively legal to use
trade mechanisms to interfere with a state’s economy in pursuit of political
goals (for example, Canada’s application of retaliatory tariffs in 2018 against
a narrow selection of American goods that just happened to be produced in
Trump­supporting regions67).
Using cyber or kinetic means to disrupt an economy is a different mat­
ter. In general, national economies are not solely connected to legitimate
military targets. Though some parts of the economy directly support mili­
tary activity, the parts that do not cannot be targeted without violating the
principle of discrimination.68 A state­involved cyberattack intended solely
to produce an economic advantage against the target state, and not to co­
erce a change in the target state’s policies, will be most effective if it targets
a critical, non­military national interest such as its financial markets. Such a
cyberattack is a clear violation of sovereignty and of the laws of armed con­
flict.69 Themeasurable effects of the cyberattack would determine whether it
is a moderate cyberattack that can be considered a use of force or a flagrant
one equivalent to an armed attack. In either case, a cyberattack against a
state’s economic interests may provide just cause for a use of force in re­
sponse, provided the other just­cause criteria and jus ad bellum conditions
are satisfied.
67W. Jim Jordan et al., With a Clear Conscience: Business Ethics, Decision­Making, and Strategic
Thinking, ed. Gregory G. Andres (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2021), 214.
68Tallinn 2.0, Rule 100, comment 21.
69Owens report, 259.
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5.4 Responsibilities for mitigation
While target states have to justify responding to an aggressive cyberopera­
tion by making reference to scale and effects (along with the other just­cause
criteria and jus ad bellum conditions), an attacking state may make the rhetor­
ical claim that its target state has some responsibility to mitigate the harm
arising from an attack so and must bear some of the blame for the extent of
the harm if it had not taken steps to mitigate that harm. However, taking
advantage of a state’s unpreparedness or inability to mitigate the harm does
not change the fact that a harm has occurred. Claiming that the target state
had responsibility to mitigate an attackmerely and unjustly attempts to shift
the blame, for mitigation would not have been necessary if the attack had
not been made. So international law permits a target state to take counter­
measures in self­defence before beginning any possible mitigation activity.70
In other words, stopping the harm is acknowledged to have higher priority
than allowing harm to continue until no further mitigation is possible.
Even so, a state does have responsibility for defending its civilians “to
the maximum extent feasible . . . against the dangers resulting from military
operations”71 during times of armed conflict. With respect to cyberwar, not
only is it in a state’s military interest to secure the computing and communi­
cation networks that support critical military infrastructure against aggres­
sive cyberoperations, but it is also in the state’s interest to do the same for
critical civilian infrastructure.72 All this entails is securing enough of the
network infrastructure, on a best­effort basis, to protect any life­ and rights­
sustaining functions that must be conducted over a computer network.73
There are existing international technical standards that describe ways to
do this from a perspective that incorporates hardware and software relia­
bility, secure network communication protocols, and organizational compe­
70Tallinn 2.0, Rule 23, comment 9. This also means that the countermeasures can be
proportionate to what is needed to end the harm being done without taking into account
any mitigation the target state might be able to do concurrently. The failure to mitigate
may affect the calculation of reparations if it can be shown that the target state intentionally
delayed it to inflate a claim for reparations, but it does not affect the permissible forcefulness
of the response. Tallinn 2.0, Rule 28, comment 8.
71AP I, Art. 58.
72Commentary on the Additional Protocols, ¶2240; Tallinn 2.0, Rule 121.
73Tallinn 2.0, Rule 121, comments 9, 12.
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tencies and responsibilities.74 If a state is home to businesses that find it
important to invest in cybersecurity to protect themselves from data theft,
malware, and operational failure as a legal defence from criminal and civil
judgements when the almost­inevitable breach does occur, then it is at least
equally important for the state’s military organizations to do so where the
stakes (state sovereignty, human lives, environment) are higher.
States originally uninvolved in a conflict may become unwilling agents
in it when cyberattacks are routed through network infrastructure in their
territory. These third­party states have the international responsibility “not
to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of
other states.”75 While this principle of “due diligence”76 was first applied in
74International Organization for Standardization and International Electrotechnical
Commission, International Standard ISO/IEC 27000: Information Technology—Security Techniques—
Information Security Management Systems, technical standard, ISO/IEC 27000:2018(E) (Geneva,
CH: International Organization for Standardization, February 2018), https://standards.
iso.org/ittf/PubliclyAvailableStandards/c073906_ISO_IEC_27000_2018_E.zip
(hereafter cited as ISO/IEC 27000) provides guidance for organizations and government de­
partments concerning information and network security in general. ASTM International,
Standard Guide for Cybersecurity and Cyberattack Mitigation, technical standard, F3286­17 (West
Conshohocken, PA: ASTM International, December 1, 2017), accessed September 1, 2020,
https://doi.org/10.1520/F3286-17 (hereafter cited as ASTM F3286) specifically addresses
mitigating the effects of cyberattacks, while ASTM International, Standard Practice for Ensuring
Dependability of Software Used in Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), technical standard, F3201­16
(West Conshohocken, PA: ASTM International, September 1, 2016), accessed September 1,
2020, https://doi.org/10.1520/F3201- 16 (hereafter cited as ASTM F3201) and ASTM
International, Standard Guide for Inclusion of Cyber Risks into Maritime Safety Management Systems
in Accordance with IMO Resolution MSC.428(98)—Cyber Risks and Challenges, technical standard,
F3449­20 (West Conshohocken, PA: ASTM International, June 1, 2020), accessed Septem­
ber 1, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1520/F3449-20 (hereafter cited as ASTM F3449) establish
practices for system security and risk management in uncrewed aircraft and maritime ves­
sels, respectively. A longer list of relevant ISO/IEC security standards is provided in O.M.
Fal’, “Standardization in Information Technology Security,” Cybernetics and Systems Analysis
53, no. 1 (January 2017): 78–82, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10559-017-9908-8.
75International Court of Justice ﹙ICJ﹚, Corfu Channel case, 1949 ICJ 4, April 9, 1949, 22,
accessed April 25, 2016, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1/1645.pdf (hereafter
cited as Corfu Channel), referenced in Tallinn 2.0, Rule 6, comment 2. The judgement also
states here that this is not an obligation imposed by a signed international convention;
rather, this obligation predates the 1907 Hague Conventions as one of the “certain general
and well­recognized principles” alluded to in those conventions.
76Tallinn 2.0, Rule 6, comment 1.
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a maritime context,77 this principle can also apply in a cyber context due to
the fundamental design of the Internet and its protocols.
Internet transmissions consist of small packets of data. Each packet can
take a different route to its destination. Because the Internet is global in
scope, Internet traffic routinely crosses international boundaries.78 Some
of this traffic is malicious or exploitive in some way.79 Cisco Systems re­
ported that 11.6% of the identifiably malicious traffic passing through its
brand of network equipment in 2015 was aimed at infiltrating, disrupting, or
disabling small­scale industrial control systems ﹙ICS﹚ and larger­scale super­
visory, control, and data acquisition ﹙SCADA﹚ systems.80 Internet­connected
77On October 22, 1946, two British warships claiming innocent passage through the
Corfu Channel (which includes some Albanian territorial waters) struck moored mines in
an area that had been clear of mines less than six months earlier. Many officers and crew
were injured, and some were killed. Even though Albania likely did not lay the mines, it
was established that Albania knew about them, and failed to warn the British ships of the
danger.
78For example, any Internet traffic between a computer at my home in Kitchener and
my hosting service in Toronto is usually routed through Chicago, because that is where my
Internet service provider makes its most efficient connection to my host’s Internet service
providers.
79There is no consensus estimate of what proportion of Internet traffic serves malicious
purposes, but there are some measures of it for major Internet­based applications. World­
Wide Web traffic is only a portion of Internet traffic, and roughly 30% of that portion is
malicious. Imperva, Inc., “Incapsula Finds Malicious Bots Account for Approximately 30
Percent of Internet Traffic,” Imperva, Inc., December 29, 2014, accessed April 28, 2016, htt
ps://www.incapsula.com/about/press-releases/incapsula-finds-malicious-bots-ac
count-for-approximately-30-percent-of-internet-traffic/. Similarly, of the roughly
347 billion email messages per day that passed through one vendor’s equipment, about
85% of it was spam, and another 76 million messages per day contained malicious software
(malware). Cisco Systems, 2015 Annual Security Report, technical report (San Jose, CA: Cisco
Systems, 2015), accessed April 28, 2016, http://www.cisco.com/web/offers/pdfs/cisco-
asr-2015.pdf. More than 50% of all Internet traffic is now encrypted, and it is not possible
to inspect encrypted data packets to see if a message contains malware. Cisco Systems,
2018 Annual Security Report, technical report (San Jose, CA: Cisco Systems, 2018), 9, accessed
March 2, 2021, https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/m/digital/elq-cmcglobal/witb/acr2018/
acr2018final.pdf. Nonetheless, somemalicious software does use encryption to obfuscate
its purpose. Sandvine Incorporated ULC, 2016 Global Internet Phenomena: Spotlight: Encrypted
Internet Traffic, technical report (Waterloo, ON: Sandvine Incorporated ULC, February 2016),
accessed April 28, 2016, https://www.sandvine.com/downloads/general/global-inte
rnet-phenomena/2016/global-internet-phenomena-spotlight-encrypted-internet-
traffic.pdf.
80Cisco Systems, 2015 Annual Security Report, 9. Cisco has not published comparable data
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command­and­control ﹙C2﹚ systems are prized targets for certain kinds of
malicious software, and military C2 systems may be legitimate targets for a
state­led network­based attack.
Even though the attacking state and target state may share a geographic
border, there is no guarantee that any network traffic between the two states
will not traverse other states’ networks. The data packets associated with
that activity may well travel through third­party states’ Internet infrastruc­
ture simply because of the way Internet routing works. This happens auto­
matically; the intermediate states receive no notification from the Internet
itself that an attack is using their network infrastructure,81 and the attacking
state has no way to force a particular routing.82 It is possible, and highly
probable, that third­party states will not be aware of the cyberattack being
conducted over their Internet infrastructure. Once an intermediate state is
aware of the operation taking place over its Internet infrastructure, satisfy­
ing the “due diligence” requirement concerning harm to another state gives
rise to another obligation: that intermediate state is expected to do what
is feasible to end the internationally unlawful use of their cyber infrastruc­
ture.83 It may be that the intermediate state will learn of the cyberattack
since this report.
81Tallinn 2.0, Rule 6, comment 14.
82Unlike the wired telephone network, the Internet does not rely on a single continuous
physical connection between two terminals. Each router (a device that forwards Internet
packets to either their destination or to another device between it and each packet’s destina­
tion) in a service provider’s network usually has connections tomultiple other routers (some
of them owned by other service providers), and the owners of each router will program a
preferred forward route to other parts of the Internet on the basis of cost, availability, or
some other metric. If the preferred route is not available, the next­best one will be chosen,
and so on. Because most Internet transmissions need multiple data packets to hold the
full content of the transmission, each packet can follow a different route from its source
to the destination, and those packets can arrive in a different order than they were sent.
The system on the receiving end will reassemble the message when all of the packets have
been received. The only way to force an Internet transmission to a single route is to have
control over all of the physical routes between the origin and the target, and program only
a single route from source to destination. This principle also facilitates national firewalls.
For example, all Internet traffic to and from China goes through a small number of state­
controlled routers. Packets going to or arriving from banned services can be intercepted
and discarded at those border gateways, but state­approved traffic will be forwarded on.
83Tallinn 2.0, Rule 7. However, determining when this is happening is not easy to do in
a timely fashion, and any encryption involved makes it even harder.
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only after the target state begins taking countermeasures against it. These
countermeasures against a third­party state are permissible as long as they
are proportionate to what is required to end the harm, and they must cease
when the third­party state begins taking its own action to end the harm.84
Having this responsibility as a third­party state and having the means
to fulfil it are two different things. Among the ugly realities of cyberwar is
an asymmetry in cost. Cyber offence can be very cheap and in crude cases
does not require a high ratio of hits to attempts for the attack to be effective.
Conversely, cyber defence can be prohibitively expensive while still being
ineffective.85 This is why the means taken do not go beyond what is feasible
(understood as “reasonably available and practicable”86) for the third­party
state to do, either on its own or with contracted assistance.87 However, if
a state does have the means to fulfil this obligation, then it also has some
ability to secure and defend its own cyber infrastructure, and this is where
network defence brings the obligations to its civilians and to other states
together. If a state has some ability to mitigate the impact of malicious net­
work traffic directed its way, then it has some of what it needs to defend its
civilian population from any death or injury that might otherwise arise from
such activity.
This gives rise to another cyber just­cause wrinkle. If a state is not de­
fending its civilian population from another state’s attacks, or if a state is
violating its citizens’ rights, it may be subject to international intervention
under emerging “responsibility to protect” reasoning. As Edward Barrett
suggests, “[s]tate actors who abuse their citizens lose their authority, their
citizens have a right to rebel and waive their right to non­interference, and
other states capable of providing security have obligations to do so.”88 While
this reasoning is often proposed with respect to conventional means of war
(air strikes against government forces, followed by troops and humanitarian
relief on the ground), it seems that it could also apply when cyber means
are involved. One way is to intervene using cyber means to thwart ongoing
84Tallinn 2.0, Rule 21.
85Owens report, 13.
86Tallinn 2.0, Rule 7, comment 2.
87Tallinn 2.0, Rule 7, comments 16, 17, 19.
88Edward T. Barrett, “Warfare in a New Domain: The Ethics of Military Cyber­
Operations,” Journal of Military Ethics 12, no. 1 (April 2013): 9, https://doi.org/10.1080/
15027570.2013.782633.
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rights violations (though admittedly most rights violations leading to third­
party interventionwould likely be those associatedwith the necessities of life
and so need a meatspace intervention alongside any cyberspace one). The
other way comes when cyber means are used to violate those rights, such
as “losing” civil records, denying access to services that are only provided
online, or violating privacy by searching personal data for the purposes of
suppression or harassment. Both of these could provide just cause for a use
of force (kinetic or cyber, depending on proportionality and discrimination
obligations) against the offending state, provided other jus ad bellum condi­
tions are met. Whatever the means, they must not add to the harm already
being done to the civilian population.
This second way has caught the attention of another international orga­
nization: the International Monetary Fund ﹙IMF﹚. The IMF has adapted this
idea, proposing a way for external states to advance and protect rights using
non­forceful means during peacetime. In its quest to bring digital financial
services to the “1.7 billion [adults worldwide who] are still unbanked,”89 the
IMF has issued a call to “[help] developing and emerging economies build
cybersecurity capacity.”90 This is one possible way for smaller and poorer
states to secure their national infrastructure to some minimal standard that
provides at least some protection to citizens’ financial data and safeguard
the right of citizens to some degree of economic freedom.91 This call, as self­
serving as it may be to the wealthy states in the global financial community,
is nominally in accordance with the states parties’ covenant “to take steps . . .
through international assistance and co­operation, especially economic and
technical, . . . with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of
the rights recognized” in the ICESCR.92
On one reading of this paragraph in the treaty, it may be considered a vi­
olation of an international obligation for a state party to ICESCR to refuse to
89Kristalina Georgieva, “Financial Inclusion and Cybersecurity in the Digital Age,” In­
ternational Monetary Fund ﹙IMF﹚, speech delivered to (Virtual) Conference on Financial
Inclusion and Cybersecurity, December 10, 2020, accessed February 19, 2021, https://
www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/12/10/sp121020-financial-inclusion-and-
cybersecurity-in-the-digital-age.
90Jennifer Elliott and Nigel Jenkinson, “Cyber Risk is the New Threat to Financial Se­





provide another state party the necessary means to develop cybersecurity to
the level where the state can participate in the international banking system.
But this level of cybersecurity will also help a state secure its military and
remaining publicly­owned civilian infrastructure. Further, it is a level of se­
curity that may prevent or blunt some of the harm caused by a cyberattack,
satisfying the best­effort obligation to defend citizens from those harms. It
may also keep the state from being an unknowing third­party conduit for a
cyberattack against the financial systems of another state (which might pro­
vide motivation for external states to provide this assistance). In theory, at
least, states without the means to secure their cyber infrastructure can ask
for help, and states that can help must do so on a best­effort basis. Still, a
state is not under any obligation to request this assistance, and not request­
ing or refusing an offer of this assistance does not diminish an aggressor
state’s responsibility for harm done by a cyberattack.
5.5 Separating the causal and the temporal
In the same way that a neutral state’s duty to not allow its cyber infrastruc­
ture to be used by an aggressor to harm other states depends on knowing
that an aggressive cyberoperation is in progress, a state’s duty to protect its
civilians from certain cyberattacks also depends on having that knowledge.
This brings in a temporal consideration for determining whether just cause
for a forceful response exists. The time at which a state becomes aware of a
cyberattack may affect whether the cyberattack is moderate or flagrant. In
situations where there is sufficient knowledge to determine the origin, in­
tention, and potential harm of an attack, the scale­and­effects doctrine pro­
vides consistent guidance in assessing the just­cause criteria of severity and
measurability of effects. When the temporal and causal distances from the
initial action to the resultant and anticipated harm are added to the mix, the
guidance becomes more conflicted. I will present examples where a state
has committed an act that violates the target state’s sovereignty that, by it­
self, would not be a flagrant attack, but the direct consequences, when they
become apparent days or months later, would. In light of the scale and ef­
fects resulting from the initial act, regardless of how far separated they are
temporally, knowledge of the effects at the time of the initial action might
contribute toward having just cause for a forceful response, yet any ability
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for the target state to mitigate any unrealized effects limit the character of
any response. I have argued that it is difficult to justify an armed response
when the effects are minimal; now I will further argue that it is also diffi­
cult to treat a state’s capability to cause harm as sufficient just cause for a
forceful response when there is no indication that the state intends to inflict
that harm. Moreover, I will show by analogy that the concerns about cy­
berwarfare in this regard are current problems with conventional means of
warfare.
It is easy to conflate the causal and temporal distances between an action
and its ultimate effect. A typical armed attack has a visible cause (say, a mis­
sile launch or armoured vehicles crossing a border) that produces a visible
effect (an explosion or the seizing of territory) a short time later. But the
relationship between the number of links in the causal chain and the length
of the timeline is not necessarily proportional. For example, the TallinnMan­
ual, in its discussion on perfidy, specifically cautions that “[p]roximate cause
should not be confused with temporal proximity,”93 because the actions and
communications that invite an adversary’s (limited) trust can occur some
time before the treacherous strike against that adversary occurs. A cyber­
attack can follow a similar pattern. A state can begin cyberoperations that
leave its adversary unknowingly at risk of harm, and then wait patiently for
an opportune time to make the damaging strike.
This caution is relevant to acts of aggression that do not involve perfidy.
Suppose an enemy saboteur, operating under military direction and wear­
ing military insignia (making it explicit that this example includes military
involvement), has managed to infiltrate a hydroelectric generating station
and loosen a few bolts on a turbine housing. This allows the housing to vi­
brate just a little more than safe operation permits. If this excess vibration
continues for a long enough time, the other bolts will bear more stress and
the resulting strain will eventually cause them to fail. The now­free turbine
will launch upward and a jet of water will follow it. Depending on other
circumstances, this could lead to a series of explosions due to pressure, tem­
perature shock, electrical arcing, or a chemical reaction. If these take place
near enough to the dam, they could weaken the dam, which may, in turn,
collapse.94 While the root cause of the failure is the saboteur loosening the
93Tallinn 2.0, Rule 122, comment 6.
94An accident at the Sayano­Shushenkaya hydroelectric generating station in Siberia in
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bolts, and it can even be considered a proximate cause, this could have been
done weeks before the mechanical failure occurred. In this particular case,
then, there is a short causal chain between the sabotage of the turbine and
the collapse of the dam, but there is an extended period of time between the
two events.
Now consider a logic bomb similar to Stuxnet that, when triggered, varies
the spin rates in a turbinewhile intercepting and replacing equipment­generated
status reports with ones that indicate everything is operating normally. The
varying spin induces a wobble. The wobble slowly loosens the bolts. The
bolts eventually shear off, giving rise to the same catastrophic effects as the
sabotage case—perhaps even up to the failure of the dam itself. One proxi­
mate cause is the placement of the malicious code. Another proximate cause
would be the triggering event, but that would not have been part of the
causal chain had the logic bomb not been in place to respond to the event.
This causal chain, in terms of macro­scale events, is no longer than in the
case of physical sabotage: the placement of the logic bomb is equivalent
to the infiltration, and the usurping of the control software is equivalent to
inducing the vibration that starts the process of loosening the bolts. Every­
thing else follows in the same way.95 As in the sabotage example, there may
be a long period of time—perhaps months—between the placement of the
code and that code being triggered, followed by the additional time needed
for the physical system to fail as intended.96 Just as in the sabotage case,
the aggressive cyberoperation’s destructive effects do not follow immedi­
ately (with respect to time) after the placement of the code, though they
are closely causally connected to that placement.
2009 produced all but the dam failure. The official root causes were inadequate mainte­
nance and safety controls. Fabian Acker, “Fatal Failures: Siberia’s Hydro Disaster,” En­
gineering and Technology Magazine 6, no. 7 (July 11, 2011), accessed March 28, 2016, http :
//eandt.theiet.org/magazine/2011/07/siberia-hydro-disaster.cfm.
95What counts as a macro­scale event is somewhat subjective. Faking controller reports
might be seen as a separate event, but it is another chain that follows from the triggering
of the logic bomb that runs parallel to the effects produced in the turbines, and not part of
the same chain.
96The intended effect may have been only to stop the generation of electricity for a mili­
tary facility. The dam failure may not have been intended. However, if the dam had failed,
the attacking state would be responsible for the downstream effects, as the failure of the
dam is out of proportion to the military advantage sought by ending electricity production.
Tallinn 2.0, Rule 113, comment 8.
124
These examples show that causal proximity and temporal immediacy,
while they often run together, can come apart in one direction: a short causal
chain with a long period of time between the initial aggressive act and the
manifestation of its intended effects. But they can come apart in the other
direction, too. A conventional aerial bombing has a longer chain of dis­
crete events: making weather observations and forecasts; briefing the crew;
assembling, loading, and arming ordnance; installing cameras to capture im­
ages for assessing the effectiveness of the attack; performing aircraft readi­
ness checks; outfitting the aircrew; coordinating an ordered launch of mul­
tiple aircraft; gathering aircraft from several bases in groups at an in­flight
assembly point; dividing into attack squadrons; dodging anti­aircraft fire;
dropping the bombs; and—if all has gone well with respect to the mission—
returning to base.97 All of this takes place in the span of about twelve hours.
Launching the aircraft indicates at least readiness to attack, and is a use of
force, but until the aircraft enter the target state’s airspace and drop their
payload, an armed attack has not taken place.98 The use of force to that
point has not produced a significant harm to the victim state, and the anti­
aircraft fire is the proportionate response to reduce the threat. This scenario
has a comparatively long causal chain compared to deploying a logic bomb,
which has no need for crew briefing and outfitting, ordnance preparation,
pre­flight checks, marshalling, or a safe return to base. The air strike has a
short period of time between the beginning of the armed attack (not the use
of force, which began at takeoff) and the first of its effects.99 So the tempo­
ral and causal chains of any harm can vary in length independently of the
97Annette Tison, “Anatomy Of a Bombing Mission,” 392nd Bomb Group, 2017, accessed
October 1, 2020, https://www.b24.net/MissionAnatomy.htm.
98The imminence of an armed attack may justify a preemptive use of force in “antici­
patory self­defence,” but that is another study. Tallinn 2.0, Rule 73, comment 2, with ref­
erence to Derek William Bowett, Self­Defence in International Law (New York, NY: Frederick
A. Praeger, 1958), 188–89. Any use of force in response must be proportionate to what is
required to end the threat of an imminent attack.
99Geology provides another analogy. An earthquake is caused by a slow build­up of
strain along a fault line. The strain along parts of the fault may be relieved by sporadic
smallish earthquakes (foreshocks). However, when a segment under a great deal of strain
(with respect to geological processes) ruptures, the time it takes to release that stored energy
along its length results in prolonged shaking that induces the catastrophic effects. The
longer the intense shaking persists (ceteris paribus), the more damage there is. The point is
a long causal chain of discrete events can produce catastrophic effects in a comparatively
brief period of time. Luc Reychler, Time for Peace:The Essential Role of Time in Conflict and Peace
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other. This means that the evaluation of any act of aggression, be it cyber or
conventional, must assess the just­cause criteria of temporal immediacy and
causal directness separately.
5.6 Aggressive cyberoperations and distant effects
The logic bomb and airstrike examples show that effects reaching the level
of an armed attack can result from both a use of force that had been initiated
at some comparatively distant time in the past and had lain dormant until
triggered, and also from more causally complex uses of force that run to
completion over a short period of time. However, both extended causal
chains and extended periods of time provide some opportunity to mitigate—
or even eliminate—the harm that the aggressive action had the potential to
produce. The temporal framework from the Owens report100 diagrammed
in Figure 5.1 is a good starting point for analyzing whether a cyberattack
meets the just­cause criteria of immediacy and directness that would make it a
flagrant cyberattack.
In the example of the logic bomb in the hydroelectric generator con­
trol system, the causal chain between its placement and producing the in­
tended harm is quite short. Unlike the Rube Goldberg­style device con­
tructed in the table game Mouse Trap,101 there are few discrete macro­level
events between Tcompromise, the time the logic bomb is successfully deployed,
and Teffects apparent, the time when the first turbine fails. The events just take a
long time to develop. There is no question that its placement is a violation
of sovereignty if it can be traced to a state (or an agent acting on behalf
of a state) that seeks a military gain of some sort.102 If the malicious code
Processes (Brisbane, AU: University of Queensland Press, 2015).
100Owens report, 89–90.
101Mouse Trap was first published in 1963 by Ideal Games. The goal is to avoid having
your mouse­shaped game token captured by the trap. Todd Coopee, “Mouse Trap by Ideal
(1963),” Toy Tales, June 29, 2018, accessed May 7, 2020, https://toytales.ca/mouse-trap-
ideal-1963. Operating the trap meant initiating a chain of 13 discrete triggering actions
in a process that has additional points of potential failure between the triggers. The whole
process, if it worked, would take about 20 seconds. Terry Beck, “Mouse Trap Game in
Slow Motion 19 Seconds,” video recording, April 27, 2015, accessed May 7, 2020, https:
//www.youtube.com/watch?v=sy840XvnQRA.
102Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 9(f), (g).
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runs to completion and causes damage that includes loss of life or harm to
property, then the effects make the whole extended episode a flagrant cyber­
attack equivalent in effects to an armed attack, and it would be reasonable
to say that the armed phase of the attack began at Tcompromise (Figure 5.1(b),
(e)).
However, the extended period of time between Tcompromise and Teffects apparent
provides a window of opportunity for the target state to detect and remove
the malicious code, thereby fending off the attacker’s use of force. The
longer the logic bomb lies dormant, the more susceptible it becomes to de­
tection by the target state and the lower the expected value it has to the
attacking state as a military operation.103 But it has already been shown that
the target state has some obligation to keep the networked components of its
infrastructure from being used to harm its civilian population. If the logic
bomb is found, the target state must take steps to remove it, rather than
knowingly place its population at risk. If it does so, then the intended ef­
fect cannot occur: the scale and effects of the whole operation do not rise to
the level of an armed attack, but are merely a technological inconvenience.
There are two lines of thinking from this point. Neither one depends
on the scales­and­effects doctrine, because there are no significant harmful
effects to assess. On one hand, Charles Dunlap suggests that if intent is
separated from capability, and if there is no discernible intent to trigger the
logic bomb in the near term, then there could be reason to say that merely
deploying the logic bombwould not be a use of force, even after Tcompromise.104
And this seems reasonable, since the effects that would make the cyber in­
cursion a flagrant cyberattack did not happen. Further, the Tallinn Manual
suggests that hostile actions that “generat[e] mere inconvenience or irrita­
tion will never” meet the threshold of being a use of force, and thus not be
even a moderate cyberattack, so they cannot meet the threshold of being an
armed attack.105 Yet all that a detected and removed logic bomb produces
is inconvenience and irritation.
On the other hand, placing the logic bomb is a kind of incursion, and
it gives the aggressor state the capability, if it so chooses, to execute a fla­
103This also reduces the operation’s likelihood of success, which runs counter to the ex­
pectation that the operation provide a definite military advantage to the attacker. Tallinn
2.0, Rule 100, comments 22, 23.
104Dunlap, “Perspectives for Cyberstrategists on Cyberlaw for Cyberwar,” 218.
105Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 9(a).
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grant cyberattack. The logic bomb may be intended to cause physical harm
at some point in the future, even if it is never triggered. If the harm that
would result if the logic bomb were triggered would render it a flagrant cy­
berattack, and thus equivalent to an armed attack, it could then be argued
that its emplacement is but one part of an extended flagrant cyberattack
because it places persons and property in the target state in some kind of
danger.106 Further, even if the logic bomb were to be detected and removed
before it could be triggered, this removal does not change the invasive and
potentially harmful character of the attack. It still “qualifies as an attack if,
absent such defences, it would have been likely to cause the requisite conse­
quences.’’107 On this account the target state may have just cause to respond
with a use of force at Tattack launch, even though it may not know about the at­
tack until Teffects apparent. The first line of thinking gives priority to the longer
temporal distance and the scale and effects of the minimal realized harm,
while the second gives priority to the intended and indirect effects of the
causal chain, even though they would not follow (temporally) immediately
from the initial emplacement.
The Tallinn Manual is not being contradictory here. Rather, it shows how
complex the deliberative process is, and that the careful assessment of each
just­cause criterion will mean that some of them point in different directions.
But I think the second line of thinking—that unrealized but intended effects
that would be equivalent to an armed attack had they come about—cannot,
on its own, satisfy the just­cause criteria for a nocuous response since the
cyberattack has been thwarted. While there would be a demonstrably close
causal connection between the placement of a logic bomb (at Tcompromise) and
its intended effects (at a non­existent Teffects apparent), the temporal distance be­
tween the two negates the permissibility of a nocuous response if the in­
tended harm does not arise. In other words, the violation of sovereignty
may be just cause for a forceful response but the remaining just­cause crite­
ria for a nocuous response cannot all be satisfied, so any response would be
limited to at most a moderate one that will not cause physical harm.
106The commentary on AP I, Art. 49, in considering whether laying land or sea mines
could be considered an armed attack, noted, “The general feeling was that there is an attack
whenever a person is endangered by a mine laid.” Commentary on the Additional Protocols,
¶1881. The discussion on land and sea mines can, by analogy, extend to logic bombs or
other aggressive cyberoperations. Tallinn 2.0, Rule 92, comment 16.
107Tallinn 2.0, Rule 92, comment 17.
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First, note that all of the foregoing depends on interpreting Teffects apparent as
the time when harmful effects become manifest. The second line of reason­
ing may seem to be stronger if Teffects apparent is understood as the time when
the potential extent of the effects become apparent, regardless of their actual
occurrence. But this interpretation turns the question into one of using pro­
portionate means to eliminate the threat of those effects occurring, not the
right to a nocuous response to real harm. Rather than leave the interpreta­
tion of Teffects apparent open, I will grant that being aware of the possibility of
harmful effects occurring and being aware of actual harmful effects are two
different things, and propose Tharm occurring as the point in time when physical
harm, understood as loss of life or damage to property, begins.
Now consider this analogy. Someone places a bomb in a subway station
(Tattack launch and Tcompromise). The bomb is not hidden. It is in a clear, unlocked
case on the counter of the lottery kiosk, and the time to detonation is dis­
played for anyone to see if they know where to look. Further, the instruc­
tions for defusing the bomb are attached to the case, and the person staffing
the kiosk gladly points themout to anyonewho asks. When the police notice
the bomb (Teffects apparent), the display reads 43 days, 16 hours, 37 minutes, and
19 seconds. They easily disarm the bomb, and the intended damage does not
occur (there is no Tharm occurring). The scale­and­effects doctrine suggests that
since the intended effects did not occur, the actual outcome was an incon­
venience. Even if the placement of the bomb can be attributed to another
state, a nocuous response is not justified, for the threat has been removed
by non­forceful means, and a mere inconvenience is not cause for a nocu­
ous response. This meatspace analogy to a logic bomb in the cyber realm
reveals that the triggering conditions may take a long time to occur, and
the longer that time, the more likely it is that the bomb can be discovered
and disabled. If that happens, it does not seem that a nocuous response is
justified. In both cases (and absent any other military activity against it) the
target state’s recourse seems to be limited to a strong diplomatic response,
perhaps in conjunction with a moderate cyber response.
This analogy also suggests that additional time points will be helpful in
assessing the permissibility of a forceful response. The first is the point
at which the targeted state begins gathering intelligence on the source of
the attack. Call this Tresponsive intelligence collection. This intelligence­gathering in­
cludes identifying, on the basis of the available evidence and to an impre­
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cise but principled standard of reasonableness, who the responsible party
is and whether that party can be considered an organ of a state. Only then
can the target state prepare a just response against the attacking state; that
preparation begins at Tresponse preparation. The response, if it is a moderate or
nocuous one, is launched at Tresponse launch. The time that the original attack­
ing state becomes aware of the response’s effects does not factor into the
analysis, but the time that the threat to the target state has been either neu­
tralized by the target state or withdrawn by the attacking state is a signif­
icant milestone. Tattack withdrawn identifies this point, and Tresponse withdrawn desig­
nates the corresponding withdrawal of the target state’s countermeasures
against the attacking state. On this account Teffects apparent will always occur
unless Tattack withdrawn occurs before that (leaving the target state unaware of
the operation), and Tharm occurring, if it ever occurs, will occur no earlier than
Teffects apparent. Some typical schematic timelines are shown in Figure 5.2; in
particular, timeline (c) reflects this defused bomb scenario.
Now suppose that the bomb in the subway has been discovered (Teffects apparent),
but police do not disarm it immediately because the detonation time is more
than six weeks away. They are ordered by their government to identify who
placed it (Tresponsive intelligence collection). If it was placed by another state’s military,
then they are to let it go off (Tharm occurring) rather than defuse it so there will
be the illusion of cause to retaliate against that other state. The scale and
effects of the damage by themselves are enough to justify a use of force, in­
cluding a nocuous one if necessary, to end the threat against it. However,
in this case the target state did not make the minimum response necessary—
defusing the bomb—to eliminate the threat (there is no Tattack withdrawn). The
temporal distance between placing the bomb and its detonation provided
ample opportunity to mitigate its effects with this minimal effort. And that
is what the proportionality obligation of jus in bello prescribes: any response
is limited in severity to what is justifiably needful to end the threat. If the
target state has adequate time andmeans to end the threat but does not exer­
cise that minimal effort to do so, and if the attacking state has made no other
threat or use of force, then if the bomb does explode, the target state has no
justification for launching a nocuous response in self­defence. A state that
claims a right to a nocuous response when the obligation to use a minimum
effective response has gone neglected is making a brazen attempt to avoid

























Figure 5.2: Attack­and­response schematic timelines. The timelines show the or­
der of events and not the amount of time between them. The solid markers for
Tintelligence collection, Tattack launch, Tcompromise, and Teffects apparent signify the events that are
presented in the Owens reporta (Figure 5.1), while the open markers signify the
events introduced in this analysis. Timeline (a) shows all the events described in
the text in their typical order. Timeline (b) illustrates the order of events where the
target state recognizes the potential for harm, but that harm does not take place.
Because Tharm occurring does not occur, a use of force is not justified, so Tresponse launch
ought not occur, and withdrawing the countermeasures at Tresponse withdrawn will not
be required. Timeline (c) represents the withdrawal of a a logic bomb from a com­
promised system before the target state becomes aware of it. The threat ends at
Tattack withdrawn with no involvement from the target state.
a Owens report, 89–90.
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By analogy, if the target state discovers a dormant logic bomb in a critical
C2 system and has the knowledge and means to remove it, any intentional
failure to do so negates the right of a forceful response in self­defence. The
state did not avail itself of the least forceful means of self­defence. So even
if there is a short causal connection between the placement of a bomb (logic
or otherwise) and its effects, provided that the target state has the means
and ample time to disable it, the temporal distance between the placement
and the anticipated effects negate whatever just cause the target state may
have otherwise had for even a moderate response. Thus temporal and causal
distance need to be considered separately in determining whether a forceful
response can be justified.108 None of this diminishes the attacking state’s
responsibility for any harm that does occur. The key point is that the target
state loses its right to a forceful response if it deliberately fails to satisfy its
obligation to protect its citizens from the harms of a flagrant cyberattack.
Second, the target state has to identify the state that placed the logic
bomb before it can make any kind of response. However, identifying the re­
sponsible party (Tresponsive intelligence collection) is both time­ and resource­intensive.
There may be a clearly evident and close causal connection between the first
stage of the attack at Tattack launch and its realized effects at Tharm occurring, and
that close connection would weigh in favour of a forceful response (includ­
ing a nocuous one if the attack’s effects support it). But it would be un­
just to respond against the wrong party. If there is enough temporal dis­
tance between Tharm occurring and identifying the responsible party at the end
of Tresponsive intelligence collection that the attacking state has ceased its activity, that
distance may also negate the right to respond with a nocuous use of force.
Any permissible response is limited to what is needful to end the threat, and
where there is no imminent or ongoing harm, there is no longer a threat to
address. A less forceful response, perhaps involving a moderate cyber re­
sponse and a diplomatic demands for reparations and to cease and desist
from further aggressive cyberoperations, would be permissible and appro­
priate until and unless the threat is renewed.
Third, in extreme cases the effects of an armed attack may not be pro­
duced until long after the larger conflict is settled. Suppose a piece of ord­
nance from a long­past war explodes, causing damage equivalent to what
108This analogy was first developed in a conversation with David DeVidi.
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an armed attack would produce in an active conflict.109 The international
community would not consider such an incident to be an armed attack,
for no current government is responsible for its placement (that is, there
is Tharm occurring without a relevant Tintelligence collection and Tattack launch). The respon­
sible state may not even exist when this damage occurs. If the earlier conflict
has been concluded well, then any permissible forceful response or warfar­
ing activity had already taken place, and settlement for damages had already
been negotiated as part of ending the armed conflict. This temporal distance
mitigates the right, and has probably already eliminated the desire or ability,
to make a moderate or nocuous response, even though there is a close causal
connection between the device’s placement and its detonation. The same sce­
nario may occur with a logic bomb. A logic bomb placed but forgotten by
one state may be triggered after hostilities have ceased. The considerations
around old ordnance are analogous to those of leftover artefacts from aggres­
sive cyberoperations. There is no need, and no justification, for an nocuous
or even moderate response when there is a negotiated settlement in place to
address any damage and reparations.
Each of these cases in its own way demonstrates why causal closeness and
the scale and effects of any harm caused or intended by an aggressive cyber­
operation are not sufficient to justify an armed response from the target state,
particularly when the intended harm has not occurred. The temporal aspect
must be considered independently of these criteria. Depending on the con­
text, and how the target state makes use of any time it might have to mitigate
the harm, the time between the placement of malicious software and the pro­
duction of its harmful effects weighs heavily against the permissibility of any
nocuous response.
5.7 Conclusion
Thescale­and­effects doctrine provides some guidance on assessing the harm
wreaked by aggressive cyberoperations. However, the guidance is limited to
comparing the effects to those of conventional attacks as they unfold over
a short period of time. Cyberoperations may take place over an extended
period of time, and the scale­and­effects doctrine is intended to apply in the
short term. Cyberoperations that cause economic harm or undermine the
109I thank Shelly Jordan for the question on how to address this kind of situation.
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institutions necessary for a state to function are not comparable to conven­
tional armed attacks in terms of effects since there is no physical harm to as­
sess. The scale­and­effects doctrine with respect to just cause do not support
a nocuous response. If the scale­and­effects doctrine is a part of assessing
the harm done by an aggressive cyberoperation, it must be generalized to
incorporate the harm done by violations of sovereignty or economic disrup­
tion in a way that manages the incommensurability of the various types of
harms aggressive cyberoperations can produce. Classifying cyberattacks as
moderate or flagrant, and permissible responses as non­forceful, moderate,
or nocuous, facilitates this. A flagrant cyberattack may give just cause for a
nocuous response by cyber or kinetic means; a moderate cyberattack would,
at most, give cause for a moderate cyber response.
Further, an extended temporal distance between them provides the tar­
get state an opportunity to neutralize the threat before any harm may oc­
cur. This diminishes the target state’s ability to claim the right to a nocu­
ous response in self­defence. The target state’s recourse is limited to what
is needful to end any threat against it. Thus the two assessment criteria of
causal directness and temporal immediacy set out in the Tallinn Manual must
be assessed separately when determining whether a flagrant cyberattack has
taken place and considering what kind of response may be justified. I have
also shown that at least one analogous scenario can arise in meatspace, so




Cyber jus in bello: the problem of
protecting data and cyberobjects
6.1 Artefacts and records
The preceding chapters have looked at cyberwarfare and its analogues with
conventional kinetic warfare. Cyberwarfare also opens up what has been
called a “fifth battlespace,”1 “the space of a myriad of electrical and logical
connections”2 containing not only the computing and network infrastruc­
ture of interest to a state, but also the software and data stored and used
within that cyber infrastructure. The data objects of cyberspace can them­
selves be damaged or destroyed by a cyberattack without causing physical
harm to the equipment. On a very narrow interpretation of harm under the
laws of armed conflict, if one state targets another with a cyberattack that
only destroys information but not hardware, there is no physical damage,
1Paul Cornish et al., On Cyber Warfare, technical report (The Royal Institute of Interna­
tional Affairs, October 2010), viii, http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/
ESDP / 124065 / ipublicationdocument _ singledocument / d922df2d - c90f - 4fa6 - 978a -
dc27940df964/en/17817_r1110_cyberwarfare.pdf. The first four are, in order of de­
velopment, land, sea, air, and space.
2Stephen J. Lukasik, “A Framework for Thinking About Cyber Conflict and Cyber De­
terrence with Possible Declaratory Policies forThese Domains,” in Committee on Deterring
Cyberattacks: Informing Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy and National
Research Council [USA], Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring Cyber Attacks: Informing Strategies
and Developing Options for U.S. Policy, 109.
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and therefore no measurable harm.3 Under this interpretation, data stored
in digital form is, for the most part, not protected. But the destruction of
data can still be a harm to the target state, and even humanity writ large,
if data objects related to the provision and exercise of human rights are de­
stroyed by a cyberattack. It seems plausible, then, that at least some data
objects that exist only in cyberspace merit some kind of protection just as
certain physical objects are protected under international law. However,
since it is the data that matters (a point recognized by the Shanghai Coop­
eration Agreement4), and not just the medium, any protection extended to
tangible data objects should extend to those that exist in intangible form.
In this chapter I will argue in support of the minority position expressed in
the commentary on Rule 100 of Tallinn 2.0 that “for the purposes of target­
ing, certain data should be regarded as an object” and have the benefit of
protection from attack during times of armed conflict.5
There are two significant classes of objects that document and perpetu­
ate a people’s distinct identity and are particularly vulnerable to destruction
in an armed conflict: their cultural objects and their civil records. Cultural
objects are things similar to the objects on the various lists of human­built
wonders of the world: the Great Pyramid at Giza in Egypt, the Taj Mahal
in India, the Panama Canal, the Buddhas of Bamiyan in Afghanistan. Ar­
chaeological objects such as old scrolls and inscriptions, archaic tools, reli­
gious icons and idols, and other artefacts from earlier cultures also count
as cultural objects. Works of art, including written works, may fall into
this category as well, depending on their significance or rarity. These are
part of the history of human cultures, markers of where peoples travelled,
worked, settled, created, and fought. While these help record the history
of peoples and communities, the comparatively mundane civil records track
the socially significant activities of individual persons. These civil records
include property deeds, tax receipts, census returns, and vital data such as
births, marriages, and deaths. Where these records exist, they can be used
to associate individual persons with particular peoples and cultures.
These artefacts and records in their original form are tangible. They can
be seen and touched. We can read some of them; we can make images of all
3Tallinn 2.0, Rule 100, comment 6.
4Shanghai Cooperation Agreement, Annex 1 (“information security”); Annex 2, ¶5.
5Tallinn 2.0, Rule 100, comment 7. The rule begins, “Civilian objects are all objects that
are not military objectives.”
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of them. Some of them (for example, musical scores) represent something
else (sounds) and need a way of converting that representation to something
that can be perceived by human senses (musicians and instruments). Dig­
ital technology, in a way similar to a musical score, allows artists to rep­
resent works in digital formats, but these formats need their analogues to
the musicians to convert those works into perceptible form. Digital objects
themselves are not tangible, but the various kinds of media containing those
representations are. The cultural value of works of art created in digital form
is not bound up in the storage medium—a physical artefact—but in the con­
tent stored in the medium.6
Our societies also create digital civil records. The compactness of digi­
tal representations makes them less costly (at least with respect to time and
space) to store, access, copy, and transport records than paper­based rep­
resentations (which was also a move from more awkward representations).
Governments are also converting older records to digital form, whether they
be digital images or data transcriptionsmade from the original paper records.
These digital information objects are also indirectly accessible by humans.
Like digital works of art, the information has to be transformed from the
stored representation to something that can be readily perceived by humans.
The medium itself is not the chronicle of persons’ activities, but the informa­
tion represented on it is. Cultural objects and civil records, two testaments
to the cultural and societal history of humanity, thus have significance as
intangible digital objects, and not just as tangible physical objects.
After the Second World War many states adopted the 1954 Hague Con­
vention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of an Armed
Conflict (Cultural Property Convention) to protect cultural heritage from
being destroyed in war.7 The Cultural Property Convention recognizes that
6Perhaps the rarity of a particular kind of storagemediummakes itmore significant. For
example, clay tablets inscribed with cuneiform lettering may currently be of more historical
and cultural value than a Microsoft Windows 2000 installation disc, but when there is
only one of those installation discs remaining, that particular disc might be treated with
reverential care to preserve the abstract machinery (software) encoded on it.
7United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization ﹙UNESCO﹚, Conven­
tion for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague,
May 14, 1954, 249 UNTS 215, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/
2A07EB0EAA5CECACC12563CD002D6BC8/FULLTEXT/IHL-60-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as Cul­
tural Property Convention).
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objects designated as having cultural significance are not just records of par­
ticular cultures, but of humanity as a whole, and the destruction of these
cultural objects diminishes human culture globally.8 However, neither the
Cultural Property Convention nor its two protocols9 make explicit reference
to the civil historical data such as taxation, property, and vital records con­
cerning births, marriages, and deaths. I will argue that these civil records
merit the same protection as other cultural objects, and that their protection
is expected under the Cultural Property Convention. I will further argue
that digital objects, including works of art and historical data, also merit
specific protection from attacks, including cyberattacks.
6.2 Inadequacy of current protections
Cultural property
The Cultural Property Convention defines cultural property this way:
(a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the
cultural heritage of every people, such as monuments of
architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; ar­
chaeological sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole,
are of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts,
books and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeolog­
ical interest; as well as scientific collections and important
collections of books or archives or of reproductions of the
property defined above;
8Cultural Property Convention, preamble.
9United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization ﹙UNESCO﹚, Proto­
col for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague,
May 14, 1954, 249 UNTS 358, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl- databases.icrc.
org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.
nsf/79B801B4D23AEA95C12563CD002D6BE3/FULLTEXT/IHL-61-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as
Cultural Property Protocol (1954)); United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization ﹙UNESCO﹚, Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protec­
tion of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,The Hague, March 26, 1999, 2253
UNTS 172, accessed April 17, 2017, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001306/
130696eo.pdf (hereafter cited as Cultural Propterty Protocol (1999)).
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(b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve
or exhibit the movable cultural property defined in sub­
paragraph (a) such as museums, large libraries and depos­
itories of archives, and refuges intended to shelter, in the
event of armed conflict, the movable cultural property de­
fined in sub­paragraph (a);
(c) centers containing a large amount of cultural property as
defined in sub­paragraphs (a) and (b), to be known as ‘cen­
ters containing monuments’.10
This definition is aimed at preserving the heritage of culture writ large, in­
cluding both those cultures that are no longer extant (and so no longer have
a stake in any conflict between peoples) and elements of the various cultures
that are present now. It also protects the record of human discovery and ex­
pression, both past and present. What it does not explicitly protect is infor­
mation about individualswhomake up a distinct people with its own cultural
heritage. International laws of armed conflict are meant to preserve some
of the rights of non­combatants as persons, but it does not grant explicit
protection to the storage facilities that contain the birth or naturalization
records that document a person’s citizenship—records that are required in
order to satisfy some rights obligations and to extend other rights, privileges,
and duties. If the Cultural Property Convention granted explicit protection
to these kinds of records, it could also serve as a convention that preserves
the distinctiveness of existing cultures, not just their cultural property.
This notion of cultural distinctiveness is vague, and attempts to define it
are often politically charged. It includes, to some extent, language, religion,
clothing, food and drink, and artistic expression11—the stuff that outsiders
can learn and embrace for themselves. It may include some notion of race
(as fraught as that notion is) or a collective identity forged by history, partic­
10Cultural Property Convention, Art. 1.
11United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization ﹙UNESCO﹚, Conven­
tion for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, Paris, October 17, 2003, Art
2(2), accessed March 4, 2021, https://ich.unesco.org/en/convention (hereafter cited
as CICH); Sarah Song, “The Subject of Multiculturalism: Culture, Religion, Language, Eth­
nicity, Nationality, and Race?,” chap. 10 in NewWaves in Political Philosophy (Basingstoke, UK:
Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 178.
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ularly through struggles to survive as a distinct group12—something that can
be used to distinguish members of a cultural group from those outside of it.
This distinctiveness is sustained in part by each cultural group’s institutions,
whether they be formally organized or informally preserved by the passing
along of traditions from one generation to the next. One one hand, these
institutions are part of the life of the members of the cultural group, both
within their local community and in connection with the group’s dispersed
communities around the world. It may not be a stretch to say that the state
of these institutions are reflections of the strength of the cultural group’s dis­
tinctiveness, for if these institutions cease to exist, then the community that
once sustained them no longer value at least the community aspect of cul­
tural distinctiveness. On the other hand, some of these institutions are the
keepers of cultural artefacts and historical documents, the very things that
are evidence of the culture’s distinctiveness. Moreover, those documents
may also be records of the lives and identities of its members. The more that
these institutions maintain records that provide evidence of the distinctive
elements of the culture and the identity of its members, the greater the threat
to maintaining the distinctiveness of that culture by destroying its records,
collective memories, and traditions. If these history­keeping institutions de­
volve or dissolve as a cultural group loses its distinctiveness, the evidentiary
record of that culture’s existence as part of humanity’s cultural heritage is at
risk.
The records and artefacts of dead cultures have historical significance,
but there is no expectation that the cultural practices themselves (particu­
larly religious ones involving mutilation or sacrifice of living beings, or the
renewing of hostilities against an adversarial cultural group) be preserved.
These records and artefacts are the things that the Cultural Property Con­
vention has in view. It does not say anything about preserving the practices
of existing cultural groups. However, the records and artefacts of currently­
existing cultural groups are also part of humanity’s cultural heritage. These
records and artefacts can support claims for personal and communal rights
of some sort, whether that be the use of a language, the (peaceable) prac­
tice of religion, residency in a particular geographical area, some kind of
political autonomy, or a combination of these. Moreover, the United Na­
12Song, “The Subject of Multiculturalism: Culture, Religion, Language, Ethnicity, Na­
tionality, and Race?,” 178.
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tions, through its ICCPR, has endorsed the rights for members of existing
minority cultural groups, “in community with the other members of their
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own reli­
gion, or to use their own language.”13 However, as Will Kymlicka notes,
the UN and other international organizations have not given much guidance
on how these rights should work,14 depending on the historical relationship
each particular cultural group has with the state and territory in which it
is situated.15 He notes two distinct cases: mass immigration (for example,
the many refugees from Syria that came to Canada around 2015) and estab­
lished minorities (for example, Indigenous peoples living within Canada’s
borders). Groups in the former category appear to have little room to repli­
cate their formal cultural institutions in their new state, though (at least in
the short term) they can usually preserve their language, practise their reli­
gion, and promote their distinctive forms of artistic expression. Groups in
the second category have a continuing presence within the territory of their
governing state. While these groups may not enjoy what Kymlicka calls “na­
tional cultural autonomy,”16 the history of that culture—and perhaps records
of individual persons—as preserved by cultural institutions may support a
claim to formal recognition of their distinctive culture within the state. This
second category is the one relevant to my argument.
If cultures are preserved through their formal and informal institutions,
then they are put at risk by undermining those institutions.17 For example,
forbidding the use of a cultural language, such as Indigenous languages in
Canada’s residential schools, hinders communication between the genera­
tions that used the language and those who were denied the opportunity
to learn it. In 1916, the destruction of Armenian Christian churches—which
13ICCPR, Art. 27.
14Will Kymlicka, “Multiculturalism and Minority Rights: West and East,” Journal on
Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 3, no. 4 (2002): 2–3.
15Will Kymlicka, “National Cultural Autonomy and International Minority Rights
Norms,” Ethnopolitics 6, no. 3 (September 2007): 381.
16Kymlicka, 382.
17Raphael Lemkin, “Genocide as a Crime under International Law” (American Jewish
History Society, manuscript collection P­154, Raphael Lemkin collection, box 6, folder 2,
1948–51), 2, accessed February 21, 2019, http://digital.cjh.org:80/R/-?func=dbin-
jump-full&amp;object_id=398972&amp;silo_library=GEN01. Here Lemkin coins the
term cultural genocide to describe the destruction of the cultural and institutional expressions
of a distinctive culture.
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were also repositories of vital records—“resulted in the erasure of of almost
all Armenian group life in Turkey.”18 Removing the institutional record of a
culture’s history eliminates the possibility of ever recovering the language
and other cultural practices as anything more than a historical curiosity.
Conversely, any surviving records and artefacts may support a right for dis­
placed persons to return to their homeland after the threat to their safety
has ended, and participate as full members of a state’s society.
The institutions that harbour the artefacts and records of a distinct cul­
ture are among the marks of a political community. They also serve as an
authority in the lives of that community’s members. When this distinct cul­
ture and its internal politics generate conflict within the larger state, that
culture may be at risk. The perceived offence need not be an attempt to ex­
ercise greater autonomy from the state; sometimes just existing as a distinct
group is enough to foment discontent within the larger population. This
can lead to restrictions on not only practising cultural activities, but also
on access to government services, public spaces, shops, banks, schools, and
jobs. This is aggravated when there is a long­standing grudge against an­
other cultural group. Where this conflict has erupted in violence, extremists
will not be satisfied with killing everyone who claims to be a member of the
notional enemy. They will want to purge as much of that group’s history
from human memory as they can. This serves two purposes: to deny rec­
ognizing a revived culture as a legitimate one that merits protection, and
to avoid charges of genocide. If there is no record of persons ever belong­
ing to that cultural group, it is difficult for a prosecution to gather evidence
to sustain the charge of genocide. This gives reason enough to extend pro­
tection to civil records—no matter where they are stored—concerning indi­
vidual persons. If the Cultural Property Convention does this, then the
international community has another way to identify and prosecute charges
of ethnic cleansing and genocide. All it takes is to clarify what is meant by
historical interest or archive.
18Peter Balakian, “Raphael Lemkin, Cultural Destruction, and the ArmenianGenocide,”
Holocaust and Genocide Studies 27, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 65.
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Individual harm and state stability
The destruction of civil records can cause another set of harms. Think of a
person who loses a wallet containing all of their recognized personal identi­
fication. Without that identification, the person has no easy access to gov­
ernment services, financial services, or perhaps even access to housing and
employment. They have to go through an extended process to verify their
identity and replace the documents. But if the civil records that corroborate
the documents carried by the person are inaccessible, there is no way for
the person to avail themselves of their rights as a member of that society. I
explore specific examples of this later in this chapter.
However, civil records serve another purpose: the functioning of society
itself, and not just the individuals within it. For example, if the statistical
information from themost recent census is destroyed, there would be no cur­
rent social data by which to evaluate public policies, so government would
become more hit­and­miss than it is even with good data.19 If business and
income tax records are destroyed, it would impair the government’s ability to
collect revenue and to provide public goods and services. This kind of gov­
ernment instability can undermine a state’s sovereignty, and in extreme or
prolonged cases even threaten its existence. The follow­on harm tomembers
of society could include the inability to enjoy their basic rights under inter­
national declarations and covenants if the state can no longer safeguard or
facilitate that enjoyment. It is not a stretch to propose that for a state to sat­
isfy its existing obligations under international human rights rules, the data
it needs to fulfil those obligations should enjoy protected status in times of
armed conflict—a status that is not explicitly provided for under the interna­
tional laws of armed conflict, but is nonetheless supported by international
agreements such as the Cultural Property Convention20 and AP I.21
19For example, the replacement of Canada’s mandatory long­form census with a volun­
tary household survey in 2011 resulted in misleading or inconsistent statistics with respect
to immigration and income. Ontario Council of University Libraries ﹙OCUL﹚, “Cancellation
of the Mandatory Long­Form Census—Background and Impact,” January 5, 2015, accessed
March 4, 2021, https://ocul.on.ca/node/3400. This could lead to an underprovision of
relevant social services and misguided changes in government policy.
20Cultural Property Convention, Art. 18, 19.
21AP I, Art. 53(a).
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6.3 Physical objects and replicas
The cultural property described in the Cultural Property Convention exists
in concrete form, not as a representation in some other kind of media. It is,
for lack of better terms, enduring or persistent. Further, many of these cul­
turally significant items are typically original and unique. These items also
vary in size, from small archaeological items such as arrowheads and iron
nails, to large sites like the Pyramid Fields from Giza to Dahshur in Egypt,
to entire cities like Bath in England. Many of these are not readily repro­
ducible; their loss would diminish the understanding of both human and
natural history. Items such as books, manuscripts, recordings, and some
works of art are less durable, but more readily reproduced. If faithful repro­
ductions of these cultural artefacts exist, the loss of the original does not
diminish the record of human discovery, creativity, and society as much as
the destruction of a unique object would. The content and expression of the
original is preserved in each replica, even though some of the fine details
may be lost.22 In many cases each replica will be indistinguishable from
the others, so any one will do for the purposes of preservation.23 For exam­
ple, the copies of any Canadian publication required to be deposited with
Library and Archives Canada24 do not have to be the first one or two from
the production run. The Cultural Property Convention extends protection
to archival reproductions of cultural property, regardless of the media in
which those reproductions are made.25
22For example, a digital compact disc recording of a jazz trio will encode enough of the
sound to satisfy the casual listener, but a listener highly attuned to the continuous form of
sound waves may notice the small discontinuities the digital sampling process introduces.
A detailed photograph of an oil painting will give a representation of the original without
reproducing the texture of the strokes, even though it will provide visual cues about them.
The same level of photographic detail will not capture the shape of a sculpture, but a three­
dimensional model could.
23Tallinn 2.0, Rule 142, comment 6.
24Library and Archives Canada, “Legal Deposit,” February 22, 2018, accessed April 19,
2018, https : / / www . bac - lac . gc . ca / eng / services / legal - deposit / Pages / legal -
deposit.aspx.
25Cultural Property Convention, Art. 1(a).
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6.4 Data objects
I have already noted that some of the objects stored in archives are not works
of intellectual or creative labour. They are data objects: records of individual
events and transactions used in part tomanage the affairs of a particular state
or society.26 These records document (among other things) births, deaths,
marriages, immigration, citizenship, military or other civic service, property
ownership, taxation, and legal proceedings. While cultural artefacts trace
the development of peoples and cultures,27 these data objects trace the ac­
tivity of persons and states. They are of significance to the operation of a
state.28
Data objects often describe relationships. For example, one way of view­
ing a contract is as a data object describing the rights and obligations of
the contracting parties with respect to each other. The interpretation of
these terms may be guided by descriptions in other data objects such as le­
gal statutes and court judgements, which themselves grant rights and estab­
lish obligations. Taxation records establish whether a party has contributed
their share to the government. Census returns and birth, death, and mar­
26Society is not a synonym for culture. A society may include many cultures, and a culture
may be represented in many societies.
27Peoples and cultures are also distinguished. International law grants the right to self­
determination to peoples, but not to all who claim a particular cultural heritage. Members
of “ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities” living within a people’s territory “are merely
entitled to enjoy their own culture” within that territory. Commentary on the Additional Proto­
cols, ¶106.
28The International Council on Archives ﹙ICA﹚ describes archives and their importance
this way: “Archives constitute the memory of nations and societies, shape their identity and
are a cornerstone of the information society. By providing evidence of activities and deci­
sions they provide continuity to organizations and justification of their rights, as well as
those of individuals and states. By guaranteeing citizens’ right of access to official informa­
tion and to knowledge of their history, archives are fundamental to democracy, accountabil­
ity and good governance.” International Council on Archives ﹙ICA﹚, Constitution, August 24,
2012, preamble, accessed April 21, 2018, https://www.ica.org/sites/default/files/
constitution_2012_en_final_2016_visual_identity.pdf. ICA is one of the founding or­
ganizations of the Blue Shield, the international association “committed to the protection
of the world’s cultural property . . . in the event of armed conflict, natural­ or human­made
disaster” and advocating for adoption and implementation of the Cultural Property Con­
vention. Blue Shield, Amendment to the Articles of Association: Association of National Committees of
the Blue Shield, Amsterdam, NL, April 6, 2015, Art. 2.1, 2.3, accessed March 5, 2021, https://
theblueshield.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/statute-Amendments_BSI_2016.pdf.
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riage records capture the relationships of natural persons to each other. Mil­
itary service records chronicle other kinds of relationships between a per­
sons and their government, persons and locations, and persons with other
persons within a command structure or as comrades­in­arms. If these data
objects are lost and cannot be recovered, it is not just the state that loses this
bit of its recorded history and collective memory. All of the parties identified
in these records lose the evidence that supports what each of them remem­
bers. Some contextual information about their lives (for fictional persons,
existence) is lost—and that loss may affect how those parties can operate in
the future. Suppose that a person is the parent to a young child. If every
copy of the record of that child’s birth is lost, then the parent cannot claim
social benefits meant to support that child because the documentation of
the parent­child relationship no longer exists.29 Regardless of the medium
in which these relationships and events are recorded (wooden tally sticks,
paper, microform, digital), they have to be stored in some kind of archival
repository so those who need to consult the records have ready access to
them. A civil archive, then, contains the institutional memory of both the
state and the cultures that it hosts, and in so doing preserves a connection
to the past.
There is no objective way to identify distinct peoples within a popula­
tion.30 In a way, what establishes a group as a people is that group’s desire
to live as a distinct people because members of that group share a common
history and one or more other identifying elements: land, language, cul­
ture, and ethnicity.31 There must also be “something that separates them
from other peoples”32 that reasonably allows them to maintain that distinc­
tion. However, a people is not equivalent to a state under international
law. A state may contain many peoples; a people may be dispersed among
many states. When conflict arises there is a desire to establish a different or­
der, and that sometimes involves weakening or eliminating a distinct people.
One way to do that is to destroy objects that help that people maintain its
29Presumably there would be some way to make a solemn affirmation of the relationship,
and that would serve as a proxy for the original record, but this is a long and complex
process requiring more testimonial evidence than the original record of birth did.
30Commentary on the Additional Protocols, ¶103.
31Commentary on the Additional Protocols, ¶103.
32Commentary on the Additional Protocols, ¶103.
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distinctiveness, a process now called “cultural cleansing.”33 One example
of such cultural cleansing is the Sovietization of the Baltic states: outlaw­
ing the local language, removing cultural artefacts, and forcibly resettling
residents in other areas of the Soviet Union, while imposing a Russified cul­
ture bolstered by relocating ethnic Russians to the Baltic republics. When
an independent Estonia removed a Stalin­era statue in April 2007, ethnic
Russians protested for days afterward—but not ethnic Estonians.34 These
protests were followed by Russia’s DDOS attack on Estonia’s Internet services
(Chapter 3).
The institutional memory of a culture is part of its heritage. It is of cul­
tural significance, at least on par with its arts, artefacts, and structural ruins,
because it captures some of the history of that culture. Because these records
are culturally significant and a part of the shared history of humanity, they
are candidates for protection under the Cultural Property Convention. Fur­
ther, the Blue Shield claims that the definition of cultural property in the
Cultural Property Convention “has the flexibility to include new forms of
CP [cultural property] that were of unseen importance or were unimagined
in 1954, for example, film archives and digital archives and information.”35
Yet contemporary civil records, those relevant to contemporary cultures and
governance of existing societies, and which will become incontrovertibly his­
torical at some indefinite time, are not explicitly protected under the laws of
armed conflict. These contemporary civil records are a part of contemporary
institutional memory, and will form a part of the shared history of human­
ity. Therefore they should also have some kind of formal protection from
wilful damage during times of armed conflict to facilitate the preservation
33UNESCO, qtd. in Megan Williams, “‘Dignity itself’: Saving World Heritage Sites from
‘Cultural Cleansing’ Won’t Be Easy,” CBC News, March 31, 2017, accessed March 31, 2017,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/saving-culture-g7-megan-williams-1.4048707.
34Ian Traynor, “Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia,” The
Guardian, May 17, 2007, accessed September 10, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia.
35Blue Shield, “Defining Cultural Heritage and Cultural Property,” February 11, 2020,
accessed March 5, 2021, https://theblueshield.org/defining-cultural-heritage-and-
cultural-property/. Just as the Red Cross is the organization dedicated to implementing
the Geneva Conventions, “[t]he Blue Shield is the cultural equivalent of the Red Cross”
with respect to the Cultural Property Convention. Blue Shield, “WhoWe Are,” February 11,
2020, accessed March 5, 2021, https://theblueshield.org/about-us/what-is-blue-
shield/.
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of contemporary cultures—even majority ones.
The digitization of civil records opens the door for potentially destabiliz­
ing havoc from the cyber domain. It has already been established that voter
records in Illinois were accessed by parties with (at least) the tacit approval
of Russian political leadership.36 While these particular records were not
altered, it is a small step from accessing them to changing them. (Such an
alteration would be one instance of a cyberattack with delayed effects, as
discussed in Chapter 5. A record­changing cyberattack executed after the
close of voter registration would not be evident until persons attempt to
cast their ballots. There may be no attack in progress at the time the harm
is discovered. A like­for­like moderate cyber response against the attacker’s
electoral system might be seen as an impermissible reprisal or a breach of
their citizens’ rights to vote—assuming the attacking state has free elections.
A moderate cyberattack against another target might be permissible.) This
breach demonstrates the feasibility of accessing and altering states’ digital
civil records, and this is the concern that motivates this part of the project.
Two of the significant potential consequences of changing or deleting
civil records are the undermining of self­governance and the erasure of ev­
idence to support individuals’ claims of being associated with a state or a
distinctive cultural group. The first of these is more subtle and disruptive
than cyberharms against infrastructure such as bringing down parts of the
electrical grid, even though neither one is, prima facie, a flagrant cyberattack
meeting the criteria that can justify a nocuous response. Nonetheless, they
disrupt the target society. Disrupting the electricity supply impedes not
only the ability to do extraordinary things such as emergency surgery, but
also the ability to do mundane things such as heating a frozen meal. This
weakens the social fabric as people recognize that they have less control over
their circumstances than they want. However, changing voting records un­
36CBS Chicago, “Illinois Election Chief to Testify at Senate Panel on Russian Hacking,”
June 21, 2017, accessed February 25, 2019, https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2017/06/21/
illinois-state-board-of-elections-russian-hacking-senate-intelligence-comm
ittee/; Garcia and O’Connell, “Illinois Elections Board ‘Very Likely’ Named in Mueller
Indictment of Russian Hackers, Officials Say.” This does not include accessing private
email exchanged by members of the Democratic Party’s campaign or the social engineering
that poisoned any hope of meaningful socio­political discourse, activity described in Chad
Day and Eric Tucker, “Court Records Reveal a Mueller Report Right in Plain View,” CTV
News, February 23, 2019, accessed February 25, 2019, https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/
court-records-reveal-a-mueller-report-right-in-plain-view-1.4309843.
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dermines the political institutions themselves. This goes beyond the efforts
to suppress voters through rigging electoral processes. Some persons who
manage to register to vote will find that their registration is invalid or miss­
ing, and so not be able to exercise their right to express their political will. If
this is done carefully enough, the outcome may be crafted to be an illusory
misrepresentation of the will of the people. The structure and appearance of
self­governance are in place, but the persons are politically incapacitated—
much as they would be if they had been incapacitated by chemical or biolog­
ical warfare, just without the physiological harm. Since this is not a physical
threat to the lives of persons in the targeted state, it would be difficult to call
such a disruptive cyberattack a flagrant one justifying an immediate nocu­
ous response.
The second of these consequences concerns the cultural record of human­
ity. Civil records are also important for the preservation of peoples and cul­
tures. One characteristic of a people is the territory inhabited by its mem­
bers, even though that territory may be shared with persons from other cul­
tures. A state governs the territory, so persons, cultures, peoples, and states
stand in relation to each other through territory. The state, as part of its
obligation to allow members of minority groups the freedom to enjoy their
culture, must keep records of those within its borders who have the right
to enjoy (and thus preserve) their culture.37 However, in an ethnic conflict
having some degree of sanction by the state’s government, the state may be
tempted to deny the existence of—or even destroy—the records of minority
persons. If those persons’ own copies of their records are not recognized
as valid, they would no longer have evidence of their rights to enjoy their
culture. They may also be denied the rights to any property they own within
the state and the rights of citizenship. For example, at the height of conflict
between Albanian and Serbian communities in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999,
forces of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] and Serbia
systematically seized and destroyed the personal identity doc­
uments and licences of vehicles belonging to Kosovo Albanian
citizens. As Kosovo Albanians were forced from their homes and
directed to Kosovo’s borders, they were subjected to demands to
surrender identity documents at selected points en route to bor­
37ICESCR, Art. 15(1)(a).
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der crossings into Albania and Macedonia. These actions were
undertaken in order to erase any record of the deported Kosovo
Albanians’ presence in Kosovo and to deny them the right to
return to their homes.38
While the seizure and destruction of those personal civil documents were not
ruled to be crimes against humanity themselves, these actions were evidence
of the deportation and forcible transfer of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo.39
Seizing and destroying identity documents did not formally change the bear­
ers’ citizenship,40 but it would have made it harder for those returning to
claim their rights as citizens.41 Even if those whose documents were seized
knew that their citizenship was intact, the depersonalizing activity is still a
psychological harm violating the general protection afforded civilians un­
der the laws of armed conflict. It could also be viewed as an act intended to
“spread terror among the civilian population,”42 something also prohibited
in non­international armed conflicts for states party to AP II.43
38International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ﹙ICTY﹚, Milutinović case
(redacted third amended joinder indictment), IT­05­87­PT D6404, June 21, 2006, ¶31, ac­
cessed March 20, 2019, http : / / www . icty . org / x / cases / milutinovic / ind / en /
milutinovic_060621e.pdf (hereafter cited as Milutinović indictment). Milan Milutinović,
the president of Serbia during the height of the Kosovo conflict, was acquitted of the
charges of crimes against humanity, but the other five persons named in the indictment were
found guilty on several counts. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
﹙ICTY﹚, Milutinović case (judgement), IT­05­87­T, February 26, 2009, vol. 3, ¶¶1207–12, ac­
cessedMarch 20, 2019, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tjug/en/jud090226-
e3of4.pdf (hereafter cited asMilutinović judgement). Four of those five appealed their con­
victions, but each of them had some guilty verdicts that survived the appeal. International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ﹙ICTY﹚,Milutinović case (appeal judgement), IT­
05­87­A, January 23, 2014, ¶1847, accessedMarch 20, 2019, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
milutinovic/acjug/en/140123.pdf (hereafter cited as Milutinović appeal judgement).
39Milutinović indictment, ¶¶71–73; Milutinović judgement, ¶40.
40Milutinović judgement, ¶172.
41Milutinović judgement, ¶166.
42AP I, Art. 51(2).
43AP II, Art. 4(2)(a), (d). The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had acceded to
AP II in 1979. United Nations General Assembly, Status of the Protocols Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts,
September 12, 1990, Report of the Secretary­General, A/45/454, 8, accessed March 6, 2021,
https://documents- dds- ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N90/222/30/img/N9022230.
pdf?OpenElement. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the former socialist republics of
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Personal records were not the only records seized or destroyed by the
Serbian community in Kosovo. Six regional archives of the Islamic Com­
munity of Kosovo were damaged to varying degrees by Serbian forces, and
many ancient Islamic manuscripts and rare books were destroyed.44 One of
the Serbian forces’ last acts in Prishtina/Priština after the armistice was in
place but before NATO peacekeepers arrived was to burn the central archive
of the Islamic Community.45 This archive contained records dating back
more than 500 years.46 The only remaining documentary evidence of Alba­
nians having been present in Kosovo resided in civil archives, and these were
not overlooked. Civil records
comprising almost the entire documentary base for the orderly
functioning of government and society in Kosova were removed
on orders from Belgrade. Registries of births, marriages and
deaths, citizenship, probate and property records, as well as ju­
dicial and police records, and the working documents of many
other state institutions were either evacuated to Serbia or burned
in situ.47
Serbia and Montenegro and the former autonomous regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo)
was not recognized as a successor state by the international community at the time of the
conflict. The parties to the conflict continued to be bound by the provisions of AP II and
other treaties. United Nations General Assembly, Status of the Protocols Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts,
August 26, 1998, Report of the Secretary­General, A/53/287, 6, accessed March 6, 2021,
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/249/43/pdf/N9824943.pdf?
OpenElement.
44These archives were located in Peja (Albanian name)/Peć (Serbian name),
Gjakova/Đakovica, Skenderaj/Srbica, Gllogoc/Glogovac, Suhareka/Suva Reka, and Lip­
jan/Lipljan. András J. Riedlmayer, “Libraries and Archives in Kosova: A Postwar Report,”
Bosnia Report, nos. 13/14 (December 1999–February 2000), accessed March 21, 2019, http:
//www.bosnia.org.uk/bosrep/decfeb00/libraries.cfm. Riedlmayer was an expert
witness with respect to destruction of cultural heritage (but not with respect to attribution
of the damage) for several trials before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia.
45András J. Riedlmayer, “Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace: Destruction of Libraries dur­
ing and after the Balkan Wars of the 1990s,” Library Trends 56, no. 1 (Summer 2007): 124;
Riedlmayer, “Libraries and Archives.”
46Riedlmayer, “Crimes of War,” 124.
47Riedlmayer, “Libraries and Archives.”
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NATO spokesperson Jamie Shea described this activity as “a kind of ‘Or­
wellian’ scenario of attempting to deprive a people and a culture of the sense
of the past and the sense of community on which it depends.”48
This kind of community erasure continued on after the recognized end of
the Kosovo conflict. In response to violence against the Serbian community
over the misreporting of circumstances around the drowning of three chil­
dren of Albanian descent in Kosovo on March 17, 2004, a pro­Serbian mob
destroyed the Islamic library in Belgrade.49 “Our library is destroyed, all
our records are destroyed, our seals are missing, our safe has been emptied,
our computers are destroyed or stolen. As the Islamic community of Bel­
grade we no longer exist,” lamented prayer leader Mustafa Jusufspahić.50
His father Hamdija Jusufspahić, the interpreter of Islamic law for the com­
munity, added, “If only they had left us our computers, that way we could at
least recover something.”51 The destruction of computers is important here:
it shows that digital records can be just as important to a community—and
just as vulnerable to destruction—as paper ones.
The aftermath of Hurricane Maria in 2017 provides a recent example of
the civil havoc that arises frommissing records. Many of the requests Puerto
Ricans—American citizens—made for assistance to rebuild their homes were
turned down because there was no record—paper or digital—of ownership.52
There is a cultural aspect to these records not existing: local custom placed
property records in the collective memory of the community. As one news­
paper reported, “[o]nly 65 percent of properties in the territory are officially
registered with the government. The problem is especially acute in small
48NorthAtlantic TreatyOrganization ﹙NATO﹚, “Press Conference of the NATO Spokesman,
Jamie Shea, and Air Commodore David Wilby,” Transcript. March 31, 1999, accessed
March 25, 2019, https://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990331a.htm.
49Riedlmayer, “Crimes of War,” 128–129; Milorad Mracevich, “Anti­Muslim Violence




52Matthew Goldstein, “Puerto Rico’s Positive Business Slogans Can’t Keep the Lights
On,” New York Times, March 5, 2018, accessed February 28, 2019, https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/03/05/business/puerto-rico-business-maria.html; News Is My Business,
“Puerto Rico Property Registry Now 100% Electronic,” ed. Michelle Kantrow­Vázquez,
April 1, 2016, accessed February 28, 2019, http://newsismybusiness.com/puerto-rico-
property-registry-now-100-electronic/.
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cities and rural areas where there’s a custom of property owners not record­
ing titles to homes,”53 because “property is often passed among family mem­
bers without paperwork.”54 Even if the records exist, there is no guarantee
that their validity will be acknowledged by the government. Some persons
of Hispanic origin, though born in the USA, were no longer able to receive or
renew passports because some midwives who served areas along the Texas–
Mexico border had issued some American birth certificates fraudulently to
persons born in Mexico.55 Since it is difficult to determine which ones were
issued legitimately and which ones were not, all of the birth certificates is­
sued by midwives in the area have been thrown into question, limiting the
ability of American citizens to exercise their rights not only to freedom of
movement, but also to a nationality.56
In Canada there is a recognition that the problem of missing or inaccu­
rate property records merits attention. Black loyalists were granted “free­
dom and a farm”57 in parts of present­day New Brunswick and Nova Scotia
for service rendered to the British Empire during the American War of Inde­
pendence.58 Access to and use of the land was permitted “under tickets of
location,” but those tickets did not confer possession of the land.59 In 1964
53Goldstein, “Puerto Rico’s Positive Business Slogans Can’t Keep the Lights On.”
54Frances Robles and Jugal K. Patel, “On Hurricane Maria Anniversary, Puerto Rico
Is Still in Ruins,” New York Times, September 20, 2018, accessed February 28, 2019, https:
//www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/20/us/puerto- rico- hurricane- maria-
housing.html.
55Kevin Sieff, “U.S. Is Denying Passports to Americans Along the Border, Throwing




practice of denying passports began with the GeorgeW. Bush administration, but escalated
under Donald Trump’s presidency.
56Universal Declaration, Art. 13, 15.
57Jessica Murphy, “Black Nova Scotians May Finally Get Title to Their Land,” BBC News,
October 8, 2017, accessed May 22, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-
41488953.
58Nova Scotia Archives, “African Nova Scotians in the Age of Slavery and Abolition:
Black Loyalists, 1783–1792,” May 2019, accessed May 22, 2019, https://novascotia.ca/
archives/Africanns/results.asp?Search=&SearchList1=2&Language=English.
59Nova Scotia Archives, “African Nova Scotians in the Age of Slavery and Abolition:
Establishment of the Negroes in Nova Scotia, Appendix 23,” Transcription of portion of
Minutes of Council, March 11, 1841. May 2019, accessedMay 22, 2019, https://novascotia.
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the provincial government introduced a process for residents to establish a
claim to title,60 but it moved slowly and stalled out. In 2017, on the advice of
the UN,61 the province announced new resources to facilitate the process.62
Even now residents of some historically Black communities in Nova Scotia
do not have clear title to the land on which they live, so the property cannot
legally be sold or willed to others.63 This work is ongoing.
Items of cultural significance may also be lost through indifference, cost
management, lack of recognition of their significance in the moment, acci­
dent, or even vanity. Broadcast media is particularly susceptible to this, be­
cause transmissions can be made without being recorded in any way. How­
ever, even recorded broadcasts are vulnerable. Robin Woods, who super­
vised the English­language program archives at the Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation ﹙CBC﹚ from 1959 to the early 1980s, drew attention to this in one
report. The earliest recordings by the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Com­
mission (CRBC, the forerunner to today’s CBC) were, for the most part, not
concernedwith Canadiana or the international tumult preceding the Second
World War. Rather,
the recordings from this period reflect little but sweetness and
light—God in his Heaven, King George the Fifth upon his Im­
perial Throne, and all right, or about to be, with the world.
ca/archives/africanns/archives.asp?ID=137&Transcript=1.
60Nova Scotia, Land Titles Clarification Act, RSNS c. 250, s. 1. Formerly the Community Land
Titles Act, SNS 1964, c. 3. 1964, accessed May 22, 2019, https://nslegislature.ca/sites/
default/files/legc/statutes/landtitl.htm
61UnitedNationsGeneral Assembly, Report of theWorkingGroup of Experts on People
of AfricanDescent on ItsMission toCanada, August 16, 2017, Report, A/HRC/36/60/Add.1,
Human Rights Council, ¶¶60–61, 96, accessed May 22, 2019, https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G17/239/60/PDF/G1723960.pdf?OpenElement.
62Nova Scotia, Government Helping Communities Get Clear Title to Land, News release
(African Nova Scotian Affairs, September 27, 2017), accessed May 22, 2019, https : / /
novascotia.ca/news/release/?id=20170927001.
63It can, however, be taxed, even though it is not clear who is responsible for paying the
tax. Some residents have been advised to let their properties go up for tax sale, reacquire
the land by paying the taxes owing, and in so doing get clear title to the property, but
this requires being informed of the pending sale. Angela Simmonds, This Land Is Our Land:
African Nova Scotian Voices from the Preston Area Speak Up, project report (Schulich School of
Law, Dalhousie University, August 19, 2014), 8–9, accessed May 22, 2019, https://nsbs.
org/sites/default/files/ftp/EQ20140819_ThisLandIsOurLand_Final.pdf.
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. . . This policy in Canadian broadcasting of recording and pre­
serving the extraordinary and ignoring the every day—the real
warp andwoof of the fabric of history—was to continue formany
years.64
Even when recordings were made as a matter of course, they were not as­
sessed for significance or managed in any way.
[P]roducers and others . . . decided what to keep and what to
destroy. This personal and unco­ordinated exercise of policy
and judgment allowed full reign to vanity, carelessness, igno­
rance, and sheer fecklessness. . . . There is one particularly sad
example of the consequences of this willy­nilly policy. In 1943
violinist Adolf Koldofsky discovered in Toronto manuscripts of
seven C.P.E. Bach concertos which had been lost for two hun­
dred years and which had never been performed in public. The
manuscripts were authenticated byWandaLandowskawho came
to Toronto to give the works their world premiere on the CBC.
With one precious, chance exception, all recordings of this se­
ries were destroyed. The result of this carelessness is a triple loss:
to musicology, to the recorded repertoire of Landowska (these
were the only recordings ever made of her performance of the
works), and to the CBC. We must suffer twice: the loss of the
recordings and the odium of having lost them.65
But archiving recordings is not enough to preserve one­of­a­kind perfor­
mances. Those recordings have to be stored on stable, readable media. The
record of Canadian culture suffered a blow during 1967, when “a million feet
of film—largely nitrate—in care of the Canadian Film Archives . . . burned
in its storage area. The disaster could have been averted had the Canadian
government supplied a grant . . . to transfer the film to safety stock which
the CFA had requested in 1964.”66
64Robin Woods, “Report on National Program Archives,” ARSC Journal 2, nos. 2/3
(Spring–Summer 1970): 6, accessed April 1, 2019, http://www.arsc-audio.org/journals/
v2/v02n2-3p3-23.pdf. This also demonstrates how the selection process can shape the




Data destruction and document invalidation are cheap and simple ways
to strip persons of their rights. When the only copy of an artist’s record­
ing is destroyed, that diminishes their right to recognition as an artist and
contributor to the culture.67 When this destruction happens to an ethnic mi­
nority, that community’s existence is threatened. If that community should
disappear, then its cultural heritage in that territory might also be removed,
opening the way for the state to craft a new national narrative. Protecting
the records of persons is one way to approach the obligation to protect the
cultural heritage of humanity as a whole. This draws attention to the inter­
nationally condemned practice of cultural cleansing.
Cultural cleansing by data destruction does not fit the definition of geno­
cide set out in international law because it does not result in significant bod­
ily harm to large numbers of persons belonging to an identifiable culture.68
Nonetheless, it does strip those persons of the right to preserve and prac­
tise their culture as a means of forcing assimilation or as an inducement to
emigrate. But there are other ways to bring about cultural cleansing. An
admittedly contrived example is a state restricting domestic meat produc­
tion to swine, prohibiting imports of all other meats, and imposing tariffs
on pulses and legumes in order to make it infeasible for Muslim and Jewish
67ICESCR, Art. 15(1)(c). While it is a stretch to say that “the full realization of this right”
is owed to the artist by the state in a positive sense, if a representation of the artist’s work
exists and it is of recognized cultural significance (such as Landowska’s recordings were),
ICESCR expects its states parties to take “steps . . . necessary for the conservation . . . and
the diffusion of . . . culture.” Art. 15(2).
68The term genocide
means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, December 9, 1948, 78 UNTS 277, Art. 2, accessed January 3, 2021, https:
//ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAtta
chment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/1507EE9200C58C5EC12563F6005FB3E5/FULLTEXT/IHL-51-
EN.pdf (hereafter cited as Genocide Convention).
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persons to eat. While this is not direct starvation, such restrictions would
still be intended to cause “serious . . . mental harm to members of” those
groups69—and this kind of cultural cleansing does fall under the category
of genocide. One way to view cultural cleansing is as a means of perpetrat­
ing cultural destruction, followed in increasing efficiency of expungement
by ethnic cleansing (forced removal of persons), identity cleansing (as hap­
pened in Kosovo), and genocide. It is important to resist the temptation
to think of these actions as a continuum in metaphoric shades of grey; the
more appropriate metaphor is glossiness of black.
Data destruction can also facilitate genocide without involving cultural
cleansing. If there is no civil record of a person’s birth, employment, taxa­
tion, military service, education, or residence, there is no documentation of
that person’s existence. This also affords a state committing genocide plau­
sible deniability for the murder of undocumented individuals. Protecting
these records provides a formal and admittedly weak means of preventing
genocide, but the greater value of protection comes through preserving evi­
dence that these persons once existed and had the right to be recognized as
persons equal to any other person before the law.70 If many persons from
an identifiable cultural community have no civil records to testify to their
existence, and those persons are contemporaries who cannot be found alive,
it may be evidence to support a claim that a genocide has taken place.
6.5 Digital objects and data integrity
None of the records described above depend on cyber infrastructure for
their preservation. However, when those objects and records do have a rep­
resentation in the cyber realm, the Tallinn Manual affirms that, when the ob­
jects and records are cultural property of some sort, then the Cultural Prop­
erty Convention applies to them.71 Cultural artefacts may even have more
protection in digital form than in tangible form because they have a claim to
being the intellectual property of a cultural community. Intellectual prop­
erty is intangible and relies on being represented in somemedium in order to
69Genocide Convention, Art. 2(b).
70ICCPR, Art. 14, 16, 26.
71Tallinn 2.0, Rule 142.
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be of use.72 In the same way that some cultural artefacts can be represented
in digital form, so can the information content of civil records.73 These digi­
tal representations are themselves objects in an abstract sense. But the ability
to access and interpret these representations depends on other objects, some
concrete and some abstract. The representations are stored, transmitted, and
presented in human form through different pieces of equipment: storage
media and access devices, networks, displays, perhaps 3­D printers. They
are converted to human­accessible form through software (another abstract
data object representing a machine) executed by a computing device. These
digital objects, storage media, and associated equipment do not look any­
thing like the archives or buildings that house cultural property described
in the Cultural Property Convention. But if these digital objects are the sole
remaining representations of these cultural or data objects, they contain the
record of human culture and thus should be protected under the Cultural
Property Convention.74
Theseizure and destruction of computing equipment and records inKosovo
demonstrates the fragility of physical storage. The digitization of data ob­
jects does not make them any less vulnerable to destruction by physical
means. It only concentrates the representations into a smaller physical space.
Destroying the physical objects that hold these digital representationsmakes
the information contained in those objects inaccessible. If a particular clus­
ter of hard disk drives contains the only representation of a piece of informa­
tion (say, the record of a person’s birth) and the machines containing those
disks are destroyed by a sledgehammer, projectile, bomb, or fire, then that
information is irretrievable. It will have been made inaccessible and so, for
all practical purposes, it is gone. It can be reconstructed from testimony, but
as already noted, testimony about a person’s identity is often not accepted,
even if it comes from non­first­person sources.
72Tallinn 2.0, Rule 142, comment 5.
73This also provides the benefit of easy indexing and searching, so there is an operational
efficiency to be had.
74While the Cultural Property Convention extends protection to reproductions, not all
reproductions are of cultural importance. The loss of some reproductions does not diminish
humanity’s cultural heritage. Otherwise it would be against the Cultural Property Conven­
tion to damage a copy of any book, regardless of its content. However, the last remaining
readable representation is culturally significant because its loss would diminish this heritage.
Tallinn 2.0, Rule 142, comment 6.
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While destroying storage media is one way of destroying information, al­
teration is another. Digital data objects, unlike paper­ or microform­based
ones, can be modified without leaving physical evidence of the alteration75
(the creation of forged records notwithstanding, since they would appear to
be unaltered). Digital storage systems with low­grade (or no) encryption
and inadequate control over data integrity checking are vulnerable to alter­
ation through software specifically designed for the purpose. Once a digital
record is altered, it will be difficult to track the source of the alteration—
if it is ever detected. The first data backup taken after the alteration will
commit the change to some kind of longer­term storage, and depending
on how the change is made, it can be propagated to other data systems in
a matter of seconds. Older forms of archives are not prone to this kind
of rapid reproduction of alterations, in part because they typically have a
documented “chain of custody”76 identifying persons or organizations re­
sponsible for the creation, modification, and safekeeping of that record. A
well­managed chain­of­custody system for an archive should make it possi­
ble for any user to verify the authoritativeness of any record,77 regardless of
how its is stored.
The chain­of­custody processes around physical archives are not adequate
for digital archives because of the risk of digital alteration. However, adapt­
ing and expanding chain­of­custody processes to cover digital archives is
possible without requiring the conversion of physical archives to digital
ones. The international scientific community workedwith archival and infor­
mation management specialists to specify a framework that, if implemented
and followed, will provide the chain­of­custody and authentication processes
needed to preserve the integrity of archived data. In 2012 this functional ref­
erence model was accepted by the International Organization for Standard­
ization ﹙ISO﹚ as an international standard addressing the authenticity and
75National Research Council [USA], Building an Electronic Records Archive at the National
Archives and Records Administration: Recommendations for a Long­Term Strategy., ed. Robert F.
Sproull and John Eisenberg (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2005), 59.
Quantum storage devices might make this kind of tampering detectable the first time the
record is accessed, but current commercially­available technologies are still vulnerable, de­
pending on how things like digests, checksums, encryption keys, and device controllers are
managed.
76National Research Council [USA], 59.
77National Research Council [USA], 69.
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security of digital archives,78 though its principles apply to other archives as
well. This specification is, in many ways, aspirational, but it does identify
the minimal components to assure data security and integrity—provided the
relevant procedures and policies are followed once they are established.
The technological aspect of data preservation is a tractable problem with
many feasible solutions ranging from paper originals and duplicates to en­
crypted cloud­based storage with multiple hosts. In many ways, the tech­
nology is the easy part. The human aspects of data creation, storage, ac­
cess, and preservation are not so neat.79 Among other things, the adminis­
trators of an ISO­compliant archive are obliged to “ensure that the informa­
tion is preserved against all reasonable contingencies, including the demise
of the Archive, ensuring that it is never deleted unless allowed as part of
an approved strategy. There should be no ad­hoc deletions.”80 Having
adequately­trained and effective administrators tomanage the available tech­
nology, data sources, processes, and user base will go a long way to pro­
viding a framework for managing data objects—digital or physical—in a
way that facilitates their preservation. Guarding against “the demise of the
Archive” satisfies the obligation to protect both the cultural heritage of hu­
manity (provided it can be stored or represented in such an archive),81 and
78Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, Reference Model for an Open Archival
Information System (OAIS): Recommended Practice, 2nd ed., CCSDS 650.0­M­2 (Washington, DC,
June 2012), accessed March 6, 2021, https://public.ccsds.org/Pubs/650x0m2.pdf,
recognized as international standard ISO 14721:2012. Like any reference model, this one sets
out what functions compliant systems must have, without specifying how those functions
are to be implemented.
79“ . . . it would be unwise to consider the problem from a solely technical standpoint.
There are also organizational, legal, industrial, scientific and cultural issues to be consid­
ered. To ignore the problems raised by preserving information in digital forms would lead
inevitably to the loss of this information.” Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems,
§1.3. “An archive that superbly guarantees the integrity of its records will not be useful if
the agencies sending records to the archive have been sloppy about any aspect of steward­
ship of the records in their custody.” National Research Council [USA], Building an Electronic
Records Archive, 69.
80Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, Reference Model, §3.1. Other obliga­
tions include acquiring “sufficient control of the information provided to the level needed to
ensure Long Term Preservation” and providing traceability “to the original submitted Data
Objects with evidence supporting its Authenticity.” Capitalized terms are defined within
the standard. Of particular note is the definition of Data Object as “[e]ither a Physical
Object or a Digital Object.” Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, §1.7.2.
81Cultural Property Convention, Art. 1–4; AP I, Art. 53.
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the obligation to protect the rights of persons by keeping relevant civil records—
regardless of the media on which they are recorded—secure from both acci­
dental and intentional harm.82
Such an archive is still vulnerable to damage arising from both benign op­
erational mistakes and intentional disruption caused by flouting the laws or
regulations governing the archive. Even so, good faith on the part of the or­
ganization in following the guidance given by this reference will be sufficient
to meet a target state’s obligation to protect archival records from damage
during times of armed conflict. Since this referencemodel has broad interna­
tional support from both government agencies and professional archivists,
this model establishes the minimal functional requirement for satisfying this
obligation. A state cannot claim to be uninformed about how to discharge
this responsibility. Further, as noted in Chapter 5, states party to ICESCRmay
ask for assistance during peacetime to put these rights­protecting measures
in place.83
6.6 Tallinn 2.0 and data objects
Tallinn 2.0 acknowledges that that international law does require protecting
certain data objects: those required to provide and manage medical services,
including patient records;84 records and other data required to fulfil obliga­
tions to persons detained during an armed conflict;85 and perhaps signifi­
cant cultural property stored in digital form.86 The expert committee did
82AP I, Art. 48, under the interpretation that civilians enjoy, as the title of Part IV, Section
I reads, “general protection against effects of hostilities.” The ICRC notes that “social secu­
rity data, tax records, bank accounts, companies’ client files or election lists or records” in
physical form have protection under this general rule without being explicitly identified in
the treaties of international humanitarian law. International Committee of the Red Cross
﹙ICRC﹚, “International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary ArmedCon­
flicts,” in 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, doc. 32IC/15/11, report
(Geneva, CH: International Committee of the Red Cross, December 8–10, 2015), 43, ac­
cessed March 6, 2021, https://rcrcconference.org/app//uploads/2015/10/32IC-
Report- on- IHL- and- challenges- of- armed- conflicts.pdf; cf. Tallinn 2.0, Rule 100,
comment 7.
83ICESCR, Art. 2(1).
84Tallinn 2.0, Rule 132, comment 3.
85Tallinn 2.0, Rule 135.
86Tallinn 2.0, Rule 142, comments 4–6.
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not, however, agree on what cultural property is significant when it repre­
sented digitally. Some held that because data objects are intangible (even
though the media on which they are stored is tangible), they do not meet
the description of cultural objects in AP I.87 Others countered that intellectual
property is intangible, and yet still has protection as a kind of cultural ob­
ject, particularly if it exists only in digital form—things like “musical scores,
digital films, . . . and scientific data.”88
The same experts that presented a case for considering digitized data ob­
jects as cultural property include “documents pertaining to e­government”
among the examples of cultural data objects,89 and this position is one that is
more readily defended. E­government initiatives typically include (among
other things) the abilities to register births and deaths through online forms,
and to request authenticated extracts from those registries.90 Thus birth reg­
istrations in these e­government systems begin as digital records—intangible
as entities, but with a representation on some physical medium. If they are
treated as intangible, and thus not eligible for protection as cultural objects,
then there is no requirement to make an effort to preserve these records.
However, there is an international mandate to record births and a recog­
87Tallinn 2.0, Rule 142, comment 4.
88Tallinn 2.0, Rule 142, comment 5. The importance of preserving scientific data was
highlighted during the presentation of the first image of a black hole on April 10, 2019,
when it was revealed that the data gathered for the project “was too much to be sent across
the Internet. Instead, the data was stored on hundreds of hard drives that were flown to . . .
central processing centres in Boston, US, and Bonn, Germany, to assemble the information.”
Pallab Ghosh, “First Ever Black Hole Image Released,” BBC News, April 10, 2019, accessed
April 10, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-47873592. The onlyway
tomake this data available to researchers was through a physical transfer of duplicatemedia,
not through a digital network. Other large data­gathering scientific research projects have
the same constraint, where distributing the digital records requires distributing the storage
media as well.
89Tallinn 2.0, Rule 142, comment 5.
90The province of Ontario has announced its intention to issue digital identity doc­
uments, including birth certificates, health insurance certificates, and drivers’ licences.
Ontario, “Ontario Onwards: Action Plan,” November 30, 2020, accessed March 18, 2021,
https://www.ontario.ca/page/ontario-onwards-action-plan#section-3. If the full in­
formation content of those records is not stored on personal smartphones, but mediated by
a secure digital identifier associated with the records in the issuer’s database, persons may
not have physical copies of these documents to compare against the official government
record.
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nized need to safeguard those records in order to protect the rights of chil­
dren. Both ICCPR and the Convention on the Rights of the Child explic­
itly state that every “child shall be registered immediately after birth and
shall have . . . a name.”91 Registration does not confer a nationality upon
the child, but it does provide documentation that will help determine the
child’s nationality, and satisfy the right of a child to a name and an identity—
the minimal acknowledgement of personhood. States party to these agree­
ments, then, have an obligation to register births, regardless of nationality,
in their territory, and to preserve those records in order to preserve the rele­
vant rights ascribed to those persons.92 Extending this to all vital records is a
small step; adding property records is then another step for the protection of
not just children, but all persons. Again, the standard framework developed
by international experts in archiving provides a strategy for implementing
this kind of recording and preservation. There is, then, no principled reason
to not provide, preserve, and protect this minimal archive.
Moreover, the minority opinion expressed by the international group of
experts in Tallinn 2.0’s commentary on Rule 100 (“Civilian objects are all
objects that are not military objectives. . . . ”) better accords with the ICRC’s
opinion that these kinds of records, among others
such as social security data, tax records, bank accounts, com­
panies’ client files or election lists or records [are] already pro­
tected. . . . Deleting or tampering with such data could quickly
bring government services and private businesses to a complete
standstill, and could cause more harm to civilians than the de­
struction of physical objects. The conclusion that this type of
operation would not be prohibited by IHL [international human­
itarian law] in today’s ever more cyber­reliant world—either be­
cause deleting or tampering with such data would not constitute
an attack in the sense of IHL or because such data would not be
seen as an object that would bring into operation the prohibi­
91ICCPR, Art. 24(2); Rights of the Child, Art. 7(1).
92All 29member states of NATO are party to the former; only the USA is not a state party to
the latter (though it is a signatory). United Nations Human Rights Committee, “Status of
Ratification Interactive Dashboard,” April 15, 2019, accessed April 16, 2019, http://indicat
ors.ohchr.org. Thus, as far as NATO members are concerned, creating and preserving birth
records is settled international law, regardless of the medium on which they are recorded.
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tion of attacks on civilian objects—seems difficult to reconcile
with the object and purpose of this body of norms.93
The ICRC more recently put a finer point on this: “Put simply, the replace­
ment of paper files and documents with digital files in the form of data
should not decrease the protection that IHL affords to them.”94
The TallinnManual’s recognition that digital representations of some intel­
lectual property has protection as cultural property,95 its acknowledgement
of the ICRC’s concern,96 and its admission that mental suffering as a result
of acts intended to spread terror—as the destruction of identity documents
did in the Kosovo conflict—is a harm that parties to an armed conflict must
avoid97 all support the conclusion that a cyberattack targeting certain civil
and personal records can “result[] in other consequences that would qualify
the cyber operation in question as an attack.”98 The minority position that
some civilian data “is ‘essential’ to the well­being of the civilian population
is encompassed in the notion of civilian objects and protected as such”99 has
stronger support from international humanitarian law and the Tallinn Man­
ual’s own interpretation of it than is presented in Rule 100. The phrasing in
the Tallinn Manual can justifiably be made stronger, clearly indicating that
some civil records, regardless of medium, fall under the umbrella of pro­
tected civilian objects, and to the extent that they facilitate participation in
and enjoyment of persons’ cultural heritage, are arguably cultural objects
as well.
93International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, “Challenges of Contemporary
Armed Conflict (2015),” 43.
94International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, “International Humanitarian Law
and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts,” in 33rd International Conference of the
Red Cross and Red Crescent, doc. 33IC/19/9.7, report (Geneva, CH: International Committee
of the Red Cross, December 9–13, 2019), 28, accessed November 28, 2020, https://sh
op.icrc.org/download/ebook?sku=4427/002- ebook (hereafter cited as Challenges of
Contemporary Armed Conflict (2019)).
95Tallinn 2.0, Rule 142, comment 5.
96Tallinn 2.0, Rule 100, comment 7, n1058.
97Tallinn 2.0, Rule 92, comment 8.
98Tallinn 2.0, Rule 100, comment 6.
99Tallinn 2.0, Rule 100, comment 7.
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6.7 Digital objects and data centres
Digital objects take up very little physical space. The Internet Archive, better
known as the Wayback Machine, contains roughly 15 petabytes of data.100
This is the equivalent of 15 quadrillion typed characters, or 7.5 trillion letter­
sized (or A4) pages of text (about one thousand pages for each person cur­
rently living), or 1.5 billion boxes of photocopier paper. It also fits on 1500
10­terabyte disks. These disks, plus associated server hardware, can take up
as little as 14 square feet of floor space.101 The paper equivalent fills a few
hundred largish buildings: roughly 15,000 floors of 10,000 square feet each.
Microform storage reduces this substantially, but still takes at least 50 floors
of this size, or one very large office tower, to store.
The compactness of a digital archive means that a physical strike on the
building containing that archive (and any facilities containing backups) only
has to be small but precise. A small, precise physical attack meets the pro­
portionality criterion of the laws of armed conflict—provided that either the
archive itself or the building housing the archive is a legitimate military ob­
jective. However, a building or object is only a legitimate military target in
armed conflict if it serves (and not merely if it potentially can serve) a mili­
tary purpose, and if its destruction “in the circumstances ruling at the time,
offers a definite military advantage.”102 A data centre that houses informa­
tion used for military purposes is a legitimate target; one that does not is
not.
100Kalev Leetaru, “WhyAreWe SoAfraid of Petabytes?,” Forbes, January 17, 2017, accessed
May 1, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2017/01/17/why-are-we-
so-afraid-of-petabytes/#609365765875.
101One manufacturer has equipment that stores this much data in the space provided by
two standard server racks. Aberdeen, Petarack, Product specification sheet. 2018, accessed
May 1, 2019, https://www.aberdeeninc.com/wwwinc/pdf/Petarack-One-Sheet.pdf. A
standard server rack is 60 cm (23.6 inches) wide, 105 cm (41.34 inches) deep, and 200 cm
(78.74 inches) tall; the floor space is a little less than 7 square feet per rack.
102AP I, Art. 52(2). Notably, the USA has not ratified, and thus is not a state party to, AP I.
Moreover, while AP I limits what counts as a military objective, American military doctrine
expands it to include any object that makes an “effective contribution to the war­fighting or
war­sustaining capability of an opposing force” (Department of Defense [USA], Department
of Defense Law of War Manual (December 13, 2016), ¶5.6.6.2, accessed May 1, 2019, https:
//www.hsdl.org/?view&did=797480), regardless of whether it is being used for military
purposes in the current conflict. Shue, “Laws of War,” 527. This is taken up further in
Tallinn 2.0, Rule 100, comments 18, 19.
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Vital records and civil property records do not, by themselves, serve a mil­
itary purpose. These records are essential for adjudicating rights claims dur­
ing and between times of armed conflict, but those are notmilitary functions.
There is societal value in preserving them, and I have shown that there are
good reasons to hold that states have an obligation to take steps to preserve
them from damage. One step is to store purely civil records in a physically
separated and identifiable repository. The complete centralization of all of
a state’s records in a single facility (and a single backup facility) prevents
states from satisfying their obligations under international law because it
houses them with records that serve a military purpose.103 This leaves civil
records unprotected, because the facility is a lawful target under the laws of
armed conflict. Civil records can only be protected from lawful attack by
storing them in a data centre that serves only civilian functions, and cannot
be intentionally misidentified as one that serves a military function.104
In 2017 Luxembourg and Estonia created a novel solution to the prob­
lems of protecting civilian data and guaranteeing its isolation from military
data. The two states signed an agreement permitting Estonia to set up a
government data centre in Luxembourg with full diplomatic protection, “ef­
fectively creating a corner of Estonian sovereign territory in cyberspace, via
a data center in Luxembourg.”105 (A separate agreement was necessary be­
cause existing diplomatic and consular law does not have provisions guar­
anteeing the inviolability of data and infrastructure outside the walls of the
official embassy.) The virtual data embassy facilitates the continuity of gov­
ernment services should Estonia be unable to provide them from within its
borders. Sincemost of Estonia’s civil records, including the official record of
government legislation,106 exist only in digital form, this kind of redundancy
is the only way to recover from a crippling cyberattack quickly. The agree­
ment between the two countries also means that an attack on Estonia’s data
103A copy of the civil records can be stored there as long as there is a copy in a separate,
purely civilian, repository.
104This is no guarantee against their destruction as collateral damage in a strike against
a legitimate military objective, but it makes intentional targeting of these records and facil­
ities a violation of international law.
105Microsoft Corporation, “Diplomatic Immunity for Data: Estonia Creates a Virtual Em­






Figure 6.1: Symbols marking protected cultural sites. (a) The Roerich Pact banner
of peace. (b) The Cultural Property Convention blue shield. Both identify civilian
sites of cultural significance that are to be protected from attack. (All images are in
the public domain.)
embassy likely also violates Luxembourg’s sovereignty,107 so this arrange­
ment could serve as a foundation for groups of states to be mutual protec­
tors of their civil records, following the model of mutual defence clauses in
military alliance treaties.
Of course, the problem of identifying these civilian data centres as pro­
tected objects remains. The Cultural Property Convention sets out a distinc­
tive marking that can be used: the blue shield described within the Cultural
Property Convention as “a shield consisting of a royal­blue square, one of
the angles which forms the point of the shield, and of a royal­blue triangle
above the square, the space on either side being taken up by a white trian­
gle.”108 This replaces the “banner of peace” consisting of a “red circle with a
triple red sphere in the circle on a white background”109 specified in the 1935
Roerich Pact for its states parties who have not acceded to the Cultural Prop­
erty Convention. Both symbols are illustrated in Figure 6.1. These symbols
function in the same way that a red cross, crescent, or diamond (Figure 6.2)
107Tallinn 2.0, Rule 4, comment 19.
108Cultural Property Convention, Art. 16(1).
109Pan­American Union, Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions
and Historic Monuments (Roerich Pact), Washington, 15 April 1935, April 15, 1935, Art. 3,
accessed January 3, 2020, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/
.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/EE57F295093E44A4C12563CD0
02D6A3F/FULLTEXT/IHL-44-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as Roerich Pact).
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6.2: Symbols marking protected sites providing humanitarian aid. (a) Red
cross. (b) Red crescent. (c) The third protocol emblem, often referred to as the red
crystal. The uses of the red cross and red crescent as protective emblems are set out
in Articles 38–43 of GC I. The third protocol emblem is described in Article 2 of
AP III. (All images are in the public domain.)
does to identify facilities providing humanitarian aid.110 Thebanner of peace
or blue shield declare that the marked facilities have protection equivalent
to that afforded humanitarian aid sites because of their value to humanity.
Theblue shield (or equivalent) emblemonly asserts protected statuswhen
it can be clearly seen by the attacking party. Consequently, this method of
marking objects and disclosing locations of protected buildings is fallible.
There is plausible deniability about not seeing the markers or otherwise rec­
ognizing the building as a protected object, particularly if weaponry is not
equipped for visual reconnaissance.
There are two particularly striking examples of misidentifying protected
facilities. NATO’s (presumably) accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy
in Belgrade, Yugoslavia—a protected building in the context the Kosovo
conflict—on May 7, 1999, illustrates how easily a protected building and
civilians can be harmed through human error. The bombs were intended
to destroy the headquarters of a Yugoslavian agency serving their armed
forces—a building located about 350 metres away from the embassy.111 They
110GC I, Art. 38, 39, 42; AP III, Art. 2.
111Kevin Ponniah and Lazara Marinković, “The Night the US Bombed a Chinese Em­




Figure 6.3: Symbols marking other protected sites. (a) Oblique red band, de­
scribed in GC IV, Annex I, Article 6, used to identify civilian hospitals and safety
zones established under Article 14 of that Convention. (b) Blue equilateral trian­
gle on an orange field, identifying civil defence facilities and personnel as set out in
Article 66 of AP I. (c)Three orange circles, used to mark “works or installations con­
taining dangerous forces,” the release of which “may cause . . . severe losses among
the civilian population,” as described in Article 56 of AP I. Symbols (b) and (c) are
shown only for completeness. (All images are in the public domain.)
were programmedwith coordinates extrapolated from an outdatedmap, and
there was no record of the Chinese embassy’s location in the “intelligence
and military databases used to cross­check targets.”112 The Chinese govern­
ment viewed this grave operational error as a violation of international law,
and the American government eventually made compensatory payments to
China and the victims’ families for the harm done.113 The second took place
on October 3, 2015 in northeastern Afghanistan. The crew of an American
AC­130U gunship aircraft destroyed a trauma centre operated in Kunduz by
Médecins Sans Frontières ﹙MSF﹚. The hospital was registered on the no­strike
list for the area, but through a tragedy of errors fuelled by fatigue, equip­
ment failure, incomplete information, and a cascading lack of situational
awareness, it was mistaken for the intended target: a suspected Taliban­
controlled site about 450 metres away.114 While the hospital did not have
any markings described in GC I (Figure 6.2) or GC IV (Figure 6.3(a)) identi­
112Ponniah and Marinković.
113Ponniah and Marinković.
114United States Central Command, Investigation Report of the Airstrike on the Médecins Sans
Frontières / Doctors Without Borders Trauma Center in Kunduz, Afghanistan on 3 October 2015, in­
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fying it as a protected site,115 it had been reported that a large MSF flag was
clearly displayed on the roof of the building.116 Further, there was no posi­
tive identification of active combatants at the hospital by anyone involved,
so under the principle of distinction the building was to be presumed to be a
civilian facility.117 The investigation found clear violations of mission rules of
engagement and the laws of armed conflict118 because the hospital had been
attacked without evidence of it being used for a military purpose. Again,
the American government made compensatory payments to the families of
the victims and contributed money toward the rebuilding of the hospital.119
In a similar vein, cyberattacks have no means to spot markings around
protected buildings. They only recognize data stored on some kind of digital
medium. The type ofmediummay be discoverable by the attacking software,
but there is no convention within a computing device’s operating system
to mark particular media as containing only civilian data objects. Even if
there were, malware can readily ignore them, in violation of the principle
of distinction.120 Tallinn 2.0 proposes this kind of data marking, at least for
vestigation report and summary (November 25, 2015), summary, [1–2], accessed Septem­
ber 5, 2020, https : / / web . archive . org / web / 20190331041350 / https : / / info .
publicintelligence.net/CENTCOM-KunduzHospitalAttack.pdf.
115United States Central Command, summary, [3].
116Joseph Goldstein, “Doctors Without Borders Says Clues Point to ‘Illegal’ U.S. Strike
on AfghanHospital,” New York Times, November 5, 2015, accessed September 5, 2020, https:
//www.nytimes.com/2015/11/06/world/asia/doctors-without-borders-seeks-explana
tion-for-kunduz-hospital-attack.html. The post­incident report noted that there were
actually two flags on the roof of the main building. United States Central Command, 47.
It is not clear whether MSF had authorization from the government of Afghanistan to use
official Geneva Convention markings. United States Central Command, 47n255, referring
to GC IV, Art. 18, ¶3. Using the MSF flags in lieu of officially recognized symbols would have
been a best­effort attempt to provide a visual signal that it was a protected facility.
117United States Central Command, 75–6.
118United States Central Command, summary, [3].
119United States Central Command, summary, [5].
120Ignoring markings and directives already happens. Web sites and the programs that
search them use an informal protocol called the Robots Exclusion Protocol. If a web server
contains a file named robots.txt in its top­level directory, any automated tools—software
robots—looking at the entire contents of that server are expected to read this file to de­
termine where they are not “allowed” to look. This is about as effective as telling a cat
that it is not allowed on the dining room table. It will go there anyway. The authorita­
tive web site on this protocol points this out, adding “[e]specially malware robots that scan
the web for security vulnerabilities, and email address harvesters used by spammers will
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information concerning medical services:
All feasible measures shall be taken to ensure that computers,
computer networks, and data that form an integral part of the
operations or administration of medical units or transports are
clearly identified through appropriatemeans, including electronic
markings. Failure to so identify them does not deprive them of
their protected status.121
The party marking the data as protected is expected to notify the other party
in the conflict what the marks are, and in turn expects the other party to
verify that those files, devices, or systems do not and are not likely to serve a
military purpose.122 As fragile as such a protocol is, there is no better scheme
currently to be had, and it is nomore fragile than other protocols identifying
civilian and humanitarian facilities. The onus is still on the attacking party to
determine the protected status of data objects, regardless of whether they are
marked or not. This, though, has another risk: the nature of the protected
data has to be verifiable, so if the data is encrypted, the relevant encryption
keys have to be exchanged, and so any personal information protected by
privacy laws may be exposed to a party that does not provide equivalent
protection. Statesmay have to placemodest limits on some of their residents’
privacy rights in order to preserve the records that support other civil rights.
6.8 Data protection in just war
As civil records move from paper or microform to digital media they become
susceptible to alteration and vulnerable to accidental or intentional destruc­
tion. But these records are essential to support granting rights and privileges
of various sorts. Defending the rights of persons to certain things requires
protecting these records, and this requires at least two distinct measures: se­
cure replica repositories, and identifying these repositories as protected ob­
jects of national and cultural significance in both physical and cyber realms.
I have already shown that both of these measures are currently practicable if
pay no attention.” robotstxt.org, “About /robots.txt,” 2007, accessed May 12, 2019, http:
//www.robotstxt.org/robotstxt.html.
121Tallinn 2.0, Rule 133.
122Tallinn 2.0, Rule 133, comment 5.
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the international community has the will to implement them. Now I turn to
how this kind of protection serves humanitarian purposes in just­war terms.
Violations of jus in bello obligations
Vital statistics records are among the data objects bearing national or cul­
tural significance. However, some of these records are evidence of more
than just citizenship. They are also a record of a person’s mere existence.123
One of the primary purposes of international humanitarian law is to set out
“the duty to prevent genocide,”124 and a genocide is easier to conceal if there
is no record of the victims. The ethnic cleansing actions of the 1998–99
civil war in Kosovo illustrates the importance of having a verifiable identity.
This conflict included a process now called identity cleansing:125 seizing and
destroying identity documents from persons, archives, and registries. Prop­
erty records were also destroyed. Not having these documents kept people
from having homes, jobs, and access to services.126 But for those who died
without a record of identity, it is as if they never existed. Their nameless bod­
ies might be accounted for in a death toll, but without identity documents
it is impossible to say with certainty that they were victims of a genocide.
Protecting identity records preserves evidence of persons’ existence. In
times of armed conflict a target state taking steps to protect these records
will hinder an aggressor state’s ability to pursue genocide as ameans of war—
one that is non­discriminatory and evil in itself, and so prohibited under the
rules of jus in bello. Conversely, an aggressor state’s intentional destruction
of these records may foreshadow an ethnic or cultural purge if the target
state’s territory is overrun.
123United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ﹙UNHCR﹚, Birth Registration, Child
Protection Issue Brief, Geneva, CH, August 2013, 2, accessed April 11, 2019, https://www.
refworld.org/docid/523fe9214.html.
124Tallinn 2.0, Rule 6, comment 6.
125U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2002 — Yugoslavia, Federal
Republic of, United States Department of State, March 31, 2003, “Kosovo,” §2d, accessed
March 28, 2018, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3e918c46c.html.
126“Because cultural expression and institutions express identity so concretely it becomes
necessary to extinguish the group’s cultural expression and expunge fromdispute territories
any evidence of the group.” RebeccaKnuth, Libricide:TheRegime­SponsoredDestruction of Books
and Libraries in the Twentieth Century (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003), 64.
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The protection of identity records is also justified under the ICJ’s interpre­
tation of international humanitarian law in its 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory
Opinion, not because of a particular means of war, but because one of the
“cardinal principles . . . of humanitarian law . . . is aimed at the protection
of the civilian population and civilian objects.”127 Civil records are civilian
objects, and while a state may use them to determine who may be obliged
to provide military service, there is yet no justification that they serve any
active military purpose. Thus the principle of discrimination of jus in bello
also applies to these data objects.
Experience has shown that where there is no will to honour the rules of
jus in bello, it will not likely be followed. States, therefore, must be permit­
ted to counter attempts by aggressor states to harm or destroy civil records,
regardless of how or where those records are stored. To this end, then, in de­
fence of its citizens’ rights and in alignment with the right to defend or repel
an attack against other civilian targets, a proportionate forceful response, ei­
ther cyber or conventional, may be justified to end an attack targeting those
records. A diplomatic claim demanding reparations may facilitate recon­
structing those records, to whatever extent is possible, is justified afterward.
Even so, the best (and probably least expensive) defence against this kind
of destruction is to have multiple digital copies distributed among archival
sites. Moreover, since these records do not serve military purposes, this may
include having a copy hosted securely in a third­party state without violat­
ing the principle of neutrality, as Estonia and Luxembourg have agreed to
do.
Facilitating jus post bellum
If, asHenry Shue suggests, “[t]he purpose of the laws [of war] is tominimize
the rights violated and the evils committed, . . . to constrain the ‘shit’ when
the ‘shit’ happens,”128 then it seems just to address those violations and re­
store, as far as possible without sowing the seeds for another conflict,129 the
rights of civilians in a deliberate but urgent fashion post bellum. Just as safe­
guarding civil records from damage can serve as an evidential hedge against
127Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, ¶78.
128Shue, “Laws of War,” 515–16.
129Brian D. Orend, “Justice after War,” Ethics & International Affairs 16, no. 1 (March 2002):
43, accessed October 25, 2015, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2002.tb00374.x.
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a genocide during a war, they can also help in reconstructing a civil society
after one.
Again, the Kosovo conflict is illustrative, both with respect to the dif­
ficulty of the task when records have been destroyed, and to the impor­
tance of doing this task well. The forcible stripping of identity records from
those fleeing the conflict was intended to ensure that citizens of Albanian
origin had no “right to return to their homes.”130 A just restoration after
the conflict would require granting these persons access to their former resi­
dences.131 However, many Albanians had already been deprived of their res­
idences before the 1998–99 conflict after the Serb­dominated government of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia revoked Kosovo’s autonomy and insti­
tuted pro­Serbian employment and housing policies in 1989.132 Moreover,
somemembers of the Serbian community also suffered displacement.133 The
competing claims to property due to missing records, altered records, and
unrecorded transfers,134 coupled with fear of violence and lack of will to
enforce judgements,135 have caused lengthy delays in restoring persons to
130Milutinović indictment, ¶31.
131“The safe and dignified return of DPs [displaced persons] to their homes is one of the
fundamental rights contributing to a stable multi­ethnic society in Kosovo.” Organization
for Security and Co­operation in Europe ﹙OSCE﹚ Mission in Kosovo, An Assessment of the Vol­
untary Returns Process in Kosovo, Returns and repatriation report (Organization for Security
and Co­operation in Europe, October 2012), 5, accessed May 12, 2019, https://www.osce.
org/kosovo/96805?download=true.
132Organization for Security and Co­operation in Europe ﹙OSCE﹚Mission inKosovo, Chal­
lenges in the Resolution of Conflict­Related Property Claims in Kosovo, Returns and repatriation
report (Organization for Security and Co­operation in Europe, June 2011), 4n8, accessed
May 12, 2019, https://www.osce.org/kosovo/80435?download=true; SerbezeHaxhiaj and
Filip Rudic, “Lost Property: Kosovo’s Missing Records Prolong Post­War Legal Battles,”
Balkan Insight, April 3, 2019, accessed May 12, 2019, https://balkaninsight.com/2019/04/
03/lost-property-kosovos-missing-records-prolong-post-war-legal-battles/.
133Organization for Security and Co­operation in Europe ﹙OSCE﹚Mission inKosovo, Chal­
lenges in Resolution, 7–8.
134Scott Leckie, “ResolvingKosovo’s Housing Crisis: Challenges for the UNHousing and
Property Directorate,” Forced Migration Review 7 (April 2000): 13–14, accessed May 15, 2019,
https://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/land-and-property-
issues/leckie.pdf; Haxhiaj and Rudic, “Lost Property.”
135Organization for Security and Co­operation in Europe ﹙OSCE﹚ Mission in Kosovo, An
Assessment of the Voluntary Returns Process in Kosovo, Returns and repatriation report (Organi­
zation for Security and Co­operation in Europe, October 2014), 14, accessed May 16, 2019,
https://www.osce.org/kosovo/129321?download=true.
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their homes, and even those who have returned home do not always feel se­
cure there.136 This aspect of jus post bellum will not be attained in Kosovo, or
anywhere else, until accurate identity and property records are established,
accepted as authoritative, and enforced.
6.9 Conclusion
The advent of cyberwarfare did not create the problem of safeguarding civil
records. It exposes and exacerbates it. In this chapter I have argued that in­
ternational humanitarian law requires recording and preserving birth records,
and that preserving human rights post bellum—or indeed after any disaster—
requires recording and preserving property and other civil records. Fur­
ther, I have established that the reconstruction of a civil society after an
armed conflict is facilitated by preserving some aspects of cultural heritage
including unique and significant artefacts that represent human creativity
and achievement. I have shown that there are archival best practices that
will allow states to satisfy these obligations regardless of their choice of tech­
nology.
I have also shown that the space efficiency provided by digital archives
makes them particularly vulnerable to physical harm. There are interna­
tional conventions for designating and identifying facilities as serving strictly
civilian purposes, and these kinds of records and cultural objects are enti­
tled to the protection of the jus in bello principle of distinction. A digital,
network­accessible marking should be agreed upon for identifying systems
that store and process these protected digital objects, and all parties to a
conflict should respect those markings, though it is a very easy thing to ig­
nore when creating software to disable a military objective. Nonetheless, the
protection of digital archives can still be satisfied under the broad terms of
existing international humanitarian law; it only needs explicit interpretation
for protecting digital objects stored in strictly civilian data centres.






7.1 Summary of findings
This project has shown that even though the means and methods of cyber­
warfare are novel, there is no relevant significant difference between them
and existing conventional means and methods of warfare. The Martens
Clause of HC II (1899),1 which is reiterated in the ICJ in its Nuclear Weapons
Advisory Opinion,2 subjects all means and methods of warfare to the interna­
tional laws of armed conflict. The challenge is interpreting those laws in such
a way that treats novel means of warfare in the same spirit and language as
conventional ones. In Chapter 2 I have set out a robust but open­textured
description of a cyberattack, then addressed each of Randall Dipert’s im­
portant questions concerning the justification of cyberattacks and responses
using existing international law, concepts from just­war theory, and two real­
world cyberattacks, demonstrating that the challenge Dipert poses can be
met.
The TallinnManual, developed in the aftermath of a crippling cyberattack
against Estonia, provides an interpretation of existing international law in
the context of aggressive cyberoperations. Chapter 3 argues that since the
1“Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties
think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, pop­
ulations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of inter­
national law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the
laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience.” HC II (1899), preamble.
2Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, ¶87.
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Internet’s operators rely on laws and norms in order to provide the service,
and since the Internet has been a vector of attack against state interests, an
analysis of international law along the lines of the Tallinn Manual is justified
to establish states’ rights and responsibilities with respect to network and
data operations. It also shows that the Tallinn Manual stands in the tradi­
tion of war manuals that distil the laws of armed conflict into a collection of
reliable, though imperfect, rules, and that the process and persons that pro­
duced the Tallinn Manual give it credibility and authority. Chapter 4 gets
more theoretical and technical, showing how the Tallinn Manual comports
with the norms of just­war theory, concluding that the Tallinn Manual not
only upholds those norms to the extent that current international law does,
but also goes further by giving consideration to matters of just cause and
human rights. This justifies accepting the Tallinn Manual as a starting point
for wrestling with the interpretation of international law with respect to cy­
berwar.
The following chapter introduces concepts that apply the TallinnManual’s
guidance to assess the severity of a cyberattack and bound the permissible
responses to an aggressive cyberoperation. The international laws of armed
conflict, and in particular the UN Charter, permit states to defend themselves
against armed attacks and lesser uses of force by other states. Under the jus
in bello obligation of proportionality, these defensive responses are limited
to what is justifiable to end the threat or attack based on the information
available at the time. In determining whether an act of aggression commit­
ted by cyber means has reached the level of a conventional armed attack, the
Tallinn Manual’s scale­and­effects doctrine is directly applicable when physi­
cal harm is readily apparent, but its applicability is limited when the harm
is not perceptible or has not yet occurred. I show that the inability to assess
unperceived harm is common to both conventional and cyber means of war­
fare. In cases of imperceptible harm, the question of whether a cyberattack
can be considered a moderate use of force or a flagrant attack equivalent
to a conventional armed attack depends in part on epistemological states—
what is (or can be) known about the intended and potential effects of the
aggressive operation. It does not depend on the means by which the action
is carried out. Further, I demonstrate that the effects of both conventional
and cyber attacks can affect the enjoyment of human rights acknowledged
under various treaties. Those impacts can be considered part of the effects
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of an attack, and so factor into the determination of whether a cyberattack
crosses the boundary from moderate to flagrant.
While the scale­and­effects criteria are useful, the Tallinn Manual’s related
assessment criteria of causal directness and temporal immediacy do not pro­
vide consistent guidance when effects take a long time to develop. Chapter 5
introduces an extended temporal model of attack and effects to demonstrate
that the maximum justifiable response to a use of force depends on when the
target state becomes aware of any harm that may arise from an aggressive
action against it—an action that may have been proceeding undetected for a
long period of time andmay not have producedmore than an inconvenience
to the target state. A state’s ability to recognize and neutralize potential
harm limits the justification for making a nocuous or a moderate response,
even though the origin of the attack has been determined and there is a short,
direct causal chain between the start of the attack and the recognition that
there is unrealized harm to avert.
The novelty of cyberwarfare does highlight how cultural and data ob­
jects are vulnerable to destruction during times of conflict. While some cul­
tural objects deemed to be of value to humanity in general are protected
from intentional targeting under international conventions and the laws of
armed conflict, the data objects—records of birth, residency, and property
ownership—needed to satisfy human rights obligations and sustain a civil
society are also of sufficient value to humanity in general that they, too,
merit being designated as protected objects. This protection must extend
to the facilities housing these records. Chapter 6 makes this argument on
the basis of human rights declarations, international humanitarian law, and
international standards of archival practice. Protecting these records from
harm involves both proactive measures ante bellum (or, perhaps more cyni­
cally, inter bella) and respect for such facilities in bello, so there is a possibil­
ity of a sustainable minimally just society post bellum. This goes beyond the
scope of the TallinnManual, but not beyond the international conventions al­
ready in place with respect to protecting both human rights and cultural ob­
jects. This protection requires international agreement on protocols specific
to data in cyberobjects, but it does not require any new conventions. How­
ever, effective protection, just as the protection of civilians during times of
armed conflict, requires a political commitment among belligerent parties
in a conflict to honour those conventions and protocols.
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7.2 Directions for future work
My short exploration of aggressive cyberoperations in the context of inter­
national armed conflict necessarily leaves follow­on questions untouched.
This is a small selection, each of which could be an extended discussion on
its own.
Separating data from cyber
Two interpretations; two priorities
The Tallinn Manual recognizes a distinction between data and cyber that can
best be summarized this way: not all data is cyber, and not all of cyber is
data. It does not claim authority to address matters concerning harm to data
except where it is connected with cyberoperations. In contrast, the Shang­
hai Cooperation Agreement makes a clear separation between the two. The
Agreement uses the term information in a way that includes data as under­
stood in the Tallinn Manual, but also incorporates the information content
represented by the data, regardless of themedium of storage or transmission.
That leaves cyber as referring to the use of digital communications and com­
puting technology to store, transfer, and process that information; that is,
computer networks form one class of what it calls information infrastructure.3
The significance of this distinction is revealed in the Agreement’s definition
of information war:
confrontation between two or more states in the information
space aimed at damaging information systems, processes and
resources, critical and other structures, undermining political,
economic and social systems, mass psychologic brainwashing to
destabilize society and state, as well as to force the state to taking
decisions in the interest of an opposing party[.]4
Note that cyberwar itself is not a primary concern; rather, the greater concern
with respect to state sovereignty appears to be maintaining control over in­
formation, in all of its breadth, as a critical national interest.
3Shanghai Cooperation Agreement, Annex 1.
4Shanghai Cooperation Agreement, Annex 1.
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One way to understand the different approaches is that the TallinnManual
is recognizing the shift in political thinking from the idea that each state is re­
sponsible for maintaining its own sovereignty and is free from the influence
of other states with respect to purely internal matters (which largely held
until the end of the First World War), to one where states are mutual guar­
antors of equal sovereignty and protectors of fundamental human rights
under an expanding collection of treaty obligations (which finally gained
traction at the end of the SecondWorld War). This puts state sovereignty in
the service of internationally recognized universal human rights, not in the
role of absolute domestic power and distributer of privileges. The Shanghai
Cooperation Agreement acknowledges “the important role of information
security in the field of ensuring human and civil rights, and fundamental
freedoms,”5 but it also sees “[d]issemination of information harmful to the
socio­political and socio­economic systems, spiritual, moral and cultural en­
vironment of other States” as a threat that
. . . is characterized by the appearance and replication of infor­
mation in digital (radio and television) and other mass media,
on the Internet and other information exchange networks that:
• distorts the perception of the political system, social order,
domestic and foreign policy, important political and social
processes in the State, spiritual, moral and cultural values
of its population . . . 6
On this account, disseminating information about universal human rights
could be seen as disruptive to the interest of states that have no desire to
respect or protect them. The protection of the state from the unwanted in­
fluence of information (even factual information) coming from outside the
state appears to trump the rights of citizens to the freedoms of opinion and
of seeking and receiving “information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers, . . . through any . . . media of his choice.”7 While the Shanghai
Cooperation Agreement demonstrates that it is the specific information con­
tent of generated, stored, transmitted, processed, or (in the case of software)
5Shanghai Cooperation Agreement, preamble.
6Shanghai Cooperation Agreement, Annex 2, ¶5.
7ICCPR, Art. 19(1), (2).
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executed data that is at play in cyberwarfare and information warfare (for
example, propaganda and psychological operations), not the uninterpreted
data. Cyber infrastructure is just the medium by which the actions are car­
ried out.
Classes of information
The ICRC has articulated a position somewhere in between the ones expressed
in the Shanghai Cooperation Agreement and the Tallinn Manual. “The ICRC
understands ‘cyber warfare’ as operations against a computer or a computer
system through a data stream, when used as means and methods of warfare
in the context of an armed conflict, as defined under IHL.”8 A cyberweapon
is just one information object contained in the data stream; the cyber infras­
tructure is the medium that carries the weapon. Stored data is just a frozen
data stream until it is accessed or transmitted.9 The data stream (whether it
is stored, being transmitted, or being executed) can contain many kinds of
information objects, each serving different purposes.
Classifying data according to the purpose of its information content can
help determine whether a cyberattack is moderate or flagrant. Some infor­
mation is related to critical national interests, whether it be on government
systems (for example, civil records and foreign intelligence) or privately­
owned systems (for example, banking records, business planning documents,
and programs that control a vehicle’s speed). Intellectual property may not
be of immediate national interest, but it has cultural, personal, or commer­
cial importance for its creators and owners, and those may be critical na­
tional interests. If a cyberattack is precisely crafted, like Stuxnet (Chapter 2)
and Sunburst (Chapter 3), the target, and thus the intended effects, could
eventually be determined. If the intention is to damage particular data, then
the character of the relationship of that data to critical national interests will
affect the assessment of the attack’s severity, and thus the scope of any per­
missible response to the attack. As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, damaging
8International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, “Challenges of Contemporary
Armed Conflict (2015),” 39.
9The idea of a data stream is a fundamental part of the C++ and other programming lan­
guages. The content encoded in that streamed data only becomes accessible and meaning­
ful when that program interprets the data in a purpose­specific way. As far as the computer
executing the program is concerned, the data is just a bag of bits.
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information that supports a state’s sovereignty and ability to satisfy interna­
tional obligations with respect to human rights and other treaties is a more
serious attack than one that, for example, changes the programmed synchro­
nization of traffic lights on a city street in the wee hours of the morning.
Having a rubric to map the kind of information harmed by a cyberattack to
its severity as a just­cause criterion for a forceful response will supplement
the framework I set out in Chapter 5 while avoiding the overreaching claims
of sovereignty over information made in the Shanghai Cooperation Agree­
ment. It will also be a step toward the ICRC’s goal of understanding “the
potential human cost of cyberwarfare.”10
Human rights in cyberspace
It is incongruous to advocate for protection of some human rights under the
international laws of armed conflict while denying that these rights are pro­
tected outside times of international armed conflict. The Tallinn Manual’s
discussion of human rights with respect to personal cyberactivity outside
times of armed conflict draws in international instruments setting out hu­
man rights and states’ obligations such as the UN Charter, the Universal
Declaration, ICCPR, and ICESCR. While the Tallinn Manual claims that there
is agreement that international human rights law does apply to natural per­
sons’ activities in cyberspace,11 it concludes that there is not enough agree­
ment on the details of what those rights entail for anything more than that
claim to be accepted as international law. There are two particular sticking
points that are attracting attention in contemporary Western society, and
they stand at opposite extremes of personal exposure: the freedom from
arbitrary state interference with one’s privacy12 and the freedom of expres­
sion.13
Freedom of expression is a negative right: outside of declared states of
public emergency,14 the only restrictions a state may place on the expression
10International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, “Challenges of Contemporary
Armed Conflict (2015),” 40.





of “information and ideas of all kinds”15 are those that protect the rights of
others, preserve public order or public health, are needful for national secu­
rity, or uphold some other local standard of morality (though this last item
leaves a lot of room for a state to reshape or impose those standards).16 The
TallinnManual affirms these restrictions with respect to cyberactivity because
of the rights­infringing harms they can produce outside the cyber realm.17
However, protecting the rights of others sometimes means a reduction in
the degree of privacy a person may have online,18 as long as the state is clear
about what the effects of the restrictions are on individual persons.19
What does privacy look like in cyberspace? ICCPR asserts the freedom
from “arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy . . . or correspon­
dence,”20 so analogies to physical objects again may be useful here. An ordi­
nary email message can be usefully compared to a postcard. The recipient’s
name and address, the message, and the name of the sender are in plain
view. Early Internet email protocols made the same information visible by
default. But if the sender puts the postcard in an envelope, only the name
and address of the recipient is visible—there is no need to put a return ad­
dress on the envelope for the mail to be delivered. Further, by putting the
postcard in an envelope, both the sender and receiver have an expectation
that the message is not subject to inspection by the postal service. Similarly,
encapsulating the content of an email in some kind of digital equivalent to
an envelope should provide the same assurance to the sender and receiver.
However, all data sent over the Internet is broken up into small chunks
called packets, and these contain source and destination information—there
is almost always a digital equivalent to a return address on a packet. The
content of a packet is interpreted on the destination end, but it can also be
examined at other network nodes while it is being transmitted. Some higher­
level protocols, such as the streaming video protocols used by services like
Netflix, include data in the packet identifying the kind of content carried
by the packet, and this is useful for giving priority or preferred routing to
certain Internet services. But if a packet can be interpreted to find this kind
15ICCPR, Art. 19(2).
16ICCPR, Art. 19(3).
17Tallinn 2.0, Rule 37.
18Tallinn 2.0, Rule 37, comments 5, 6.
19Tallinn 2.0, Rule 37, comment 13.
20ICCPR, Art. 17(1).
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of service­related data, its content can also be sniffed for plain­text words or
phrases (for example, bomb or Daesh) that may trigger further examination
of every available packet in the transmission. The need for Internet services
to run efficiently can facilitate the routine breach of the expectation of con­
fidentiality. This is, at least in the North American context, a commercial
issue, but it is also a rights issue when states take steps to justify inspect­
ing the data content of Internet transmissions (deep packet inspection) for
surveillance purposes simply because the service itself requires limited data
inspection. What degree of packet inspection becomes an infringement of
the ordinary right to privacy?21 Do financial and medical Internet­based
services require positive steps to ensure this right is protected?
Questions also arise around the use of encryption and the conflict with
lawful interception of personal data or correspondence. Does the freedom
from interference with privacy mean that encryption is permitted and en­
couraged, placing a technical limit on the ability for states to inspect In­
ternet transmissions, or does it mean that encryption is discouraged and in
exchange the government, as protector of the right, will not ordinarily in­
spect the content of Internet packets, but will take steps to try and punish
cybercriminals and others who do? Legal liability has pushed commercial
Internet users to the former with respect to data transmission, but personal
information stored on data servers in unencrypted form may still be subject
to warrantless inspection for legal purposes.
State sovereignty
Election interference
States party to ICCPR are expected to have some kind of electoral process
whereby citizens may “take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly
or through freely chosen representatives.”22 This obligation requires creat­
ing or maintaining some kind of record system to support voters’ eligibility
claims. Voter lists are the kinds of records that are essential for democratic
states to function, but unlike the records set out in Chapter 6, they are not
required to safeguard non­derogable human rights or prosecute violations
of those rights.
21Tallinn 2.0, Rule 35, comment 9.
22ICCPR, Art. 25(1).
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The well­documented vulnerabilities in certain voting machines in cur­
rent use in the USA23 leave the tallies open to manipulation,24 and some voter
databases have been accessed (if not modified) by foreign actors.25 Tam­
pering with voter lists and vote tallies interferes with the state’s obligation
of “guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors,”26 and is a
violation of a state’s sovereignty.27 Further, it raises questions about the le­
gitimacy of any government elected under that interference. If this activity
can be attributed to a foreign government, then this disruption of elections
meets the invasiveness criterion for just cause,28 though any civil unrest pro­
duced as a result does not meet the directness criterion in a way that can be
attributed to the attacking state. Under the framework presented in Chap­
ter 5, this would be no more than a moderate cyberattack, and so a nocuous
response would be impermissible. However, diplomacy is unlikely to end
the pattern of interference. What moderate measures can a state devise to
respond to (and end) attacks on its electoral processes? Does the state’s gov­
ernment have an obligation to its citizens to pursue them? Would the cur­
rent government have a definable interest or obligation toward taking action
to secure the next election, particularly if its own legitimacy is in question?
Inciting hatred and violence
Inciting hatred and violence is prohibited under human rights law.29 States
party to ICCPR are obliged to establish a domestic law prohibiting those
actions, and any such law must “safeguard individuals from human rights
23Joseph Marks and Tonya Riley, “The Cybersecurity 202: U.S. Voting Machines Vul­
nerable to Hacks in 2020, Researchers Find,”Washington Post, September 27, 2019, accessed
October 6, 2020, https : / / www . washingtonpost . com / news / powerpost / paloma / the -
cybersecurity- 202/2019/09/27/the- cybersecurity- 202- u- s- voting- machines-
vulnerable-to-hacks-in-2020-researchers-find/5d8cf823602ff14beb3da99e/.
24Kevin Monahan, Cynthia McFadden, and Didi Martinez, “‘Online and Vulnerable’:
Experts Find Nearly Three Dozen U.S. Voting Machines Connected to Internet,” NBC News,
January 10, 2020, accessed March 8, 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/election
s/online-vulnerable-experts-find-nearly-three-dozen-u-s-voting-n1112436.
25CBS Chicago, “Illinois Election Chief to Testify at Senate Panel on Russian Hacking.”
26ICCPR, Art. 25(2).
27Tallinn 2.0, Rule 4, comment 16; Rule 66, comment 2.
28Tallinn 2.0, Rule 69, comment 9(d).
29“Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.” ICCPR, Art. 20(2).
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abuses that are initiated in cyberspace, but may affect their rights offline.”30
When this kind of messaging originates outside a state (for example, from
an Eastern European troll farm31 paid to post divisive content to widely­used
social media services such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube), enforcement
of these laws directly against the posting party is not possible. However, the
messages are present on servers in the states where these services operate. If
a state is party to ICCPR, and those messages are stored on a server in that
state, and those messages are aimed at inciting harm within that same state,
then the obligation to protect rights violations suggests some sort of action
must be taken to remove those messages from view.32
A significant problem arises when these Internet services are for­profit
commercial operations. Businesses, generally speaking, are not in the busi­
ness of enforcing laws that fall outside the scope of their operations, so they
are not responsible for enforcing laws against external parties on behalf of
the state. How should this responsibility to protect rights be shared between
the state and the service­providing businesses operating within the state, par­
ticularly when the service providers are not creating the offendingmessages?
Is it a business’ responsibility to help safeguard the society in which it oper­
ates? It seems that since the business depends on at least some elements of
a stable and well­functioning society for it to exist at all, it is in the interest
of the business to participate alongside the state in this safeguarding activ­
ity.33 What measures can it take to protect itself and society from incitement
to hatred and violence that are not themselves violations of other rights?
Economic disruption
As the Tallinn Manual notes, there is increasing concern about aggressive cy­
beroperations targeting civilian commercial and industrial infrastructure to
30Tallinn 2.0, Rule 35, comment 7.
31“A ‘troll farm’ is an organized operation of many users whomay work together in a ‘fac­
tory’ or from different places across a distributed network to generate online traffic aimed at
affecting public opinion, and to spread misinformation and disinformation.” Mike Snider,
“RobertMueller Investigation:What Is a Russian Troll Farm?,” USA Today, February 16, 2018,
accessed October 7, 2020, https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2018/02/16/
robert-mueller-investigation-what-russian-troll-farm/346159002/.
32Tallinn 2.0, Rule 36, comment 7.
33Jordan et al., With a Clear Conscience: Business Ethics, Decision­Making, and Strategic Think­
ing, 250–1.
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bring about economic disruption.34 While there is movement toward these
kinds of activities being treated as violations of sovereignty, right now they
are, at their most severe, international civil crimes unless a foreign govern­
ment is demonstrably involved in the operation. In Chapter 4 I discuss
economic disruption as a result of sanctions being permitted under current
international law, and in Chapter 5 I touch briefly on how economic harm
does not typically produce direct physical harm at the scale that a conven­
tional armed attack does. Either kind of disruption may still be a violation
of rights.
This problem is magnified when transnational industries rely on infras­
tructure distributed across multiple states (for example, the automotive in­
dustry in Canada, the USA, and Mexico). A cyberattack targeting part man­
ufacturers in Mexico will have a follow­on effect in the other two countries
where those parts are used to assemble vehicles. If the goal of the cyber­
attack is to disrupt the manufacturing sector in the USA, taking Mexico’s
production offline may be the most effective way to do that. But Mexico
then becomes an unwilling third party state in the conflict. If the attack is
state­supported, then the attacking state has violated Mexico’s sovereignty
and neutrality.35 Such an action would trigger Mexico’s obligation to re­
spond in a way that upholds its responsibilities under the relevant treaties
and international law. Any consideration of assessing and redressing eco­
nomic harm caused by cyber means must take into account the fact that
states’ economies have sectors that are connected to other states’ economies.
Economic harm will cross borders and oceans, so an attacking state may
draw a diplomatic (or stronger) response from states other than the one di­
rectly attacked but are nonetheless affected. The fundamental moral and
legal principles needed to make sense of economic harm—whether caused
by conventional or cyber means—need to be identified, knowing that, just
as in the laws of armed conflict, no single one of those principles is likely to
be absolute or primary.
Non­state actors
International law, by and large, does not address non­state actors such as pri­
vate individuals, non­government businesses, and activist or terrorist groups
34Tallinn 2.0, Rule 4, comment 28.
35Tallinn 2.0, Rule 150, 151.
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regardless of their hierarchy or degree of organization.36 They are not party
to international agreements.37 The Tallinn Manual notes that a harmful cy­
beroperation launched by a non­state actor might be a breach of the host
state’s international obligation to “exercise due diligence in ensuring terri­
tory and objects over which [states] enjoy sovereignty are not used to harm
other States.”38 The target state may be justified in taking countermeasures
against the host state if this obligation is not kept.39 States that do not have
the means to exercise this due diligence then become vulnerable to mod­
erate countermeasures—and in extreme situations, perhaps even a nocuous
response—as a result of a non­state actor operating against another state
without the host state’s sanction. While there are documented best prac­
tices for safeguarding cyber infrastructure, implementing those best prac­
tices takes money and resources smaller states may not have. It seems, then,
that countermeasures against a host state must be measured in part by that
state’s ability to exercise robust, technically sophisticated oversight of its cy­
ber infrastructure. The appropriate response might be to offer technical as­
sistance in providing this oversight40 rather than inflicting harm in response.
States are gradually adopting the stance that, against current interna­
tional law, an attack made by a non­state actor can trigger the right of self­
defence even without giving the state where the attackers operated a chance
to stop the operation.41 Theparadigm example is the series of attacks against
the USA by al­Qaeda on September 11, 2001.42 Thegovernment of Afghanistan
(to the extent that it had one)may have approved of the attacks, but the state
itself was not directly involved. Nonetheless, the American response did in­
36Tallinn 2.0, Rule 17, comment 2; Rule 33, comment 1.
37International organizations are also technically non­state actors, but they are estab­
lished with state sanction, do not have the rights of states to self­defence, and have obliga­
tions to uphold applicable international law and any relevant treaties. Tallinn 2.0, 153–7.
38Tallinn 2.0, Rule 6, comment 1.
39Tallinn 2.0, Rule 4, comment 4.
40Tallinn 2.0, Rule 4, comments 31. This assistance can also be offered to states being
targeted by a cyberattack. In October 2019 US Cyber Command worked with the Montene­
grin government to understand how Russian attacks on its government networks operated.
Paul M. Nakasone and Michael Sulmeyer, “How to Compete in Cyberspace: Cyber Com­
mand’s New Approach,” Foreign Affairs, August 25, 2020, accessed October 14, 2020, https:
//www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-08-25/cybersecurity.
41Tallinn 2.0, Rule 71, comment 19.
42Tallinn 2.0, Rule 71, comment 18.
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volve making a series of defensive strikes in Afghanistan in response. The
issue is that while international law grants states the right to self­defence
against armed attacks, it also presumes that only states (or actors acting on
behalf of states) can make armed attacks as a matter of law,43 even if those
non­state actors are “armed” in the sense of being able to mount the equiv­
alent of an armed attack. While there are elements of state sovereignty over
non­state actors, and state responsibility for their actions, there is not neces­
sarily state culpability for the harm caused by non­state actors. Yet the right
to self­defence may cause harm that, if not made in self­defence, would be a
flagrant attack.
Consider a scenario where a technology hacking44 group (perhaps a team
of students doing a research project in a university course on power engi­
neering), deciding it would be fun to see how resilient the North Ameri­
can electrical grid really is, gained control of the power distribution man­
agement systems in each region, including the interconnections between
regions. Then imagine that the group started disconnecting high­voltage
transmission lines from the grid. Suppose, too, that the operation is coordi­
nated from a computer in New Zealand. The harm, even if it is inspired by
technical curiosity rather than the desire to wreak industrial and commer­
cial havoc, clearly has been caused by a non­state actor.45 The group may
be distributed, so each member of the group may be under the sovereignty
of a different state. If this had been done by a state actor, a clear attribu­
tion could be made. But a state claiming the necessity of self­defence to end
the threat would have only one plausible immediate target: the computer
in New Zealand. Sending an uncrewed aerial vehicle ﹙UAV﹚ down the streets
of Dunedin in search of a particular flat does not seem to be a minimum
effective armed response—or even the response that ends the threat in the
shortest time. An emergency throttling of Internet traffic through under­
sea and satellite interconnections would do. This action is permissible un­
der state sovereignty,46 could be requested by both Canadian and American
43Tallinn 2.0, Rule 71, comment 19.
44Here I mean hacking in the “figure out how it works” sense of the technical craft rather
than the intentionally malevolent and criminal sense used in popular media.
45This kind of cyberoperation is not far­fetched. One of the goals of the US Cyber Com­
mand is to be able to take down the Russian electrical grid as an offensive measure should
it be needed. Graff, “The Man Who Speaks Softly—and Commands a Big Cyber Army.”
46Tallinn 2.0, Rule 62.
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governments, and in the current context of intelligence partnerships, would
likely be granted. But if the controlling computer had been in Ulaanbaatar,
Mongolia, it is not clear that the isolation request could be honoured. Is a
UAV attack then permissible, or is the appropriate response isolating North
America from the global Internet until the threat can be contained?
The just­cause criteria set out in the Tallinn Manual’s assessment criteria
for cyberattacks and the classification framework presented in this project
will be useful in determining what degree of action may be justified in re­
sponse to an attack by a non­state actor. The limiting factor is whether a
state can justly respond to a non­state actor under the international laws of
armed conflict rather than handling the threat under international criminal
and commercial law.47 In any case, a nocuous response must always be a
last resort, after exhausting feasible moderate ones, with criminal and diplo­
matic methods following as quickly as practicable after the initial threat has
been addressed. This still leaves open important questions about responsi­
bility and reparations. To what extent can harm caused by non­state actors
be attributed to states? If reparations are owed to the state hosting the non­
state actor for harm caused in the course of responding to the initial attack,
is it just to impose them on the targeted state? Does the hosting state owe
reparations to the target state for an act that it did not commit but only had
the obligation to stop once it became aware of it? Even though a state of
armed conflictmay not have existed between the states, some attenuated ana­
logues to jus post bellum requirements might apply here, such as assurance of
domestic criminal prosecution for the individuals responsible for the harm.
Information and technology concerns
Communication satellites
While there are very few civilians in space, there are many civilian objects
in space, and those are primarily used for scientific and communication pur­
poses. The Tallinn Manual draws a conceptual distinction between “space­
enabled cyber operations and cyber­enabled space operations.”48 The latter
applies to physical objects in space that are controlled by objects on the
47Tallinn 2.0, Rule 71, comment 18.
48Tallinn 2.0, 270.
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ground, in the air, at sea, or in space.49 These are subject to space­related
treaties and international law concerning state sovereignty over and respon­
sibility for objects owned by entities within the state registering the satel­
lite.50 The former applies primarily to the services provided by communi­
cation satellites such as SpaceX’s Starlink system, which are elements of
privately­owned network infrastructure that just happen to be in orbit. The
communication facilitated by these satellites, and to some degree the satel­
lites as physical components of the global communication infrastructure,
are governed under international telecommunications treaties51 and other
conventionally accepted international laws.52
As physical objects, communication satellites often serve both civil and
military purposes.53 However, treaties governing the use of outer space per­
mit the use of space for peaceful purposes only.54 In other words, satellites
may be used for military purposes only if they are not facilitating the use of
force (moderate or nocuous) or the transgression of international law (self­
defence and UN Security Council licence might be exceptions as long as the
satellites themselves are not weapons). But any military use, even for non­
combat purposes, makes them lawful targets during times of international
armed conflict,55 just as dual­purpose terrestrial communications facilities
are. Thus satellites serving purely civilian purposes would have protected
status under the laws of armed conflict as long as they are not providing
services for military activity.56
Launching a strike against any object in space (whether in self­defence
or during an international armed conflict) cannot be undertaken without a
consideration of what the collateral effects are likely to be.57 Thephysical de­
struction of any satellite would create a debris field that might interfere with
other satellites.58 Altering the orbit or orientation of a satellite used for both
49Tallinn 2.0, 271.
50Tallinn 2.0, Rule 58, comment 1.
51Tallinn 2.0, 284.
52Tallinn 2.0, Rule 58, comment 8.
53Tallinn 2.0, Rule 58, comment 7.
54Tallinn 2.0, Rule 58.
55Tallinn 2.0, Rule 101.
56Tallinn 2.0, Rule 58, comment 11.
57Tallinn 2.0, Rule 113, comments 3, 6.
58Tallinn 2.0, Rule 58, comments 5, 11.
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military and civilian purposes ends the provision of service to both. The for­
mer is nocuous, with secondary harm likely to occur on occasion for years
afterward. The second is a moderate response, since it does disrupt civilian
service and is not likely to have harmful second­order effects. Regardless
of the severity of the planned response, the direct and indirect effects must
both be accounted for when assessing the proportionality constraint on pos­
sible uses of force. Any measures taken against communication satellites or
other objects in space must be necessary to achieve the specific military ob­
jective, without producing excessive collateral damage to civilian objects.59
However, as the ICRC notes, most data communication technologies have re­
dundant routes; if one route (say, a satellite connection) is blocked, another
route will be chosen (possibly involving another satellite).60 Completely cut­
ting off communication would require disabling every possible route, and
so every satellite capable of carrying data traffic would need to be taken out
of service somehow, along with every terrestrial connection. This quickly be­
comes an infeasible way of meeting the military objective of stopping data
communication to and from an adversary state. The indefinite valuation of,
for example, the loss of government services available only over the Internet
or the disruption to global transportation infrastructure adds further com­
plexity to the proportionality assessment. Moreover, this assessment must
be made before the strike is launched, since an after­the­fact determination
of proportionality defeats the purpose of the obligation.61
It is always going to be difficult to perform a proportionality analysis
with respect to communication satellites. One of the simultaneously fas­
cinating and maddening characteristics of networked computing and com­
munications systems is that while failure modes of individual components
and the follow­on effects are typically well­understood, the effects that such
failure has on other parts of the infrastructure depends on how the surviv­
ing elements interact as they respond individually to the disruption. This
emergent collective behaviour makes it difficult to assess the extent of any
indirect effects resulting from an attack on cyber infrastructure. The skill in
simulating, analyzing, and understanding these cascading failures has to be
developed before this kind of disruption can be ruled out of the proportion­
59Tallinn 2.0, Rule 113.
60International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, “Challenges of Contemporary
Armed Conflict (2015),” 42.
61Tallinn 2.0, Rule 113, comment 11.
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ality assessment. Until there is a reasonable judgement that can be made to
the contrary, any attack on a communications satellite should be expected
to produce wide­spread communication chaos and disruption of economic
activity in non­belligerent states, not just the target state.
In principle, then, while disabling a communication satellite may be per­
missible under the laws of armed conflict, the state of knowledge concerning
the extent of plausible collateral harm mitigates against it, and other, lower­
risk means of disabling military use of communication satellites—such as
targeting military ground stations—appear to be favoured. Howmuchmod­
elling of effects is “good enough” to justify a strike against the satellite itself?
When is the epistemic burden of assessing potential effects reasonably satis­
fied, and how can that be demonstrated before the fact?
Data as objects
Chapter 6 discusses the need to protect data needful to rebuild and sustain
civil society and cultural heritage. I have not addressed the idea of data as
property and how to assess the harm incurred through its loss. This ques­
tion is now more relevant than ever in an economy driven by the automated
interpretation of data.
Any medium containing data is tangible property that can be owned.
Data objects themselves are intangible, but they have information content
that may also be owned and assigned economic value; the notion of intel­
lectual property is evidence that data can be property. While businesses
and governments understand this well, and most of them take steps to safe­
guard their data from loss or alteration, this comes at the cost of acquiring
and maintaining a data management infrastructure. The advent of so­called
cloud­based services62 provides an opportunity to contract out these data man­
agement functions for a lower cost, at the risk of entrusting data to another
organization. This, in turn, opens up a new area of insurable risk: the liabil­
ity for loss of customers’ data.63
62The name derives from the convention of representing the global Internet and its po­
tential “someone else can do this” commodity services in network diagrams as an indistinct
complexity­obscuring cloud.
63Marianne Bonner, “Liability for Damage to Electronic Data,”TheBalance Small Business,
December 8, 2018, accessed October 16, 2020, https://www.thebalancesmb.com/liabili
ty-for-damage-to-electronic-data-462620.
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In this regard, data is much like money. Both are intangible though rep­
resentable in multiple media forms; both have economic value; both are
objects of fiduciary duties and liabilities; both can be created, lost, and de­
stroyed. A banknote or a coin is a document asserting that it has a fixed
monetary value. But only money in the form of currency and in the hands
of non­combatants (civilians, prisoners of war, internees, the shipwrecked,
wounded, sick, or dead) has protection under the laws of armed conflict.64
(Currency in the hands of a belligerent state is likely to be used, at least
in part, for military purposes and so may be lawfully targeted.) However,
the total wealth of the world is not represented entirely in currency or pre­
cious metal. It is represented in account records as data, now largely stored
in digital form. Time may not be money, but money is data. If all rights­
and culture­supporting digital data is accorded the same reverence as the
wealth represented in digital form, there would be more clarity around rele­
vant protections for these kinds of data during both times of armed conflict
and of peace. Further, wealth is instrumental to the enjoyment of rights and
the development of culture. It seems a little backward to afford the thing
with merely instrumental value more protection than the things of plausible
intrinsic value to which it facilitates access.
This comes back to the discussion in Chapter 5 about the IMF’s interest
in securing financial data. If that can be secured, then any other data rel­
evant to state interests, including human rights, can also be secured. The
point here is that, as the physical objects that carry information about in­
tangible objects change, the concept of object has to change as well. Again,
the ICRC has the right of it: “the replacement of paper files and documents
with digital files in the form of data should not decrease the protection that
IHL affords to them.”65 Classifying money as one type of data opens the way
to identifying other types of data, each of which can be subject to its own
level of protection as the international community sees fit. Philosophically
this continues the conversation about the metaphysics of information and
economics.
64GC I, Art. 16; GC II, Art. 19; GC III, Art. 18; GC IV, Art. 97; AP I, Art. 52; AP II, Art. 13.
65Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict (2019), 28.
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7.3 Value of this part of the project
Cyberwarfare opens up a new way for states to interfere in the sovereign
affairs of other states. My dissertation project has argued for the value of
the Tallinn Manual and provided an analysis of its interpretation of the in­
ternational laws of armed conflict with respect to cyberoperations. I have
set out conceptual frameworks for assessing the causal chain, timing, extent
of the effects, and severity of permissible responses associated with being
the target of an aggressive cyberoperation. Since cyberwarfare, as any other
kind of warfare, poses risks to the civilian population and the record of hu­
man heritage, I thought it important to examine the protections that inter­
national law provides during times of armed conflict and the steps toward
implementing those protections during times of peace. I have identified
and described a gap in the articulation of protections afforded to civilian
data objects, be they digital or physical, under international law, and argued
that protecting these data objects is essential for the safeguarding of human
rights. In response I have developed some guidance on how states could
protect these objects from damage or loss by cyber or conventional means.
Constraining the effects of aggressive cyberoperations is, then, just as impor­
tant as constraining the effects of war conducted by other means, and the
international community ought to continue working toward agreement on
how to do this. Finally, I have set out how this work can be continued and
connected to questions in metaphysics, epistemology, and applied ethics
with respect to human rights. I trust that this dissertation has also made a
constructive contribution to philosophy as a discipline. May humanity be
better for it.
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Selected milestones in international
law
While every treaty, declaration, judgement, or manual is important to inter­
national law, they are not of equal significance in the development, codifi­
cation, or promulgation of international law. This appendix identifies the
documents that demonstrate the evolution of international law to the point
where its application to cyberwarfare could be codified in the Tallinn Man­
ual. The documents are listed in chronological order with a brief statement
of their significance and the aspects of international law that they develop.
A.1 Between the Crimean and First World Wars (1856–1914)
Paris Declaration, 1856
• Identifies desire “to establish a uniform doctrine” with respect to mar­
itime law1
• Model for accession to treaties by non­signatory states2
• Jus in bello: clarifies neutrality and blockades; bans privateering3
1DeclarationRespectingMaritime Law, Paris, April 16, 1856, preamble, accessedDecem­
ber 28, 2020, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/
domino / OpenAttachment / applic / ihl / ihl . nsf / 10207465E7477D90C12563CD002D65A3 /
FULLTEXT/IHL-1-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as Paris Declaration).
2Department of Defense [USA], Department of Defense Law of War Manual, §19.4.
3Paris Declaration, Art.1–4.
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• In force for still­extant states parties and their successor states4
Lieber Code, 1863
• Jus in bello: prohibits poison, unnecessary suffering, rape, murder, and
other violent or criminal acts5
• Humanitarian rules: provides for prisoners of war6 and recognition
(but little protection) for noncombatants7
• Cultural objects: provides limited protection for hospitals, institutes
of religion, charity, education, and arts and sciences8
• Some aspects still in force for American armed forces9
Geneva Convention, 1864
• Jus in bello: establishes neutrality of hospitals, ambulances, and their
personnel;10 specifies use of a red cross as distinctive marking for hu­
manitarian personnel, facilities, and objects11
• Humanitarian rules: provision of care for wounded combatants12
• Superseded by later conventions13
4International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, “Declaration Respecting Maritime
Law, Paris, 16 April 1856.”
5United States of America, “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field (Lieber Code),” April 24, 1863, Art. 44, 47, 70, 71, accessed December 28,
2020, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/
OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/A25AA5871A04919BC12563CD002D65C5/FULLTEXT/
IHL-L-Code-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as Lieber Code).
6Lieber Code, §§3, 6, 7.
7Lieber Code, Art. 18, 19.
8Lieber Code, Art. 34–36, 118.
9Department of Defense [USA], Department of Defense Law of War Manual, §19.3.
10International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, Geneva, August 22, 1864, Art. 1,
2, accessed December 28, 2020, https://ihl- databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.
nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/477CEA122D7B7B3D
C12563CD002D6603/FULLTEXT/IHL-GC1864-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as Geneva Convention
(1864)).
11Geneva Convention (1864), Art. 7.
12Geneva Convention (1864), Art. 5, 6.
13International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, “Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field. Geneva, 22 August 1864,” Treaties,
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St. Petersburg Declaration, 1868
• Jus in bello: first prohibition of certainweapons;14 “[t]he only legitimate
object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to
weaken the military forces of the enemy”15 (proportionality)
• Anticipates need for further propositions “in view of future improve­
ments which science may effect in the armament of troops, in order
to maintain the principles which [the states parties] have established,
and to conciliate the necessities of war with the laws of humanity”16
• In force for still­extant states parties and their successor states17
Brussels Declaration, 1874
• Jus in bello: rules for occupying powers;18 classification of belliger­
ents;19 forbidding certain “means of injuring the enemy”;20 denying
rights as a combatant to those caught in hostile territory while con­
States Parties and Commentaries, accessed December 28, 2020, https://ihl-databases.icrc.
org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=477CEA122D7B7B3DC12563CD002D6603
&action=openDocument.
14International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, “Declaration Renouncing the Use,
in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight. Saint Petersburg, 29
November / 11 December 1868,” Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, accessedDecember 31,
2020, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=
3C02BAF088A50F61C12563CD002D663B&action=openDocument.
15Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400
GrammesWeight. Saint Petersburg, December 11, 1868, accessed December 31, 2020, https:
//ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachm
ent/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/3C02BAF088A50F61C12563CD002D663B/FULLTEXT/IHL-6-EN.pdf
(hereafter cited as St. Petersburg Declaration).
16St. Petersburg Declaration.
17International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, “Declaration Renouncing the Use,
in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight. Saint Petersburg,
29 November / 11 December 1868.”
18Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War,
Brussels, August 27, 1874, unratified, Art. 1–8, accessed January 1, 2021, https : / / ihl -
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/42F78058BABF9C51C12563CD002D6659/FULLTEXT/IHL- 7- EN.pdf
(hereafter cited as Brussels Declaration (1874)).
19Brussels Declaration (1874), Art. 9–11.
20Brussels Declaration (1874), Art. 12, 13.
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ducting espionage21
• Humanitarian rules: provisions for prisoners of war;22 care for sick
and wounded according to the Geneva Convention (1864);23 protec­
tion for hospitals from attack24
• Cultural objects: requires attackers to take “all necessary steps . . . to
spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to art, science, or chari­
table purposes, . . . provided that they are not at that time being used
for military purposes”;25 advocates legal settlement for “seizure, or
destruction of, or wilful damage to institutions of [religion, charity,
education, and the arts and sciences], historic monuments, works of
art and science”26
• Never ratified27
Oxford Manual (Laws of War on Land), 1880
• Codification: first “ ‘Manual’ suitable as a basis for national legislation
in each State”28
• Informed by Brussels Declaration (1874)29
• Not treaty law, but an expression of “the accepted ideas of our age so
far as this has appeared allowable and practicable”30
21Brussels Declaration (1874), Art. 19–21.
22Brussels Declaration (1874), Art. 23–34.
23Brussels Declaration (1874), Art. 35, 56.
24Brussels Declaration (1874), Art. 17.
25Brussels Declaration (1874), Art. 17.
26Brussels Declaration (1874), Art. 8.
27International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, “Project of an International Decla­
ration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War, Brussels, 27 August 1874,” Treaties, States
Parties and Commentaries, accessed January 1, 2021, https://ihl- databases.icrc.org/
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=42F78058BABF9C51C12563CD002D6659&
action=openDocument.
28Instittute of International Law ﹙IIL﹚, The Laws of War On Land, September 9, 1880,
preamble, accessed January 1, 2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.
nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/40371257507EBB71C
12563CD002D6676/FULLTEXT/IHL-8-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as Oxford Manual (1880)).
29International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, “Project of an International Decla­
ration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War, Brussels, 27 August 1874.”
30Oxford Manual (1880), preamble.
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Hague Conventions and Declarations, 1899
• Jus in bello: Martens Clause on general protections where the laws of
armed combat have not been codified;31 separate declarations prohibit­
ing use of gas weapons32 and expanding (Dum­Dum) bullets33
• Humanitarian rules: incorporates Geneva Convention (1864) and fu­
ture amendments34 and adapts it to maritime war35
• Brussels Declaration (1874) served as foundation36
31“Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Par­
ties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them,
populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of
international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from
the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience.” Hague Peace Confer­
ences, Convention ﹙II﹚ with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague,
July 29, 1899, preamble, accessed January 1, 2021, https://ihl- databases.icrc.org/
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/
CD0F6C83F96FB459C12563CD002D66A1/FULLTEXT/IHL-10-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as HC II
(1899)).
32Hague Peace Conferences, Declaration (IV,2) Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, The
Hague, July 29, 1899, accessed January 3, 2021, https : / / ihl - databases . icrc . org /
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/
B0625F804A9B2A64C12563CD002D66FF/FULLTEXT/IHL-13-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as HD IV.2
(1899)).
33Hague Peace Conferences, Declaration (IV,3) Concerning Expanding Bullets, The
Hague, July 29, 1899, accessed January 3, 2021, https : / / ihl - databases . icrc . org /
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/
D528A73B322398B5C12563CD002D6716/FULLTEXT/IHL-14-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as HD IV.3
(1899)).
34Hague Peace Conferences, Convention ﹙II﹚ Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws
and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, July 29, 1899, Art. 22, accessed January 1, 2021,
https://ihl- databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/
OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/CD0F6C83F96FB459C12563CD002D66A1/FULLTEXT/
IHL-10-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as HC II (1899) Annex).
35Hague Peace Conferences, Convention ﹙III﹚ for the Adaptation toMaritimeWarfare of
the Principles of the Geneva Convention of 22 August 1864,TheHague, accessed January 3,
2020, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/
OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/2B134D111958C73AC12563CD002D66C8/FULLTEXT/
IHL-11-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as HC III (1899)).
36International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, “Convention ﹙II﹚ with Respect to the
Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 29 July 1899,” Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries,
accessed January 1, 2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.
245
• HC II (1899), HD IV.2 (1899), and HD IV.3 (1899) still in force for still­
extant states parties and their successor states not ratifying 1907 revi­
sions37
Geneva Convention, 1906
• Jus in bello and anticipating jus post bellum: requirement for govern­
ments to “repress . . . as well as punish” persons who violate the Con­
vention38
• Superseded by later conventions39
Hague Conventions and Declaration, 1907
• Jus ad bellum: requirement to give notice of a declaration of war to
enemy and neutral states40
• Jus in bello: reaffirms Martens Clause of HC II (1899);41 codification of
xsp?documentId=CD0F6C83F96FB459C12563CD002D66A1&action=openDocument.
37International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, “Convention ﹙II﹚ with Respect to the
Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 29 July 1899.”
38International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, Geneva, July 6, 1906, Art.
28, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/
OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/C64C3E521F5CC28FC12563CD002D6737/FULLTEXT/
IHL-GC-1906-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as Geneva Convention (1906)).
39International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, “Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of theWounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, Geneva, 6 July 1906,” Treaties,
States Parties and Commentaries, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=C64C3E521F5CC28FC12563CD002D6737&
action=openDocument.
40Hague Peace Conferences, Convention ﹙III﹚ Relative to the Opening of Hostilities,The
Hague, October 18, 1907, Art. 1, 2, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.
org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.
nsf/BD56907463617993C12563CD002D6774/FULLTEXT/IHL-18-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as
HC III (1907)).
41Hague Peace Conferences, Convention ﹙IV﹚ Respectting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
TheHague, October 18, 1907, preamble, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-databases.
icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/
ihl.nsf/4D47F92DF3966A7EC12563CD002D6788/FULLTEXT/IHL-19-EN.pdf (hereafter cited
as HC IV (1907)).
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laws of neutrality42 and extension to naval war;43 rules on underwa­
ter mines and torpedoes;44 naval bombardment of undefended sites
constrained in ways analogous to land­based bombardment45
• Jus post bellum: compensation for violations of the convention46
• Humanitarian rules: adaptation of Geneva Convention (1906) to mar­
itime context47
• Human rights: belligerents cannot suspend rights of “nationals of the
hostile party”;48 “family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and
private property, as well as religious convictions and practice” are pro­
tected in occupied territory49
• Some protection for submarine cables in occupied territory50
• Many provisions still in force
42Hague Peace Conferences, Convention ﹙V﹚ Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neu­
tral Powers and Persons in Case ofWar on Land,TheHague, October 18, 1907, accessed Jan­
uary 3, 2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/
domino / OpenAttachment / applic / ihl / ihl . nsf / 71929FBD2655E558C12563CD002D67AE /
FULLTEXT/IHL-20-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as HC V (1907)).
43Hague Peace Conferences, Convention ﹙XIII﹚ Concerning the Rights and Duties of
Neutral Powers inNavalWar,TheHague,October 18, 1907, accessed January 3, 2021, https:
//ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAtta
chment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/06A47A50FE7412AFC12563CD002D6877/FULLTEXT/IHL-28-
EN.pdf (hereafter cited as HC XIII (1907)).
44Hague Peace Conferences, Convention ﹙VIII﹚ Relative to the Laying of Automatic Sub­
marine Contact Mines, The Hague, October 18, 1907, accessed January 3, 2021, https :
/ / ihl - databases . icrc . org / applic / ihl / ihl . nsf / xsp / .ibmmodres / domino /
OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/7D389CA23C22337BC12563CD002D67FF/FULLTEXT/
IHL-23-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as H VIII (1907)).
45Hague Peace Conferences, Convention ﹙IX﹚ Concerning Bombardment by Naval
Forces in Time ofWar,TheHague, October 18, 1907, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/F13F9FFC628FC33BC12563CD002D6819/FULLTEXT/IHL-24-EN.pdf
(hereafter cited as HC IX (1907)); cf. HC IV (1907), Annex, Art. 25.
46HC IV (1907), Art. 3.
47Hague Peace Conferences, Convention ﹙X﹚ for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of
the Principles of the Geneva Convention,The Hague, October 18, 1907, accessed January 3,
2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/
OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/E5397A0FB560D0A9C12563CD002D6832/FULLTEXT/
IHL-25-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as HC X (1907)).
48HC IV (1907), Annex, Art. 23(h).
49HC IV (1907), Annex, Art. 46.
50HC IV (1907), Annex, Art. 54.
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Oxford Manual (Laws of Naval Warfare), 1913
• Codification of laws of naval warfare in the same vein as Oxford Man­
ual (1880)
• Clarifies that mail is not subject to seizure (blockades notwithstand­
ing)51
• Intended to be discussed at a future Hague Peace Conference52
• Not treaty law
A.2 Between the First and Second World Wars (1918–1939)
Geneva Gas and Bacteriological Weapons Protocol, 1925
• Jus in bello: declares use of gas as a means of war as a violation of
international law, and extends prohibition to biological weapons53
• Still in force
51Instittute of International Law ﹙IIL﹚, Manual of the Laws of Naval War, August 9, 1913,
Art. 53, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.
nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/0F63D17A90E5CDC0C
12563CD002D68EF/FULLTEXT/IHL-33-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as Oxford Manual (1913)).
52International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, “Manual of the Laws of Naval War,
Oxford, 9 August 1913,” Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, accessed January 3, 2021,
https://ihl- databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=
0F63D17A90E5CDC0C12563CD002D68EF&action=openDocument.
53Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition,
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Geneva, June 17, 1925, preamble, accessed January 3,
2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/
OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/921B4414B13E58B8C12563CD002D693B/FULLTEXT/
IHL-36-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as Geneva Gas Protocol).
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Geneva Conventions, 1929
• Humanitarian rules: protection for medical aircraft;54 extensive de­
tailing of rules concerning prisoners of war,55 including prohibition
of reprisals and collective punishment56
• Superseded by later conventions
London Treaty, Article 22, 1930
• Jus in bello: Submarines must also respect rules of maritime war con­
cerning merchant ships57
• Still in force
Roerich Pact, 1935
• Cultural objects: protections for “treasures of culture”: “historic mon­
uments, museums, scientific, artistic, educational and cultural institu­
tions” and their personnel, “in times of peace as well as war”58
54International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, Geneva, July 27, 1929, Art.
18, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/
xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/09DFB7A98E19533AC125
63CD002D6997/FULLTEXT/IHL-GC-1929-1-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as Geneva Convention
(Wounded and Sick, 1929)).
55International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Convention Relative to the Treat­
ment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, July 27, 1929, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/0BDEDDD046FDEBA9C12563CD002D69B1/FULLTEXT/IHL-GC-1929-2-
EN.pdf (hereafter cited as Geneva Convention (Prisoners of War, 1929)).
56Geneva Convention (Prisoners of War, 1929), Art. 2, 11, 46.
57Treaty for the Limitation andReduction ofNaval Armaments, (Part IV, Art. 22, relating
to submarine warfare), London, April 22, 1930, accessed January 4, 2021, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/32C5DA6C8C43775AC12563CD002D69CC/FULLTEXT/IHL-41-EN.pdf
(hereafter cited as London Treaty (Art. 22)).
58Pan­American Union, Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions
and Historic Monuments (Roerich Pact), Washington, 15 April 1935, April 15, 1935, pream­
ble, Art. 1, accessed January 3, 2020, https : / / ihl - databases . icrc . org / applic /
ihl / ihl . nsf / xsp / .ibmmodres / domino / OpenAttachment / applic / ihl / ihl . nsf /
EE57F295093E44A4C12563CD002D6A3F / FULLTEXT / IHL - 44 - EN . pdf (hereafter cited as
Roerich Pact).
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• Still in force for states parties, supplemented by Cultural Property
Convention
A.3 After the Second World War (1945–2021)
London Agreement and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 1945
• Jus post bellum: established prosecution and punishment for crimes
committed by European Axis in the course of the SecondWorldWar,59
with crimes categorized as “crimes against peace,” “war crimes,” and
“crimes against humanity”60
• Foundational for subsequent ad hoc tribunals and International Crim­
inal Court61
United Nations Charter, 1945
• Jus ad bellum: UnitedNations Security Council has the power to autho­
rize any use of military force;62 states have right to act in self­defence
“if an armed attack occurs”63
• Human rights: promotes “equal rights and self­determination of peo­
ples”64
• Still in force
59Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, and Charter of the InternationalMilitary Tribunal, London, August 8, 1945,
Charter, Art. 1, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/
ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/87B0BB4A5
0A64DEAC12563CD002D6AAE/FULLTEXT/IHL-49-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as War Criminals
Agreement).
60War Criminals Agreement, Charter, Art. 6.
61J. Holmes Armstead Jr., “The International Criminal Court: History, Development
and Status,” Santa Clara Law Review 38, no. 3 (January 1998): 748–9, accessed January 7,
2021, http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol38/iss3/3.
62United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, October 24, 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, Art. 42,
accessed October 6, 2015, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html (hereafter
cited as UN Charter).
63UN Charter, Art. 51.
64UN Charter, Art. 55.
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Convention on Genocide, 1948
• Jus in bello: establishes a definition of genocide,65 identifies it as a
“crime under international law,”66 and requires a punishment for in­
dividuals found to have engaged in or encouraged genocide67
• Still in force
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948
• Human rights:
– rights to: “life, liberty, and the security of the person,”68 a na­
tionality and to change it,69 equality before the law and right
to equal protection under it,70 due process in criminal proceed­
ings,71 own property,72 participate in government and its selec­
tion,73 access public services and social security,74 safe work with
equitable pay,75 rest and leisure,76 a minimally decent standard of
living,77 free elementary education,78 “a social and international
order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declara­
tion can be fully realized”79
65United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, December 9, 1948, 78 UNTS 277, Art. 2, accessed January 3, 2021,
https://ihl- databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/
OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/1507EE9200C58C5EC12563F6005FB3E5/FULLTEXT/
IHL-51-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as Genocide Convention).
66Genocide Convention, Art. 1.
67Genocide Convention, Art. 3, 4.
68United Nations General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Decem­
ber 10, 1948, A/RES/217﹙III﹚, Art. 3, accessed January 5, 2021, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/
UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf (hereafter cited as Universal Declaration).
69Universal Declaration, Art. 15.
70Universal Declaration, Art. 7.
71Universal Declaration, Art. 10–11.
72Universal Declaration, Art. 17.
73Universal Declaration, Art. 21.
74Universal Declaration, Art. 21, 22.
75Universal Declaration, Art. 23.
76Universal Declaration, Art. 24.
77Universal Declaration, Art. 25.
78Universal Declaration, Art. 26.
79Universal Declaration, Art. 28.
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– freedom of: movement within their state and the right to return
to it,80 “thought, conscience and religion,”81 “opinion and expres­
sion,”82 “peaceful assembly and association,”83 participation in
cultural activities84
– freedom from: slavery in any form,85 “torture or . . . cruel, inhu­
man or degrading treatment,”86 “arbitrary interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence [and] attacks upon his
honour and reputation”87
– duties to: recognize and respect “the rights and freedoms of oth­
ers,” “meet[] the just requirements of morality, public order, and
the general welfare in a democratic society”88
• Not international law by itself, but foundational to the subsequent
development of international law concerning human rights
Geneva Conventions, 1949
• Jus in bello: distinction between civilians of an enemy state in territory
controlled by a belligerent state and the civilian population in gen­
eral;89 declaration and recognition of safe zones for the wounded and
80Universal Declaration, Art. 13.
81Universal Declaration, Art. 18.
82Universal Declaration, Art. 19.
83Universal Declaration, Art. 20.
84Universal Declaration, Art. 27, with the observation that both the arts and the sciences
are part of cultural activity and development.
85Universal Declaration, Art. 4.
86Universal Declaration, Art. 5.
87Universal Declaration, Art. 12.
88Universal Declaration, Art. 29.
89International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Convention ﹙IV﹚ Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 287,
Art. 4, accessed January 3, 2021, https : / / ihl - databases . icrc . org / applic /
ihl / ihl . nsf / xsp / .ibmmodres / domino / OpenAttachment / applic / ihl / ihl . nsf /
AE2D398352C5B028C12563CD002D6B5C/FULLTEXT/ATTXSYRB.pdf (hereafter cited as GC IV);
Oscar M. Uhler et al., Commentary: IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per­
sons in Time ofWar, ed. Jean S. Pictet, trans. Ronald Griffin and C.W. Dumbleton, vol. 4,The
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva, CH: International Committee of the Red
Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, 1958), 45, accessed January 8, 2021, https://b-ok.org/book/1266129/0a8d8d.
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civilian population;90 identification and protection of civilian hospi­
tals andmedical staff;91 prohibition of “[r]eprisals against thewounded,
sick, personnel, buildings or equipment protected by theConvention;”92
nomeans for states to absolve themselves or other states of liability for
grave breaches of the Conventions93
• Jus post bellum: formal inquiries into breaches of the Conventions if
requested by any party to the conflict94
• Humanitarian rules: rules of basic care and protections apply to par­
ties in non­international armed conflicts;95 conventions apply to neu­
tral states hosting or finding members of other states’ armed forces in
their territory;96 protected persons shall not be subject to torture or
experimentation97
• Human rights: occupying states have responsibility “to maintain the
orderly government of the territory” while maintaining (as far as pos­
sible) the penal laws of the territory they occupy;98 civilian persons in
90GC IV, Art. 15.
91GC IV, Art. 14, 18, 20.
92International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Convention ﹙I﹚ for the Ameliora­
tion of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva,
August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 31, Art. 46, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-databases.
icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/
ihl.nsf/4825657B0C7E6BF0C12563CD002D6B0B/FULLTEXT/GC-I-EN.pdf (hereafter cited
as GC I); International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Convention ﹙II﹚ for the Amelio­
ration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea, Geneva, August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 85, Art. 47, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/2F5AA9B07AB61934C12563CD002D6B25/FULLTEXT/GC- II- EN.pdf
(hereafter cited as GC II).
93GC I, Art. 51; GC II, Art. 52; GC IV, Art. 148.
94GC I, Art. 52; GC II, Art 53; GC IV, Art. 149.
95International Committee of the RedCross ﹙ICRC﹚, GenevaConventions I–IV, August 12,
1949, Common Art. 3 (hereafter cited as GC I–IV (1949)).
96GC I, Art. 4; GC II, Art. 5.
97GC I, Art. 12; GC II, Art. 12; International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Con­
vention ﹙III﹚ Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, August 12, 1949, 75
UNTS 135, Art. 13, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/
ihl / ihl . nsf / xsp / .ibmmodres / domino / OpenAttachment / applic / ihl / ihl . nsf /
77CB9983BE01D004C12563CD002D6B3E/FULLTEXT/GC-III-EN.002.pdf (hereafter cited as
GC III).
98GC IV, Art. 64.
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occupied territories have the right to due process in penal matters;99
civilian enemy nationals retain certain rights and may not be unduly
barred from leaving the country or occupied territory;100 forcible re­
location (not evacuation) from occupied territory prohibited;101 no
punishment for caring for the sick or wounded;102 protections and
provision for interned civilians set out in ways analogous to those for
prisoners of war;103 provisions for safety and education of orphaned
children104
• GC II replaces HC X (1907)105
• Still in force
Recognition of Principles of International Law, 1950
• Jus in bello, jus post bellum: formalization of already­accepted principles
set down in War Criminals Agreement106 that “crimes against peace,”
“war crimes,” and “crimes against humanity” are “punishable under
international law”;107 no immunity from prosecution for heads of state
or persons following orders108
99GC IV, Art. 65–75.
100GC IV, Art. 35–40, 47–48.
101GC IV, Art. 49.
102GC I, Art. 18.
103GC IV, Art. 79–135.
104GC IV, Art. 24.
105International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, “Convention ﹙X﹚ for the Adaptation
to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention, The Hague, 18 October
1907,” Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-datab
ases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=E5397A0FB560D0A9C12563
CD002D6832&action=openDocument.
106International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, “Principles of International Law
Recognized in the Charter of the Nüremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal,
1950,” Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-datab
ases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=854DDAACFDE285E4C12563
CD002D6B95&action=openDocument.
107United Nations International Law Commission, Principles of International Law Rec­
ognized in the Charter of the Nüremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal,
July 29, 1950, Principle 6, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/
854DDAACFDE285E4C12563CD002D6B95/FULLTEXT/IHL-58-EN.pdf.
108United Nations International Law Commission, Principles 3, 4.
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Cultural Property Convention and Protocol, 1954
• Jus in bello: respect for cultural property within territory of all states
parties, including prevention of looting or vandalism of such prop­
erty;109 visiblemarking (Figure 6.1) of cultural property and persons re­
sponsible for its protection;110 protection is lost when cultural property
is used formilitary purposes;111 protection extends to non­international
armed conflicts112
• Cultural property: expands and clarifies what is covered by the term
cultural property;113 preparations to protect such property should be
done before the next onset of hostilities114
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966
• Human rights:
– rights to: life,115 “liberty and security of the person,”116 “respect
for the inherent dignity of the human person,”117 equality before
the law,118 presumption of innocence,119 due process in criminal
proceedings,120 peaceful assembly,121 marry and “found a fam­
109United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization ﹙UNESCO﹚, Conven­
tion for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague,
May 14, 1954, 249 UNTS 215, Art. 4, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.
org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.
nsf/2A07EB0EAA5CECACC12563CD002D6BC8/FULLTEXT/IHL-60-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as
Cultural Property Convention).
110Cultural Property Convention, Art. 6, 10, 15–17.
111Cultural Property Convention, Art. 8(3), 9, 11.
112Cultural Property Convention, Art. 19(1).
113Cultural Property Convention, Art. 1.
114Cultural Property Convention, Art. 3, 7.
115United Nations General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, December 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171, Art. 6, accessed February 12, 2019, https : / /
treaties . un . org / doc / publication / unts / volume % 20999 / volume - 999 - i - 14668 -
english.pdf (hereafter cited as ICCPR).
116ICCPR, Art. 9(1).
117ICCPR, Art. 10(1).





ily,”122 participation in public affairs and elections,123 access pub­
lic services,124 participation in their cultural, religious, or linguis­
tic communities,125 state protection of rights and means of re­
dressing violations126
– freedom of: movement and residence127 (including leaving any
country128), “thought, conscience and religion,”129 opinion and
expression,130 associationwith others (including trade unions),131
– freedom from: torture,132 slavery,133 “arbitrary arrest or deten­
tion,”134 “arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, fam­
ily, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his hon­
our and reputation,”135 “propaganda for war,”136 “advocacy of . . .
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence,”137 forced marriage,138 arbitrary discrimination139
– children’s right to: having their birth recorded,140 a name,141 a na­
tionality,142 “protection as . . . required by his status as a minor”143
– collective rights to self­determination with respect to political sta­

























• Provides for limited derogation (non­recognition) of certain (but not
all) rights “[i]n time of public emergencywhich threatens the life of the
nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed” and made
known to other states parties145
• Builds on foundation established by Universal Declaration146
• Still in force
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 1966
• Human rights:
– Right to: work at a freely­chosen occupation147 under “just and
favourable conditions,”148 form and join trade unions,149 “social
security, including social insurance,”150 an “adequate standard of
living,”151 “enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physi­
cal and mental health”152 (including access to health care153), free
primary education (with states progressing toward free secondary
and higher education),154 participation in cultural life (including
“benefits of scientific progress” and protection for creators’ inter­
ests in their works)155




147United Nations General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, December 16, 1966, 993 UNTS 3, Art. 6, accessed June 26, 2018, https :
//treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1976/01/19760103%2009-57%20PM/Ch_IV_03.pdf













– Collective rights: of peoples to self­determination with respect to
political status and use of natural resources,159 of trade unions to
operate freely (including joining other associations and calling
workers to strike)160
• Recommendations that states provide: paid maternity benefits,161 pro­
tection of children “from economic and social exploitation”162
• Builds on foundation established by UN Charter and Universal Decla­
ration163
• Still in force
Outer Space Treaty, 1967
• Jus in bello: prohibitions on placing weapons of mass destruction in
orbit around the earth or on any celestial body and on establishing
military infrastructure on celestial bodies164
Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 1977
• Jus ad bellum and jus in bello: attack defined as an “act[] of violence
against the adversary, whether in offence or defence”165
• Jus in bello:






164United Nations, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explo­
ration andUse of Outer Space, including theMoon andOther Celestial Bodies, January 27,
1967, 610 UNTS 205, Art. 4, accessed November 28, 2019, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/
en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html (hereafter cited as Outer Space
Treaty).
165International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, Art. 49(1), accessed Jan­
uary 3, 2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/
domino / OpenAttachment / applic / ihl / ihl . nsf / D9E6B6264D7723C3C12563CD002D6CE4 /
FULLTEXT/AP-I-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as AP I).
166AP I, Art. 1(2).
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– responsibility under laws of armed combat: armed forces’ codes
of discipline “shall enforce compliance with the rules of inter­
national law applicable in armed conflict”;167 parties obliged to
have legal advisors available to military commanders for interpre­
tation and application of relevant laws;168 parties obliged to de­
termine if uses of “a new weapon, means or method of warfare . . .
would . . . be prohibited”;169 parties obliged to take precautions to
ensure targets are lawful and minimize “incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects”;170 viola­
tions of laws of armed conflict do not terminate rights associated
with being a combatant or prisoner of war171
– principle of distinction: protections for persons in the context
of non­international armed conflicts;172 clarification of the prin­
ciple (“The civilian population and individual civilians shall en­
joy general protection against dangers arising from military op­
erations.”173) extension of scope of GC I–IV (1949) to “armed
conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domina­
tion and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exer­
cise of their right of self­determination”;174 extension of protec­
tions to civilian medical personnel, units, and transports, and to
civilian religious personnel175 (including those affected by non­
international armed conflicts176); exclusion ofmercenaries as com­
167AP I, Art. 43(1).
168AP I, Art. 82.
169AP I, Art. 36.
170AP I, Art. 57.
171AP I, Art. 44(2).
172International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non­
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Geneva, June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, Art.
1(1), accessed January 3, 2021, https : / / ihl - databases . icrc . org / applic / ihl /
ihl . nsf / xsp / .ibmmodres / domino / OpenAttachment / applic / ihl / ihl . nsf /
AA0C5BCBAB5C4A85C12563CD002D6D09/FULLTEXT/AP-II-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as AP II).
173AP I, Art. 51(1); AP II, Art. 13(1).
174AP I, Art. 1(4).
175AP I, Art. 8, 12, 15.
176AP II, Art. 9, 11.
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batants;177 civilian protections for journalists;178 restriction of mil­
itary operations to those directed “only against military objec­
tives”;179 prohibitions on attacking or terrorizing civilian persons,180
attacking civilian objects,181 indiscriminate attacks,182 and reprisals
against civilian persons and objects183
– unnecessary harmor suffering: prohibition of “methods andmeans
of warfarewhich are intended, ormay be expected, to causewidespread,
long­term and severe damage to the natural environment”;184 pro­
hibition of starvation and deprivation of “objects indispensable
to the survival of the civilian population” as a means of war;185
protection of “[w]orks or installations containing dangerous forces,
namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations”186
• Jus post bellum: “grave breaches” of the conventions and protocols are
to be prosecuted as war crimes187
• Humanitarian rules: provision for and protection of civil defence188
and civilian relief operations;189 protection of stateless persons and
refugees;190 measures to reunite families;191 protections and provisions
for “persons deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the [non­
international] armed conflict”;192 provision of humane treatment and
medical care for “[a]ll the sick, wounded, and shipwrecked, whether or
not they have taken part in the [non­international] armed conflict”193
177AP I, Art. 47.
178AP I, Art. 79.
179AP I, Art. 48.
180AP I, Art. 51(2); AP II, Art. 13(2).
181AP I, Art. 52(1).
182AP I, Art. 51(4).
183AP I, Art. 51(6); AP I, Art. 52(1).
184AP I, Art. 35(3); cf. Art. 55.
185AP I, Art. 54; AP II, Art. 14.
186AP I, Art. 56(1); AP II, Art. 15.
187AP I, Art. 85.
188AP I, Art. 61–67.
189AP I, Art. 68–71.
190AP I, Art. 73.
191AP I, Art. 74.
192AP II, Art. 5.
193AP II, Art. 7.
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• Human rights: protection for basic rights and respect for human dig­
nity;194 due legal process and presumption of innocence for those charged
with “criminal offences related to the [non­international] armed con­
flict195
• Cultural objects: prohibition of “acts of hostility directed against the
historicmonuments, works of art or places of worshipwhich constitute
the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples”196
• Still in force
Convention Prohibiting Certain Conventional Weapons, 1980
• Jus in bello: reaffirmation of Martens Clause;197 individual protocols
prohibit the use of weapons that “injure by fragments which in the
human body escape detection by X­rays”;198 the use of mines, booby­
traps and other explosive devices in an indiscriminate fashion or that
are designed to cause “superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering”;199
194AP I, Art. 75; AP II, Art. 4.
195AP II, Art. 6.
196AP I, Art. 53; AP II, Art. 16.
197United Nations, Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have In­
discriminate Effects, Geneva, October 10, 1980, 1342 UNTS 137, preamble, accessed January 3,
2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/
OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/7A690F9945FF9ABFC12563CD002D6D8E/FULLTEXT/
IHL-81-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as Conventional Weapons Convention).
198United Nations, Protocol on Non­Detectable Fragments (Protocol I) Annexed to the
Convention on Prohbitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oc­
tober 10, 1980, 1342 UNTS 168, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl- databases.icrc.
org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.
nsf/CFCC9F92E14E1945C12563CD002D6DA9/FULLTEXT/IHL-82-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as
Conventional Weapons Protocol I).
199United Nations, Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby­
Traps and Other Devices As Amended (Protocol II Annexed to the Convention on Pro­
hbitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects), May 3, 1996, 2048
UNTS 93, Art. 3, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl- databases.icrc.org/applic/
ihl / ihl . nsf / xsp / .ibmmodres / domino / OpenAttachment / applic / ihl / ihl . nsf /
82CF2C7C75E37C5AC12563FB006181B4/FULLTEXT/IHL-92-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as Con­
ventioal Weapons Protocol II (amended)).
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the use of incendiary weapons to target civilians, civilian objects, or
military targets in close proximity to a “concentration of civilians”;200
the use of laser weapons or systems to induce permanent blindness201
• Jus post bellum: states participating in an armed conflict must record
locations of explosive ordnance used in the conflict and provide for
the removal of unexploded or abandoned ordnance after the end of
hostilities202
• Still in force
200United Nations, Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary
Weapons (Protocol III) Annexed to the Convention on Prohbitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious
or toHave Indiscriminate Effects, October 10, 1980, 1342 UNTS 171, Art. 2, accessed January 3,
2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/
OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/1E37E38A51A1941DC12563CD002D6DEA/FULLTEXT/
IHL-84-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as Conventional Weapons Protocol III).
201United Nations, Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV) Annexed to the
Convention on Prohbitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oc­
tober 13, 1995, 2024 UNTS 163, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl- databases.icrc.
org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.
nsf/70D9427BB965B7CEC12563FB0061CFB2/FULLTEXT/IHL-91-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as
Conventional Weapons Protocol IV).
202United Nations, Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V) Annexed to the
Convention on Prohbitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,
November 28, 2003, 2399 UNTS 100, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-databases.
icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/
ihl.nsf/22EFA0C23F4AAC69C1256E280052A81F/FULLTEXT/IHL-99-EN.pdf (hereafter cited
as Conventional Weapons Protocol V).
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Convention Against Torture, 1984
• Human rights: establishes a definition of torture;203 declares that tor­
ture, attempts to commit torture, and participation or complicity in
torture are to be treated as crimes by states party to the convention;204
grants victims of torture rights to redress and compensation;205 obliges
states to take steps to prevent not only torture but also “other acts of
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not
amount to torture as defined” in the convention206
• Still in force
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989
• Jus in bello: children younger than 15 years cannot be recruited into the
armed forces or participate in hostilities207
• Human rights:
– rights to: a name, a nationality, and parental care;208 have their
births registered;209 expeditious re­establishment of identity if el­
203“The term ‘torture’ means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or
a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person
has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of
a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” United Nations General
Assembly, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, December 10, 1984, 1465 UNTS 85, Art. 1, accessed January 5, 2021, https://w
ww.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cat.pdf (hereafter cited as Convention
Against Torture).
204Convention Against Torture, Art. 4.
205Convention Against Torture, Art. 14.
206Convention Against Torture, Art. 16.
207United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Novem­
ber 20, 1989, 1577 UNTS 3, Art. 38, accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.
org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.
nsf/B92BDC3CAE1B142DC12563CD002D6E8C/FULLTEXT/IHL-86-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as
Rights of the Child).
208Rights of the Child, Art. 7.
209Rights of the Child, Art. 7.
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ements of it are lost;210 “benefit from child­care services and fa­
cilities for which they are eligible”;211 “special protection and as­
sistance provided from the State” if their best interests are served
by removal from the family environment212
• Still in force
Chemical Weapons Convention, 1993
• Jus in bello: prohibits use of weapons intended to disperse chemicals213
“that can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to
humans or animals”214
• Prohibits production, accumulation, and transfer of such weapons,215
and requires their destruction216
• Still in force
San Remo Manual (Armed Conflict at Sea), 1994
• Intended to be an updated version of Oxford Manual (1913)217
• Adapts developments in laws of armed conflict and other treaties since
1913 to the context of naval warfare
• Articulates protections from naval attacks for civilians at sea or in air­
craft over the sea equivalent to those afforded civilians on land by GC II
and AP I218
210Rights of the Child, Art. 8.
211Rights of the Child, Art. 18(3).
212Rights of the Child, Art. 20.
213United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Paris, January 13,
1993, 1974 UNTS 45, Art. 1(1), 2(1), accessed January 3, 2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.
org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.
nsf/9D3CCA7B40638EF5C12563F6005F63C5/FULLTEXT/IHL-87-EN.pdf (hereafter cited as
Chemical Weapons Convention).
214Chemical Weapons Convention, Art. 2(2).
215Chemical Weapons Convention, Art. 1(1).
216Chemical Weapons Convention, Art. 1(2),(3).
217International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo Manual on International Law Ap­
plicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, ed. Louise Doswald­Beck (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Uni­
versity Press, 1985), 5 (hereafter cited as San Remo Manual).
218San Remo Manual, 5.
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• Not treaty law as presented, but an expression and explanation of it
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998
• Jus post bellum: a permanent court with “jurisdiction over persons for
themost serious crimes of international concern,”219 in particular, geno­
cide,220 crimes against humanity,221 war crimes,222 and “the crime of
aggression”223
• Only for cases where a state party with jurisdiction is not willing or
able to investigate and prosecute in accordance with its international
obligations,224 or where a state party or the UN Security Council has
referred it to the court225
• Still in force
Covenant for the Safeguarding the Intangible Cultural Heritage, 2003
• Cultural heritage: aims to ensure respect for and preservation of “the
practices, representations, expression, knowledge, skills—as well as
the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith—
that communities, groups, and in some cases, individuals recognize as
part of their cultural heritage”226 such as “oral traditions and expres­
sions, . . . language . . . [,] performing arts . . . [,] social practices, . . .
[and] traditional craftsmanship”227
• Still in force
219International Criminal Court ﹙ICC﹚, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
2011, 2187 UNTS 90, amended, The Hague, NL, Art. 1, accessed April 8, 2020, https : / /
www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/
RomeStatutEng1.pdf.
220International Criminal Court ﹙ICC﹚, Art. 6.
221International Criminal Court ﹙ICC﹚, Art. 7.
222International Criminal Court ﹙ICC﹚, Art. 8.
223International Criminal Court ﹙ICC﹚, Art. 8 bis, added in 2010.
224International Criminal Court ﹙ICC﹚, Art. 17.
225International Criminal Court ﹙ICC﹚, Art. 13.
226United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization ﹙UNESCO﹚, Conven­
tion for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, Paris, October 17, 2003, Art.




ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 2005
• Codification of non­treaty humanitarian law arising fromnear­universal
practices of states with respect to particular issues228
• Sets out the state practices that led to the formation of each rule229
• Not new law, and not a substitute for treaty law, but authoritative be­
cause states largely abide by the rules set out
HPCR Manual (Air and Missile Warfare), 2009
• Codification of existing international law controlling air and missile
warfare230
• Jus in bello: observes that “[t]here is no specific obligation on Belliger­
ent Parties to use precision guided weapons. There may, however,
be situations in which the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, or
the obligation to avoid—or in any event, minimize—collateral dam­
age, cannot be fulfilled without using precision guided weapons”;231
applies rules to uncrewed aerial vehicles232
• Not treaty law as presented, but an expression and explanation of it
228International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Rules, vol. 1 of Customary International
Humanitarian Law, ed. Jean­Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald­Beck (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), xxxvi, accessed April 20, 2018, https://www.icrc.
org/en/doc/assets/files/other/customary- international- humanitarian- law- i-
icrc-eng.pdf.
229International Committee of the Red Cross ﹙ICRC﹚, Practice, vol. 2 of Customary Interna­
tional Humanitarian Law, ed. Jean­Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald­Beck (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), accessed April 20, 2018, https://www.icrc.org/
en/doc/assets/files/other/customary-international-humanitarian-law-ii-icrc-
eng.pdf.
230Claude Bruderlein, The Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at
HarvardUniversity, HPCRManual on International Law Applicable to Air andMissileWarfare (New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013), vii (hereafter cited as HPCR Manual).
231HPCR Manual, Rule 8.
232HPCR Manual, Rule 22(a), 29(vi), 39, 147, 170.
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Tallinn Manual (Tallinn 1.0 on Cyberwarfare), 2013
• Codification of existing international laws of armed conflict applied
to cyberwarfare construed as “cyber­to­cyber operations”233
• Application of international law to a new domain of conflict, following
the pattern established by Oxford Manual (1880), Oxford Manual (1913),
San Remo Manual, and HPCR Manual
• Jus ad bellum: rules concerning self­defence or UN Security Council res­
olutions in response to cyberattacks234
• Jus in bello: adapts principles controlling conventionalmeans andmeth­
ods of war to cyberwarfare
• Not treaty law as presented, but an expression and interpretation of it
• Superseded by Tallinn 2.0
Tallinn Manual (Tallinn 2.0 on Cyber Operations), 2017
• Most comprehensive manual of applied international law to date
• Extends rules of cyberwarfare in Tallinn 1.0 to include codification of
international human rights law,235 laws of international responsibil­
ity,236 diplomatic and consular law,237 the law of the sea,238 air and
space law,239 and international telecommunications law240 applicable
to cyber­to­cyber operations in general
• Not treaty law, but an expression and interpretation of it that extends
beyond the laws of armed conflict
233Michael N. Schmitt, ed., Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber War­
fare: Prepared by the International Group of Experts at the Invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber
Defence Centre of Excellence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 5, accessed
September 18, 2015, http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/356296245.pdf
(hereafter cited as Tallinn 1.0).
234Tallinn 1.0, Rules 10–19.
235Michael N. Schmitt and Liis Vihul, eds., TallinnManual 2.0 on the International Law Appli­
cable to Cyber Operations: Prepared by the International Group of Experts at the Invitation of the NATO
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2017), Rules 34–38 (hereafter cited as Tallinn 2.0).
236Tallinn 2.0, Rules 14–31.
237Tallinn 2.0, Rules 39–44.
238Tallinn 2.0, Rules 45–54.
239Tallinn 2.0, Rules 55–60.
240Tallinn 2.0, Rules 61–64.
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Nuclear Weapons Treaty, 2017
• Jus in bello: prohibits threatened or actual use of “nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices”241
• Jus post bellum: provision of medical, psychological, and social assis­
tance to victims of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices;242
obligation to decontaminate and remediate “areas . . . contaminated
as a result of activities related to the testing or use of nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices”;243 declaration that states parties
with the resources and ability to assist other states parties in these areas
shall do so244
• Prohibitions on: development, production, accumulation, testing, pos­
session, and transfer of nuclear weapons or explosive devices;245 other
parties’ use of state party’s territory for “stationing, installation, or de­
ployment” of these weapons or devices246
• Obligation for states parties to remove and destroy nuclear weapons
and nuclear explosive devices247
• Entered into force in January 2021
241United Nations, Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, July 7, 2017, Art. 1(d),
accessed December 19, 2020, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N17/
209/73/PDF/N1720973.pdf (hereafter cited as Nuclear Weapons Treaty).
242Nuclear Weapons Treaty, Art. 6(1).
243Nuclear Weapons Treaty, Art. 6(2).
244Nuclear Weapons Treaty, Art. 7(1)–(4).
245Nuclear Weapons Treaty, Art. 1(a)–(c).
246Nuclear Weapons Treaty, Art. 1(g).




Howmany of you have had to replace a lost or stolen credit card? A driver’s
licence? A birth certificate? You have to spend a lot of time proving you are
who you claim to be—or if your identity has been stolen, proving who you
aren’t. Now imagine doing this when the official record of your birth has
been destroyed—erased by a cyberattack on your government’s vital statis­
tics database.
My project explores what international laws of war such as the Geneva
Conventions allow and disallow in cyberwarfare. These laws clearly state
that, with rare exception, it is not lawful for one state to destroy another
state’s civic buildings and objects of national and cultural significance. This
protects works of art, libraries, and archives like this one (Figure B.1). And
this matters because when the war ends, the non­combatants can not only
pick up the pieces of their lives, but also rebuild their society.
Digital archives have the same protection, even though they are not men­
tioned in these decades­old laws. But there is no practical way to distinguish
a data centre that serves only civilian purposes from one that could be used
by the military. Current military thinking says that makes them lawful tar­
gets in war. These data centres can be destroyed by a bomb strike, or by
a network­based attack on the computers and storage devices. A state can
destroy the vital and other historical records of another state’s citizens and
justify it as acceptable damage from a lawful cyberattack against a military
facility.
These records are vital for rebuilding a civil society. They tell us who has
the rights of citizenship, access to services, the ability to have paid work, the
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Figure B.1: Vedran Smailović, “The Cellist of Sarajevo.” Smailović is playing in the
ruins of theNational andUniversity Library of Bosnia andHerzegovina in Sarajevo.
The library had been destroyed by Serbian forces on August 25, 1992. (Photograph
by Mikhail Evstafiev, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vedran_Smail
ović#/media/File:Evstafiev-bosnia-cello.jpg under CC BY­SA 3.0, used here
by permission.)
freedom to travel. My research will show that international lawmust protect
these kinds of digital objects from cyberattacks. Why does this matter? For
two reasons: one for the person, and one for society. A civil society can­
not exist without people being able to live well together. And you cannot
live well without a home, an income, and a verifiable identity of your own.
Defending your well­being requires preserving and protecting your basic
personal data—the record of your identity. You are worth making sure in­
ternational law is strong enough to keep warring states from destroying it.
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